Rational Behavior And Bargaining Equilibrium In Games And Social Situations
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Author | : John C. Harsanyi |
Publisher | : CUP Archive |
Total Pages | : 340 |
Release | : 1986 |
Genre | : Decision-making |
ISBN | : 9780521311830 |
This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
Author | : John C. Harsanyi |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 352 |
Release | : 1977-10-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9780521208864 |
This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
Author | : Francesco Farina |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 370 |
Release | : 1996 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9780198289814 |
The connection between economics and ethics is as old as economics itself, and central to both disciplines. The essays included in the present volume provide an analysis of the connections between ethics and economics as viewed from several different - oft
Author | : W. Leinfellner |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 476 |
Release | : 2013-06-29 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9401716544 |
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
Author | : J.C. Harsanyi |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 292 |
Release | : 1976-12-31 |
Genre | : Social Science |
ISBN | : 9789027706775 |
When John Harsanyi came to Stanford University as a candidate for the Ph.D., I asked him why he was bothering, since it was most un likely that he had anything to learn from us. He was already a known scho lar; in addition to some papers in economics, the first two papers in this vol ume had already been published and had dazzled me by their originality and their combination of philosophical insight and technical competence. However, I am very glad I did not discourage him; whether he learned any thing worthwhile I don't know, but we all learned much from him on the foundations of the theory of games and specifically on the outcome of bar gaining. The central focus of Harsanyi's work has continued to be in the theory of games, but especially on the foundations and conceptual problems. The theory of games, properly understood, is a very broad approach to social interaction based on individually rational behavior, and it connects closely with fundamental methodological and substantive issues in social science and in ethics. An indication of the range of Harsanyi's interest in game the ory can be found in the first paper of Part B -though in fact his owncontri butions are much broader-and in the second paper the applications to the methodology of social science. The remaining papers in that section show more specifically the richness of game theory in specific applications.
Author | : Julian Nida-Rümelin |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 215 |
Release | : 2013-04-17 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9401596166 |
It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.
Author | : A. V. Fiacco |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 554 |
Release | : 2012-12-06 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 3642464149 |
The papers appearing in this Volume were selected from a collec tion of papers presented at the Internationa~ Symposium on Extrema~ Methods and Systems Ana~ysis on the Occasion of Professor A. Charnes' 60th Birthday, at the University of Texas in Austin, 13-15 September 1977. As coeditors, we have followed the normal editorial procedures of scholarly journals. We have obtained invaluable assistance from a number of colleagues who essentially performed the duties of associate editors, coordinating most of the reviews. All papers except those appearing in the Historica~ Perspectives section were refereed by at least two individuals with competency in the respective area. Because of the wide range and diversity of the topics, it would have been im possible for us to make a consistently rational selection of papers without the help of the associate editors and referees. We are indeed grateful to them. The breadth of extremal methods and systems analysis, suggested by the range of topics covered in these papers, is characteristic of the field and also of the scholarly work of Professor Charnes. Extre mal methods and systems analysis has been a pioneering and systematic approach to the development and application of new scientific theories and methods for problems of management and operations in both the pri vate and public sectors, spanning all major disciplines from economics to engineering.
Author | : Colin F. Camerer |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 569 |
Release | : 2011-09-05 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1400840880 |
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
Author | : Reinhard Selten |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 427 |
Release | : 2013-03-09 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : 3662096641 |
The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by Güth, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi.
Author | : Charalambos D. Aliprantis |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 733 |
Release | : 2013-11-11 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 3662058588 |
A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.