The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation

The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation
Author: Todd J. Zywicki
Publisher:
Total Pages: 64
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

Fresh off of the most substantial national liquidity crisis of the last generation and the enactment of sweeping credit card regulation in the form of the Credit CARD Act, Congress continues to deliberate, with a continuing drumbeat of support from lobbyists, a set of new regulations for credit card companies. These proposals, offered in the name of consumer protection, seek to constrain the setting of “interchange fees” - transaction charges integral to payment card systems - through a range of proposed political interventions. This article identifies both the theoretical and actual failings of such regulation. Payment cards are a secure, inexpensive, welfare-increasing payment mechanism largely unlike any other in history. Rather than increasing consumer welfare in any meaningful sense, interchange fee legislation represents an attempt by some merchants to shift costs away from their businesses and onto card issuing banks and cardholders. In particular, bank-issued credit cards offer a dramatic improvement in the efficiency and availability of consumer credit by shifting credit risk from merchants onto banks in exchange for the cost of the interchange fee - currently averaging less than 2% of purchase value. Merchants' efforts to cabin these fees would harm not only consumers but also the merchants themselves as commerce would depend more heavily on less-efficient paper-based payment systems. The consequence of interchange fee legislation, as Australia's experiment with such regulation demonstrates, would be reduced access to credit, higher interest rates for consumers, and the return of the much-loathed annual fee for credit cards. Interchange fee regulation threatens to constrain credit for consumers and small businesses as the American economy begins to convalesce from a serious “credit crunch,” and should be accordingly rejected.

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees

The Law and Economics of Interchange Fees
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
Publisher:
Total Pages: 120
Release: 2006
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN:

Interchange Fee Economics

Interchange Fee Economics
Author: Jakub Górka
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 196
Release: 2018-11-29
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3030030415

Interchange fees have been the focal point for debate in the card industry, among competition authorities and policy makers, as well as in the economic literature on two-sided markets and on the regulation of market failures. This book offers insight into the economics of interchange fees. First, it explains the nature of two-sided markets/platforms/networks and elaborates on four-party schemes and on the rationale behind interchange fees according to Baxter’s model and its later refinements. It also includes the debate about the optimum level of interchange fees and its determination (“tourist test”), and presents the original framework for assessing the impact of interchange fee regulatory reductions for the market participants: consumers, merchants, acquirers, issuers, and card organisations. The framework addresses three areas of concern in reference to the transmission channels of interchange fee reductions (pass-through) and the card scheme domain (triangle: payment organisation, issuer, acquirer). The book discusses the effects of regulatory interchange fee reductions in Australia, USA, Spain, and, most specifically, Poland. It will be of interest to policy makers, card and payments industry practitioners, academics, and students.

Interchange Fees

Interchange Fees
Author: David S. Evans
Publisher: CreateSpace
Total Pages: 226
Release: 2011-09-22
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9781466368576

Interchange fees have become increasingly controversial. These fees constitute the bulk of the cost that merchants incur for taking cards because most consumers pay with a card from a four-party system that assesses these fees. The total interchange fees paid by merchants have increased dramatically as consumers have switched to electronic payments. Merchants have complained, have filed lawsuits, and have lobbied governments to do something about this. Meanwhile governments around the world have intensified their examination of these fees. For example, the US Congress passed legislation in 2010 that required the Federal Reserve Board to regulate debit card interchange fees; the Reserve Bank of Australia decided to regulate credit card interchange fees in 2002 after concluding that a market failure had resulted in merchants paying fees that were too high; and in 2007 the European Commission ruled that MasterCard's interchange fees violated the EU's antitrust laws. The controversy raises two broad issues. The first relates to how payment card systems decide how much merchants should pay for taking cards either through the interchange fee for four-party systems or the merchant discount for three party systems. The second concerns whether the setting of interchange fees by private businesses results in a market failure and if so what if any regulation should be adopted to correct this market failure. This interchange fee debate helped stimulate a new literature on multi-sided platforms or what are sometimes called two-sided markets. Payment card systems serve as intermediaries between merchants and consumers and operate a platform that enables these two different kinds of customers to interact. It turns out that there are many other businesses that have similar features including software platforms like the iPhone OS, shopping malls, search engines, and exchanges. Economists have developed general models of multi-sided businesses and applied them to payment cards.

Credit and Debit Cards

Credit and Debit Cards
Author: Richard J. Hillman
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Total Pages: 63
Release: 2008-10
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1437905307

Fed. agencies, corp., and others are users of credit and debit cards, as both ¿merchants¿ and purchasers. Merchants accepting cards incur fees paid to banks to process the transactions. For Visa and MasterCard transactions, a large portion of these fees -- referred to as interchange -- goes to the card-issuing banks. Some countries limit these fees. This report examines: (1) the benefits and costs assoc. with fed. entities¿ acceptance of cards; (2) the effects of other countries¿ actions to limit interchange fees; and (3) the impact on fed. entities of using cards to make purchases. The author analyzed fee data and info. on the impact of accepting and using cards, interviewed officials of major card co., and 3 foreign gov¿ts. Includes recommendations. Charts.

Pricing Debit Card Payment Services

Pricing Debit Card Payment Services
Author: Wilko Bolt
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 35
Release: 2003-10-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1451874421

This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing pricing structures in debit card schemes featuring cardholders, retailers, their respective banks, and a network routing switch. The network routing switch controls the electronic debit card network and is jointly owned by the banks. In setting its prices, it needs to consider getting both consumers and retailers to participate in the market. In this two-sided market for debit cards, we show that the "double-monopolistic" network routing switch may want to supply consumers with cheap debit cards, deriving profits from charging a high retailer fee per transaction. This theoretic result resembles the current practice in the Netherlands where consumers pay no transaction fee, but retailers do. This corner solution carries over when we analyze socially optimal pricing.