Optimal Performance and Incentive Contracts in a Multidivisional Firm
Author | : Zenat Mohamed Moharam |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 222 |
Release | : 1983 |
Genre | : Incentives in industry |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Zenat Mohamed Moharam |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 222 |
Release | : 1983 |
Genre | : Incentives in industry |
ISBN | : |
Author | : George P. Baker |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 39 |
Release | : 2010 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. Naturally, objective and subjective measures often are substitutes, sometimes strikingly so: we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible (because the firm's fallback position after reneging on an implicit contact is too attractive). We also show, however, that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other: if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship, and so reduce the firm's incentive to renege). We also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures, and provide case-study evidence consistent with our analyses.
Author | : Robert F. Göx |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 49 |
Release | : 2019 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
We study how a firm owner motivates a manager to create value by optimally designing an information system and a compensation contract based on a manipulable performance measure. In equilibrium, the firm either implements a perfect or an uninformative system. The information system and the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of the compensation contract can be substitutes in a sense that the firm optimally combines a perfect information system with a low PPS or an uninformative system with a high PPS. Because the information design is endogenous, firms facing relatively high manipulation threat may offer financial incentives that are higher-powered than the ones offered by their peers facing lower manipulation threat. If the manager is in charge of implementing the information system, he chooses a perfect one unless the firm uses the information for internal control. The firm may prefer to commit to an internal control level before observing any information.
Author | : Robert Gibbons |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 70 |
Release | : 1991 |
Genre | : Compensation management |
ISBN | : |
This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a worker's current output to update its belief about the worker's ability and competition then forces future wages (or wage contracts) to reflect these updated beliefs. Career concerns are stronger when a worker is further from retirement, because a longer prospective career increases the return to changing the market's belief. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.
Author | : Veikko Thiele |
Publisher | : VDM Publishing |
Total Pages | : 132 |
Release | : 2007 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9783836422253 |
Employees are generally charged with performing a collection of various tasks that contribute to firm value differently. The accountability for multiple tasks implies that employees can not only decide on their effort intensity, but also on how to allocate their effort across these tasks. To motivate employees, firms often utilize incentive contracts on the basis of objective performance measures. However, if individual performance evaluations do not accurately reflect employees' contributions to firm value, the application of such incongruent performance measures induces employees to place more emphasis on less valuable tasks relative to those with greater contributions to firm value. The author, Veikko Thiele, investigates and explicates the optimal design of incentive contracts in situations where employees are charged with multiple tasks (multitasking). He identifies and explores potential mechanisms aimed at motivating employees to implement more efficient effort allocations from a firm's perspective. This book specifically targets economists, executives, consultants, and companies.
Author | : Joseph L. Midler |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 356 |
Release | : 1970 |
Genre | : Contracting out |
ISBN | : |
Several versions of the negotiation of the parameters of incentive contracts between a government and private contractors are formulated as game theoretical models. This framework permits one focus upon a number of aspects that have previously been overlooked such as the interaction of the participants, the lack of domination by one side or the other, constraints upon the player's strategies, and the possible joint interests of the one party in the other player's outcome. Computational methods of solution are suggested. (Author).
Author | : Gregory Sanders |
Publisher | : Rowman & Littlefield |
Total Pages | : 74 |
Release | : 2018-04-19 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1442280662 |
Traditional contracting is primarily transactional, rewarding contractors when deliveries are made or certain process milestones are met. Performance-Based Logistic (PBL) contracting seeks to base contractor incentives on ongoing performance measures to achieve reliability and cost savings. Key to the success of these arrangements are the incentives that align the interests of the customer and the vendor. This report describes the incentives used in PBL contracts, identifies best practices, and provides recommendations for effective incentives going forward. The study team interviewed PBL practitioners including defense-unique contractors, defense-commercial contractors, and experts who are knowledgeable in the government perspective in the United States and abroad. The team supplemented these interviews by analyzing a PBL dataset of U.S. Department of Defense contracts. Of the four identified categories of incentives—time-based, financial, scope, and other—interviews found that time-based incentives stood out for their reliable appeal and relative underuse in the United States.