Properties And Propositions
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Author | : Robert Trueman |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 241 |
Release | : 2021-01-07 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1108890164 |
This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind.
Author | : Robert Trueman |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 241 |
Release | : 2021-01-07 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1108840477 |
Articulates and defends a novel theory of properties and propositions, based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects.
Author | : Colin McGinn |
Publisher | : Clarendon Press |
Total Pages | : 122 |
Release | : 2000-11-09 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191529230 |
The concepts of identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth are at the centre of philosophy and have rightly received sustained attention. Yet Colin McGinn believes that orthodox views of these topics are misguided in important ways. Philosophers and logicians have often distorted the nature of these concepts in an attempt to define them according to preconceived ideas. Logical Properties aims to respect the ordinary ways we talk and think when we employ these concepts, while at the same time showing that they are far more interesting and peculiar than some have supposed. There are real properties corresponding to these concepts - logical properties - that challenge naturalistic metaphysical views. These are not pseudo-properties or mere pieces of syntax. Logical Properties is written with the minimum of formal apparatus and deals with logico-linguistic issues as well as ontological ones. The focus is on trying to get to the essence of what the concept concerned stands for, and not merely finding some established notation for providing formal paraphrases.
Author | : Jeffrey C. King |
Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
Total Pages | : 274 |
Release | : 2014-01-10 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191502707 |
Philosophy (especially philosophy of language and philosophy of mind), science (especially linguistics and cognitive science), and common sense all sometimes make reference to propositions—understood as the things we believe and say, and the things which are (primarily) true or false. There is, however, no widespread agreement about what sorts of things these entities are. In New Thinking about Propositions, Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and that traditional accounts of propositions are inadequate. They each then defend their own views of the nature of propositions.
Author | : Chris Tillman |
Publisher | : Taylor & Francis |
Total Pages | : 569 |
Release | : 2022-09-30 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1351982273 |
Propositions are routinely invoked by philosophers, linguists, logicians, and other theorists engaged in the study of meaning, communication, and the mind. To investigate the nature of propositions is to investigate the very nature of our connection to each other, and to the world around us. As one of the only volumes of its kind, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of propositions, and our capacity to engage with them in thought and in communication. The chapters are clearly organized into the following three sections: I. Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions II. Historical Theories of Propositions III. Contemporary Theories of Propositions Essential reading for philosophers of language and mind, and for those working in neighboring areas, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions is suitable for upper-level undergraduate study, as well as graduate and professional research.
Author | : D. M. Armstrong |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 174 |
Release | : 2004-05-27 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9780521547239 |
This book, first published in 2004, makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy.
Author | : Jeffrey C. King |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 274 |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : Language Arts & Disciplines |
ISBN | : 0199693765 |
Philosophy, science, and common sense all refer to propositions—things we believe and say, and things which are true or false. But there is no consensus on what sorts of things these entities are. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and each defend their own views on the debate.
Author | : David Hunter |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 319 |
Release | : 2017-10-02 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1317510283 |
These are exciting times for philosophical theorizing about propositions, with the last 15 years seeing the development of new approaches and the emergence of new theorists. Propositions have been invoked to explain thought and cognition, the nature and attribution of mental states, language and communication, and in philosophical treatments of truth, necessity and possibility. According to Frege and Russell, and their followers, propositions are structured mind- and language-independent abstract objects which have essential and intrinsic truth-conditions. Some recent theorizing doubts whether propositions really exist and, if they do, asks how we can grasp, entertain and know them? But most of the doubt concerns whether the abstract approach to propositions can really explain them. Are propositions really structured, and if so where does their structure come from? How does this structure form a unity, and does it need to? Are the representational and structural properties of propositions really independent of those of thinking and language? What does it mean to say that an object occurs in or is a constituent of a proposition? The volume takes up these and other questions, both as they apply to the abstract object approach and also to the more recently developed approaches. While the volume as a whole does not definitively and unequivocally reject the abstract objection approach, for the most part, the papers explore new critical and constructive directions. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Author | : David Hunter |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 499 |
Release | : 2017-10-02 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1317510275 |
These are exciting times for philosophical theorizing about propositions, with the last 15 years seeing the development of new approaches and the emergence of new theorists. Propositions have been invoked to explain thought and cognition, the nature and attribution of mental states, language and communication, and in philosophical treatments of truth, necessity and possibility. According to Frege and Russell, and their followers, propositions are structured mind- and language-independent abstract objects which have essential and intrinsic truth-conditions. Some recent theorizing doubts whether propositions really exist and, if they do, asks how we can grasp, entertain and know them? But most of the doubt concerns whether the abstract approach to propositions can really explain them. Are propositions really structured, and if so where does their structure come from? How does this structure form a unity, and does it need to? Are the representational and structural properties of propositions really independent of those of thinking and language? What does it mean to say that an object occurs in or is a constituent of a proposition? The volume takes up these and other questions, both as they apply to the abstract object approach and also to the more recently developed approaches. While the volume as a whole does not definitively and unequivocally reject the abstract objection approach, for the most part, the papers explore new critical and constructive directions. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Author | : Trenton Merricks |
Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
Total Pages | : 248 |
Release | : 2015-03-26 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0191046515 |
Propositions has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, Trenton Merricks draws a variety of controversial conclusions about related issues, including, among others, supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts. An argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. Propositions begins with the assumption that some arguments are modally valid. Merricks then argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments are not sentences. Instead, he argues, they are propositions. So, because there are modally valid arguments, there are propositions. Merricks defends the claim that propositions are not structured and are not sets of possible worlds. He thereby presents arguments against the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. Those arguments are intended not only to oppose those accounts, but also to deliver conclusions about what a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should say. Of particular importance in this regard are arguments concerning the alleged explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to represent thing as being a certain way. Merricks then defends his own account of the nature of propositions, which says only that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way.