Participation In Contests With Asymmetric Information
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| Author | : Karl Warneryd |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2006 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) where some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive probability, then there is some threshold number of informed players such that if there are less, all uninformed players are active, and otherwise all uninformed players are inactive.
| Author | : Carmen Beviá |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 239 |
| Release | : 2024-05-31 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1009504428 |
A new way to understand economic problems that complement the traditional views and expand subjects that social scientists should consider.
| Author | : Massimo Marrelli |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 212 |
| Release | : 2012-12-06 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1461515831 |
The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.
| Author | : Markus K. Brunnermeier |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 262 |
| Release | : 2001-01-25 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0191606928 |
Asset prices are driven by public news and information that is often dispersed among many market participants. These agents try to infer each other's information by analyzing price processes. In the past two decades, theoretical research in financial economics has significantly advanced our understanding of the informational aspects of price processes. This book provides a detailed and up-to-date survey of this important body of literature. The book begins by demonstrating how to model asymmetric information and higher-order knowledge. It then contrasts competitive and strategic equilibrium concepts under asymmetric information. It also illustrates the dependence of information efficiency and allocative efficiency on the security structure and the linkage between both efficiency concepts. No-Trade theorems and market breakdowns due to asymmetric information are then explained, and the existence of bubbles under symmetric and asymmetric information is investigated. The remainder of the survey is devoted to contrasting different market microstructure models that demonstrate how asymmetric information affects asset prices and traders' information , which provide a theoretical explanation for technical analysis and illustrate why some investors "chase the trend." The reader is then introduced to herding models and informational cascades, which can arise in a setting where agents' decision-making is sequential. The insights derived from herding models are used to provide rational explanations for stock market crashes. Models in which all traders are induced to search for the same piece of information are then presented to provide a deeper insight into Keynes' comparison of the stock market with a beauty contest. The book concludes with a brief summary of bank runs and their connection to financial crises.
| Author | : Jun Xiao |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 45 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper studies complete-information, all-pay contests with asymmetric players competing for heterogeneous prizes. In these contests, each player chooses a performance level or "score". The first prize is awarded to the player with the highest score, the second -- less valuable -- prize to the player with the second highest score, etc. The players are asymmetric as they incur different scoring costs, and they are assumed to have ordered marginal costs. The prize sequence is assumed to be either geometric or quadratic. We show that each such contest has a unique Nash equilibrium, and we exhibit an algorithm that constructs the equilibrium. Then, we apply the results to study the issue of tracking in schools and the optimality of winner-take-all contests.
| Author | : Milan Vojnović |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 737 |
| Release | : 2016-02-04 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 1316472906 |
Contests are prevalent in many areas, including sports, rent seeking, patent races, innovation inducement, labor markets, scientific projects, crowdsourcing and other online services, and allocation of computer system resources. This book provides unified, comprehensive coverage of contest theory as developed in economics, computer science, and statistics, with a focus on online services applications, allowing professionals, researchers and students to learn about the underlying theoretical principles and to test them in practice. The book sets contest design in a game-theoretic framework that can be used to model a wide-range of problems and efficiency measures such as total and individual output and social welfare, and offers insight into how the structure of prizes relates to desired contest design objectives. Methods for rating the skills and ranking of players are presented, as are proportional allocation and similar allocation mechanisms, simultaneous contests, sharing utility of productive activities, sequential contests, and tournaments.
| Author | : Roger D. Congleton |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 720 |
| Release | : 2008-08-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9783540791812 |
The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.
| Author | : Antonio Estache |
| Publisher | : CEPR |
| Total Pages | : 157 |
| Release | : 2011 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1907142355 |
This book presents a comprehensive review of the vast economic literature covering the governance issues of network industries and suggests paths to improve their efficiences.
| Author | : Ian C. W. Hardy |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 385 |
| Release | : 2013-05-30 |
| Genre | : Science |
| ISBN | : 1107244390 |
Contests are an important aspect of the lives of diverse animals, from sea anemones competing for space on a rocky shore to fallow deer stags contending for access to females. Why do animals fight? What determines when fights stop and which contestant wins? Addressing fundamental questions on contest behaviour, this volume presents theoretical and empirical perspectives across a range of species. The historical development of contest research, the evolutionary theory of both dyadic and multiparty contests, and approaches to experimental design and data analysis are discussed in the first chapters. This is followed by reviews of research in key animal taxa, from the use of aerial displays and assessment rules in butterflies and the developmental biology of weapons in beetles, through to interstate warfare in humans. The final chapter considers future directions and applications of contest research, making this a comprehensive resource for both graduate students and researchers in the field.
| Author | : Ganna Pogrebna |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In a competitive environment players often face uncertainty about the relative strength of their opponents. This paper considers a winner-take-all rent-seeking contest between two players with different costs of effort. Costs of effort are private knowledge, however, players have an opportunity to learn the opponent's type by engaging in either private (the opponent does not know about the information acquisition) or public (the opponent knows about the information acquisition) learning. We show that a situation, when one player learns the type of the opponent privately while the opponent abstains from learning cannot be an equilibrium. Yet, there exists an equilibrium, when one player engages in public learning and the other refrains from learning.
