Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
Total Pages: 65
Release: 1980
Genre:
ISBN:

GAO undertook a review to determine the relationship between commercial spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and worldwide weapons proliferation and the adequacy of safeguards technology to detect diversions of weapons-usable material. In 1977, the President decided to indefinitely defer commercial nuclear spent fuel reprocessing in the United States because of the risks of nuclear technology and/or materials being diverted from such plants. This decision was justified on the basis that the United States can sustain its nuclear power program for the foreseeable future without reprocessing and that premature commercialization of reprocessing in the United States could encourage other nations to expand reprocessing activities. Despite the U.S. policy, many other countries continue to expand their reprocessing programs. Reprocessing, the chemical separation of usable uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear power reactor fuel, produces plutonium which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Safeguard systems used at federal reprocessing plants cannot assure that diversions of weapons-usable material for unauthorized purposes can be detected in a timely manner. Material control and accountability systems cannot accurately measure and account for weapons-usable material in spent fuel rods and in the process and waste streams. Instruments needed to measure the precise quantity of this material in spent nuclear reactor fuel have not been developed and current accountability systems cannot determine precisely the quantity being processed. Accurate measurements are also lacking in the radioactive waste portions of reprocessing operations. Since material control and accountability systems do not provide timely information on quantities or locations of weapons-usable material, it is doubtful that a diversion could be discovered before the material could be converted into a suitable form for weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE) relies on physical security to ensure the integrity of its material control and accountability systems. While DOE recognizes the limitations of its systems, it has not comprehensively identified these limitations or developed an approach to provide for as much safeguard protection as may be necessary. To date, effective worldwide systems and controls are nonexistent partly because the United States is not fully supporting a proposed international plutonium management and storage regime. U.S. research and development efforts fall short of providing the needed framework to solve reprocessing safeguards problems.

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Science. Subcommittee on Energy
Publisher:
Total Pages: 178
Release: 2005
Genre: Technology & Engineering
ISBN:

Safeguarding the Atom

Safeguarding the Atom
Author: David Fischer
Publisher: Routledge
Total Pages: 268
Release: 2020-11-19
Genre: History
ISBN: 1000199673

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.