Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility

Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility
Author: Hakan Kara
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2003
Genre:
ISBN:

In the conventional optimal monetary policy framework, two key assumptions underline the full commitment solution: Monetary authority is perfectly credible, and can commit for an infinite number of periods. Using a baseline forward looking model, this study explores the implications of relaxing these assumptions in turn. First, finite lasting commitments are introduced using a stochastic exogenous process that generates policy reoptimizations. As a consequence, monetary policy is characterized with a continuum from pure discretion to full commitment. Second, we solve the optimal and robust targeting rules when the central bank confronts imperfect and/or uncertain credibility. Imperfect credibility is defined as a situation in which the private sector expects the commitment regime to end sooner than that is intended by the policy maker. The results indicate that, under imperfect credibility, optimal policy becomes observationally closer to the discretionary solution, the more being so as the degree of uncertainty rises. These findings may be insightful for explaining the observed near-discretionary behavior of the central banks, which indeed operate under imperfect credibility.

Imperfect Credibility Versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy

Imperfect Credibility Versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy
Author: Jean-Bernard Chatelain
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2020
Genre:
ISBN:

A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegning his commitment ("quasi-commitment"), is a necessary condition for anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his commitment ("optimal discretion"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics. In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.

Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers

Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers
Author: Maral Shamloo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 37
Release: 2010-02-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1451962649

In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process. I show that this setup gives rise to a continuous measure of the degree of monetary authority's commitment. The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy.

Optimal Monetary Policy under Uncertainty, Second Edition

Optimal Monetary Policy under Uncertainty, Second Edition
Author: Richard T. Froyen
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Total Pages: 466
Release: 2019
Genre: Mathematical optimization
ISBN: 1784717193

This book provides a thorough survey of the model-based literature on optimal monetary in a stochastic setting. The survey begins with the literature of the 1970s which focused on the information problem in policy design and extends to the New Keynesian approach of the 1990s which centered on evaluating alternative targeting strategies. New to the second edition is consideration of research since the world financial crisis on the role of financial markets and institutions in the conduct of monetary policy.

A Note on Imperfect Credibility

A Note on Imperfect Credibility
Author: Ippei Fujiwara
Publisher:
Total Pages: 16
Release: 2016
Genre:
ISBN:

We explore how outcomes of optimal monetary policy with loose commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) can be observationally equivalent, or interpretable as outcomes of deeper optimal policy under sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990). Both interpretations of “imperfect credibility” in optimal monetary policy design are attempts to rationalize outcomes that lie in between the conventional extremes of optimal policy under commitment and under discretion. In a standard monetary-policy framework, when we match impulse responses of inflation and the output gap to large enough markup shocks, we find that a small probability (1 - a = 0.05) of replanning in the quasi/loose commitment world corresponds to N = 18 in the N-period punishment optimal sustainable monetary policy, in terms of observable outcomes. For plausible cases of loose-commitment model economies (with a between 0.77 and 1) we can find an observationally equivalent sustainable-plan economy indexed by some N.

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty
Author: Richard T. Froyen
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Total Pages: 341
Release: 2008-01-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1847208649

Froyen and Guender have provided a thorough and careful analysis of optimal monetary policy over most of the range of theoretical models that have been used in modern macroeconomics. By providing a comprehensive and clear comparative framework they will help the student of monetary policy understand why there have been conflicting views of what policy makers should do. Central Banking In Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty, academicians and economists Richard T. Froyen and Alfred V. Guender have collaborated on presenting an informed and informative survey of optimal monetary policy literature arising during the 1970s and 1980s as a ground work for understanding current market and other economic influences on such germane issues as discretion versus commitment, target versus instrument rules, and the delegation of policy making authority within the private and public sectors. With meticulous attention to scholarship and objectivity. . . Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty is a thoughtful and thought-provoking body of work that is very strongly recommended for professional, academic, corporate and governmental economic reference collections and supplemental reading lists. Midwest Book Review Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty. This book provides a thorough survey of the literature that has resulted from this renewed interest. The authors ground recent contributions on the science of monetary policy in the literature of the 1970s, which viewed optimal monetary policy as primarily a question of the best use of information, and studies in the 1980s that gave primacy to time inconsistency problems. This broad focus leads to a better understanding of current issues such as discretion versus commitment, target versus instrument rules, and the merits of delegation of policy authority. Casting a wide net, the authors survey the recent literature on the New Keynesian approach to optimal monetary policy in the context of the earlier literature. They emphasize the relationship between policy decisions and the information set available to the policymaker, a central focus of the earlier literature, obscured in much recent work. Optimal policy questions are considered in open as well as closed economy models and the often confusing terminology in the literature is sorted and clarified. Questions are considered within easily analysed models and the authors clearly show why these models lead to different (or equivalent) policy conclusions. Recent policy issues such as desirability of inflation targeting and the relative merits of target versus instrument rules are covered in detail. Economists in academia and in policymaking organizations who want to learn about recent developments in the area of optimal monetary policy, as well as graduate and advanced undergraduate students in macroeconomic and monetary economics, will find this volume a clear and thorough examination of the topic.

The Science of Monetary Policy

The Science of Monetary Policy
Author: Richard H. Clarida
Publisher:
Total Pages: 118
Release: 1999
Genre: Keynesian economics
ISBN:

This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exploit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy implicitly incorporates inflation targeting. We also characterize the gains from making a credible commitment to fight inflation. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that gains from commitment may emerge even if the central bank is not trying to inadvisedly push output above its natural level. We also consider the implications of frictions such as imperfect information.

Monetary Policy Under Imperfect Commitment

Monetary Policy Under Imperfect Commitment
Author: Hakan Kara
Publisher:
Total Pages: 30
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

In the standard forward-looking models of the recent literature, theoretical optimal monetary policy rules imply much higher inertia of interest rates than estimated historical policy rules. Motivated by the observation that theoretical policy rules often assume perfect commitment on the part of the monetary authority, this study formulates the monetary policy behavior with a continuum from discretion to full commitment and, using this setup, seeks to match the theory with evidence. It is shown that optimal instrument rules under imperfect commitment exhibit less inertia on the policy instrument; the degree of inertia declines as the policy moves from full commitment to discretion. Therefore, under the assumption that the monetary authorities operate somewhere in between discretion and commitment, historically observed policy behavior can be reconciled with the optimal policy rulesᔞven in a purely forward-looking framework. As a by-product, we propose a method to measure the stance of monetary policy from the perspective of discretion versus commitment. To test our proposal, we estimate a structural monetary policy rule for the Federal Reserve, which nests discretion and commitment as special cases. Empirical results suggest that recent practice of monetary policy has been closer to commitment than the policy pursued in the 1970s.

Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks

Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks
Author: Davide Debortoli
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 56
Release: 2017-07-21
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1484311752

Yes, it makes a lot of sense. This paper studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilizing economic activity also stabilizes other welfare relevant variables. Second, the estimated model features mitigated inflation distortions due to a low elasticity of substitution between monopolistic goods and a low interest rate sensitivity of demand. The result holds up in the presence of measurement errors, with large shocks that generate a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and resource utilization, and also when ensuring a low probability of hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates.