Reasons For Action
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| Author | : Ingmar Persson |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 180 |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0198845030 |
Ingmar Persson offers an original view of the processes of human action: deliberating on the basis of reasons for and against actions, making a decision about what to do, and from there implementing the decision in action in a way that makes the action intentional. Persson's analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, though how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts is also discussed. The interpretation of intentional action that is presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalyzed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficient for our acting for reasons is also sketched out.
| Author | : Maria Alvarez |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 220 |
| Release | : 2010-03-25 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191613932 |
Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the area; but she takes her main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G.E.M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. Alvarez's conclusions are therefore likely to be controversial; and her bold and painstaking arguments will be found provocative by participants on every side of the debates with which she engages. Clear and directly written, Kinds of Reasons aims to stake out a distinctive position within one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary philosophy.
| Author | : Piotr Makowski |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 240 |
| Release | : 2017-07-05 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1351497170 |
This volume explores two traditions in practical philosophy: action theory, which concerns the nature of motivation for human action, and praxiology, the study of human action. By bringing different perspectives together, the volume strives to contribute to the international debate on theories of reasons for action as a philosophy of action.The volume consists of three main parts. The first part, "Reasons for Action," bridges the gap between reasons for action theories and praxiology. The second part of the volume, titled "Theories of Action," explores philosophical approaches to action. Finally, in the third part, "Applications," the contributors show several ways of applying praxiological ways of thinking and acting to the problems of reflection assessment, solving action incompleteness, and knowledge management.The ultimate goal of this volume is to broaden the scientific view of action: to establish a perspective on action that is permeated by moral theories on the one hand, and accounts focused on efficiency and economy of action on the other hand. This work is the newest volume in Transaction's Praxiology series.
| Author | : David Sobel |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 312 |
| Release | : 2009-04-27 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : |
This volume contains eleven essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers.
| Author | : Robert Streiffer |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 171 |
| Release | : 2020-07-20 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1000080250 |
Originally published in 2003, this book examines moral relativism and the author discusses the main arguments for Appraiser Relativism and Agent Relativism. The final chapter of the book discusses the implication of some recent developments in metaethics and develops a theory of reasons for action based on the way in which an action can be good as an alternative to the desire-based, agent-centred account critiqued in the earlier chapters.
| Author | : David Sobel |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 533 |
| Release | : 2009-04-27 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1139474391 |
What are our reasons for acting? Morality purports to give us these reasons, and so do norms of prudence and the laws of society. The theory of practical reason assesses the authority of these potentially competing claims, and for this reason philosophers with a wide range of interests have converged on the topic of reasons for action. This volume contains eleven essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, practical conditionals and the wide-scope ought, the explanation of action, the sources of reasons, and the relationship between morality and reasons for action. The volume will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in ethics and practical reason.
| Author | : B.C. Postow |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 214 |
| Release | : 2013-03-09 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 940172850X |
2 first-person point of view, I acknowledge these possible handicaps and try to overcome them. Other people may coherently judge that I am incapable of figuring out correctly what I rationally ought to do, or they may inform me of reasons of which I had heretofore been ignorant, or they may try to help me overcome intellectual hindrances. Like me, these people would be assuming that the goal is to identify what I really rationally ought to do. Nevertheless, we are concerned with reasons for the agent to act in a certain way, rather than with reasons, say, for someone to want it to be the case that the agent act. Thus to be a reason in our sense is to be a consideration which has an appropriate guiding role to play in the. agents deliberation. (An agent is guided by reasons if she determines what to do in light of the reasons. ) Suppose then that a nor mative theory says that it is supremely desirable, or that it rationally ought to be the case, that agents act in a way that maximizes the general utility, but that (since the general utility is never in fact maximized by those who pay attention to it) considerations of the general utility should play no role in the agents' deliberation. Such a theory would not be said to ascribe to agents a reason to maximize the general utility on our usage.
| Author | : Sarah Paul |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 159 |
| Release | : 2020-12-29 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1317245032 |
This book offers an accessible and inclusive overview of the major debates in the philosophy of action. It covers the distinct approaches taken by Donald Davidson, G.E.M. Anscombe, and numerous others to answering questions like "what are intentional actions?" and "how do reasons explain actions?" Further topics include intention, practical knowledge, weakness and strength of will, self-governance, and collective agency. With introductions, conclusions, and annotated suggested reading lists for each of the ten chapters, it is an ideal introduction for advanced undergraduates as well as any philosopher seeking a primer on these issues.
| Author | : Ingmar Persson |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 180 |
| Release | : 2019-09-11 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0192583662 |
Ingmar Persson offers an original view of the processes of human action: deliberating on the basis of reasons for and against actions, making a decision about what to do, and from there implementing the decision in action in a way that makes the action intentional. Persson's analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, though how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts is also discussed. The interpretation of intentional action that is presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalyzed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficient for our acting for reasons is also sketched out.
| Author | : M.C. Redondo |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 198 |
| Release | : 2013-06-29 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 9401591415 |
A focus on reasons for action and practical reason is the perspective chosen by many contemporary legal philosophers for the analysis of some central questions of their discipline. This book offers a critical evaluation of that approach, by carefully examining the empirical, logical and normative problems hidden behind the concepts of `reason for action' and `practical reasoning'. Unlike most other works in this field, it is a meta-theoretical study which analyses and compares how different theories use the notion of reason in their reconstruction of problems concerning issues such as normativity, the acceptance of norms, or the justification of judicial decisions. This book is directed primarily to scholars specializing in legal theory and concerned with the contribution practical philosophy can make to it, but it also contains important arguments and insights for all those interested in the controversy between legal positivists and their critics, in the theory of human action or in reason-based practical theories in general.
