Improving the Social Security Representative Payee Program

Improving the Social Security Representative Payee Program
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
Total Pages: 182
Release: 2007-10-17
Genre: Social Science
ISBN: 0309111005

More than 7 million recipients of Social Security benefits have a representative payee-a person or an organization-to receive or manage their benefits. These payees manage Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance funds for retirees, surviving spouses, children, and the disabled, and they manage Supplemental Security Income payments to disabled, blind, or elderly people with limited income and resources. More than half of the beneficiaries with a representative payee are minor children; the rest are adults, often elderly, whose mental or physical incapacity prevents them from acting on their own behalf, and people who have been deemed incapable under state guardianship laws. The funds are managed through the Representative Payee Program of the Social Security Administration (SSA). The funds total almost $4 billion a month, and there are more than 5.3 million representative payees. In 2004 Congress required the commissioner of the SSA to conduct a one-time survey to determine how payments to individual and organizational representative payees are being managed and used on behalf of the beneficiaries.1 To carry out this work, the SSA requested a study by the National Academies, which appointed the Committee on Social Security Representative Payees. This report is the result of that study. Improving the Social Security Representative Payee Program: Serving Beneficiaries and Minimizing Misuse (1) assesses the extent to which representative payees are not performing their duties in accordance with SSA standards for representative payee conduct, (2) explains whether the representative payment policies are practical and appropriate, (3) identifies the types of representative payees that have the highest risk of misuse of benefits, and (4) finds ways to reduce the risk of misuse of benefits and ways to better protect beneficiaries.

Payment modality preferences: Evidence from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme

Payment modality preferences: Evidence from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme
Author: Hirvonen, Kalle
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
Total Pages: 25
Release: 2018-10-23
Genre: Political Science
ISBN:

Economists typically default to the assumption that cash is always preferable to an in-kind transfer. We extend the classic Southworth (1945) framework to predict under what conditions this assumption holds. We take the model to longitudinal household data from Ethiopia where a large-scale social safety net intervention – the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) – operates. Even though most PSNP payments are paid in cash, and even though the (temporal) transaction costs associated with food payments are higher than payments received as cash, the overwhelming majority of the beneficiary households prefer their payments only or partly in food. However, these preferences are neither homogeneous nor stable. Higher food prices induce shifts in preferences towards in-kind transfers, but more food secure households and those closer to food markets and to financial services prefer cash. There is suggestive evidence that preferences for food are also driven by self-control concerns.