Optimal Time Consistent Government Debt Maturity
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| Author | : Davide Debortoli |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2014 |
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| ISBN | : |
This paper develops a model of optimal government debt maturity in which the government cannot issue state-contingent bonds and cannot commit to fiscal policy. If the government can perfectly commit, it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short-term assets and issuing long-term debt. These positions are quantitatively very large relative to GDP and do not need to be actively managed by the government. Our main result is that these conclusions are not robust to the introduction of lack of commitment. Under lack of commitment, large and tilted positions are very expensive to finance ex-ante since they exacerbate the problem of lack of commitment ex-post. In contrast, a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost of lack of commitment, though it also limits insurance and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions. We show that the optimal time-consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols.
| Author | : |
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| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2016 |
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| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Eric Michael Leeper |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2019 |
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| ISBN | : |
The textbook optimal policy response to an increase in government debt is simple--monetary policy should actively target inflation, and fiscal policy should smooth taxes while ensuring debt sustainability. Such policy prescriptions presuppose an ability to commit. Without that ability, the temptation to use inflation surprises to offset monopoly and tax distortions, as well as to reduce the real value of government debt, creates a state-dependent inflationary bias problem. High debt levels and short-term debt exacerbate the inflation bias. But this produces a debt stabilization bias because the policy maker wishes to deviate from the tax smoothing policies typically pursued under commitment, by returning government debt to steady-state. As a result, the response to shocks in New Keynesian models can be radically different, particularly when government debt levels are high.
| Author | : Mr.Guillermo Calvo |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 42 |
| Release | : 1990-12-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1451942796 |
Optimal management of the public debt is explored in a context where economic policy is continuously revised because, when the public debt is non—indexed, policy—makers are tempted to use inflation in order to reduce the real value of the public debt. The model’s implications are explored following two approaches. First, the effects of various exogenous disturbances are examined by means of numerical simulations. Secondly, the analysis explores—for Italy, Ireland, and the United States—if the model’s implications concerning the maturity structure of government debt are consistent with actual experience.
| Author | : Mr. Philip Barrett |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 74 |
| Release | : 2021-04-23 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1513582518 |
This paper examines ways to summarize the maturity structure of public debts using a small number of parameters. We compile a novel dataset of all promised future payments for US and UK government debt from every month since 1869, and more recently for Peru, Poland, Egypt, and Nigeria. We show that there is a unique parametric form which does not arbitrarily restrict debt issuance – portfolios of bonds with exponential coupons. Compared to the most popular alternative, this form 1) more accurately describes changes in debt maturity for these six countries and 2) gives a quite different interpretation of historical debt maturity. Our work can be applied not just to analyze past debt movements, but – because parameter estimates are relatively similar across countries – also for monitoring changes in debt maturity, including in countries where data are partial or incomplete.
| Author | : International Monetary Fund |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 36 |
| Release | : 1989-09-14 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
This paper focuses on the role of debt maturity in managing the government’s incentives to use opportunistic inflation to reduce the ex post real value of its nominal liabilities. The maturity structure of government debt is shown to be a powerful instrument to affect the time profile of the inflation tax base and, hence, to mitigate the distortions introduced by time inconsistency on taxation policies. The nature of the optimal policy is shown to be heavily dependent on the type of precommitment enjoyed by policymakers.
| Author | : Mr.Cristiano Cantore |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 44 |
| Release | : 2017-03-30 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1475590180 |
The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government’s commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with “normal shocks”, perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds–under commitment–the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.
| Author | : Gabriel Desgranges |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 43 |
| Release | : 2014-09-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1498330436 |
We study the relationship between default and the maturity structure of the debt portfolio of a Sovereign, under uncertainty. The Sovereign faces a trade-off between a future costly default and a high current fiscal effort. This results into a debt crisis in case a large initial issuance of long term debt is followed by a sequence of negative macro shocks. Prior uncertainty about future fundamentals is then a source of default through its effect on long term interest rates and the optimal debt issuance. Intuitively, the Sovereign chooses a portfolio implying a risk of default because this risk generates a correlation between the future value of long term debt and future fundamentals. Long term debt serves as a hedging instrument against the risk on fundamentals. When expected fundamentals are high, the Sovereign issues a large amount of long term debt, the expected default probability increases, and so does the long term interest rate.
| Author | : Davide Debortoli |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 41 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : Debts, Public |
| ISBN | : |
This paper develops a model of optimal government debt maturity in which the government cannot issue state-contingent bonds and cannot commit to fiscal policy. If the government can perfectly commit, it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short-term assets and issuing long-term debt. These positions are quantitatively very large relative to GDP and do not need to be actively managed by the government. Our main result is that these conclusions are not robust to the introduction of lack of commitment. Under lack of commitment, large and tilted positions are very expensive to finance ex-ante since they exacerbate the problem of lack of commitment ex-post. In contrast, a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost of lack of commitment, though it also limits insurance and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions. We show that the optimal maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols.
| Author | : Davide Debortoli |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
According to the Lucas-Stokey result, a government can structure its debt maturity to guarantee commitment to optimal fiscal policy by future governments. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not generally hold in the same model and under the same definition of time-consistency as in Lucas-Stokey. Our argument rests on the existence of an overlooked commitment problem that cannot be remedied with debt maturity: a government in the future will not tax on the downward slopping side of the Laffer curve, even if it is ex-ante optimal to do so. In light of this finding, we propose a new framework to characterize time-consistent policy. We consider a Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium, where a government reoptimizes sequentially and may deviate from the optimal commitment policy. We find that, in a deterministic economy, any stationary distribution of debt maturity must be flat, with the government owing the same amount at all future dates.
