Product Market Competition and Agency Costs

Product Market Competition and Agency Costs
Author: Jen Baggs
Publisher:
Total Pages: 36
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

We model the effects of product market competition on managerial efficiency, and isolate the agency effect of competition, which is present only in firms subject to agency costs, from the direct pressure effect, which is present in all firms. Using a unique set of Canadian data which allows us to simultaneously observe the characteristics of firms as well as their employees, we then evaluate the empirical significance for these two effects. We find that competition has both a significant direct pressure effect, as well as a significant agency effect. Both effects increase the importance firms place on quality improvements and on cost reductions, as well as contractual incentives and employee effort.

Corporate Payout Policy

Corporate Payout Policy
Author: Harry DeAngelo
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 215
Release: 2009
Genre: Corporations
ISBN: 1601982046

Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.

Does Product Market Competition Discipline Managers? Evidence from Exogenous Trade Shock and Corporate Acquisitions

Does Product Market Competition Discipline Managers? Evidence from Exogenous Trade Shock and Corporate Acquisitions
Author: Azizjon Alimov
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2017
Genre:
ISBN:

This study uses the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement as a source of exogenous shock to product markets to establish a causal effect of competition on acquisition returns to shareholders. Following the agreement, acquirers exposed to greater increases in competitive pressure experience higher announcement returns. The positive impact of increased competition is stronger in acquirers with relatively higher agency costs. Managers of acquirers facing more competition are more likely to be terminated following value-destroying acquisitions. These results suggest that intensifying competition positively influences the efficiency of managerial decisions.

Product Market Competition and Agency Conflicts

Product Market Competition and Agency Conflicts
Author: Vidhi Chhaochharia
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2015
Genre:
ISBN:

We use the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a natural experiment of a shock to internal governance to examine the link between product market competition and internal governance mechanisms. Consistent with the notion that product market competition is a close substitute for internal governance, we find that firms in concentrated industries experienced a larger improvement in operational efficiency after the approval of SOX than did firms in non-concentrated industries. These gains in efficiency appear to come from a significant reduction in production and administrative costs. Several robustness tests confirm that our main results are not driven by unobservable factors unrelated to changes in corporate governance.

The Effects of Competition

The Effects of Competition
Author: George Symeonidis
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 558
Release: 2002-01-18
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262264655

A theoretical and empirical study of the effects of competition across a broad range of industries. Policies to promote competition are high on the political agenda worldwide. But in a constantly changing marketplace, the effects of more intense competition on firm conduct, market structure, and industry performance are often hard to distinguish. This study combines game-theoretic models with empirical evidence from a "natural experiment" of policy reform. The introduction in the United Kingdom of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act led to the registration and subsequent abolition of explicit restrictive agreements between firms and the intensification of price competition across a range of manufacturing industries. An equally large number of industries were not affected by the legislation. Using data from before and after the 1956 act, this book compares the two groups of industries to determine the effect of price competition on concentration, firm and plant numbers, profitability, advertising intensity, and innovation. The book avoids two problems common to empirical studies of competition: how to measure the intensity of competition and how to unravel the links between competition and other variables. Because the change in the intensity of competition had an external cause, there is no need to measure the intensity of competition directly, and it is possible to identify one-way causal effects when estimating the impact of competition. The book also examines issues such as the industries in which collusion is more likely to occur; the effect of cartels and cartel laws on market structure and profitability; the links between competition, advertising, and innovation; and the constraints on the exercise of merger and antitrust policies.

Competition, Contracts, and Innovation

Competition, Contracts, and Innovation
Author: John Simpson
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

Our paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between innovation and market power by considering how changes in the intensity of product market competition affect innovation when managerial compensation is a linear function of firm profits. Changes in the intensity of product market competition affect both the return from innovation and the cost of inducing managers to innovate. Several recent papers account for both the returns-to-investment effect and the agency-cost effect in analyzing the effect of additional product market competition on incentives to innovate (see e.g., Schmidt (1997), Raith (2003), and Piccolo, D'Amato, and Martina (2008)). Our model differs from these papers in the type of contract that we assume firms can use to induce innovation. With linear profit-sharing contracts, the cost of a non-drastic innovation declines as product market competition increases because the increment gained from innovation becomes a larger fraction of the total profit. We argue that this decline in the cost of attaining innovation as competition increases means that competition will often lead to more innovation even in models where the returns to innovation otherwise would fall as competition increases.

Product Market Competition and Cost Stickiness

Product Market Competition and Cost Stickiness
Author: Wulung Li
Publisher:
Total Pages: 44
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

Extant literature on cost stickiness has focused on how firm-specific characteristics affect the asymmetric cost behavior. In this paper, we explore how a firm's operating environment affects the firm's cost stickiness. Specifically, we examine the effect of product market competition on cost stickiness since a firm's investment and cost retention decisions partly depend on how the firm interacts with its rival firms in the product markets. Using two firm-level text-based product market competition measures extracted from management disclosures in firms' 10-K filings (Li, Lundholm, & Minnis 2013; Hoberg and Phillips 2010, 2015), we find strong evidence consistent with cost asymmetry increasing in competition after controlling for known economic determinants of cost stickiness. In additional analyses, we also find that the effect of product market competition on the degree of cost stickiness increases in firms' financial strength, likely because management in financially stronger firms has more resources for investment expenditures in spite of a sales fall. We also find that cost stickiness is increasing in competition if management is optimistic about future demand, whereas competition is not associated with cost asymmetry if management is pessimistic about future demand. Finally, we find that the relationship between competition and cost stickiness, although statistically insignificant at conventional levels, is more pronounced for single-segment firms relative to multi-segment firms.

Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets

Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets
Author: Sabri Boubaker
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 625
Release: 2014-04-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3642449557

This book fills the gap between theories and practices of corporate governance in emerging markets by providing the reader with an in-depth understanding of governance mechanisms, practices and cases in these markets. It is an invaluable resource not only for academic researchers and graduate students in law, economics, management and finance but also for people practicing governance such as lawmakers, policymakers and international organizations promoting best governance practices in emerging countries. Investors can benefit from this book to better understand of these markets and to make judicious investment decisions.