Neural Machines A Defense Of Non Representationalism In Cognitive Neuroscience
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| Author | : Matej Kohár |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2023 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9783031267475 |
In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal. Kohar focuses on the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience. The work significantly contributes to two areas of literature: 1) the debate between representationalism and non-representationalism, and 2) the literature on mechanistic explanation. Kohar begins with an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience.
| Author | : Matej Kohár |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 199 |
| Release | : 2023-03-09 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 303126746X |
In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal. Kohar focuses on the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience. The work significantly contributes to two areas of literature: 1) the debate between representationalism and non-representationalism, and 2) the literature on mechanistic explanation. Kohar begins with an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience.
| Author | : Anthony Chemero |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 269 |
| Release | : 2011-08-19 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0262516470 |
A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation. While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, “shored up” and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. “Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher,” Chemero writes in his preface, adding, “I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything.” With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought.
| Author | : Michael L. Anderson |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 411 |
| Release | : 2014-12-12 |
| Genre | : Psychology |
| ISBN | : 0262028107 |
A proposal for a fully post-phrenological neuroscience that details the evolutionary roots of functional diversity in brain regions and networks. The computer analogy of the mind has been as widely adopted in contemporary cognitive neuroscience as was the analogy of the brain as a collection of organs in phrenology. Just as the phrenologist would insist that each organ must have its particular function, so contemporary cognitive neuroscience is committed to the notion that each brain region must have its fundamental computation. In After Phrenology, Michael Anderson argues that to achieve a fully post-phrenological science of the brain, we need to reassess this commitment and devise an alternate, neuroscientifically grounded taxonomy of mental function. Anderson contends that the cognitive roles played by each region of the brain are highly various, reflecting different neural partnerships established under different circumstances. He proposes quantifying the functional properties of neural assemblies in terms of their dispositional tendencies rather than their computational or information-processing operations. Exploring larger-scale issues, and drawing on evidence from embodied cognition, Anderson develops a picture of thinking rooted in the exploitation and extension of our early-evolving capacity for iterated interaction with the world. He argues that the multidimensional approach to the brain he describes offers a much better fit for these findings, and a more promising road toward a unified science of minded organisms.
| Author | : Andy Clark |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 310 |
| Release | : 1998-01-23 |
| Genre | : Psychology |
| ISBN | : 9780262260527 |
Brain, body, and world are united in a complex dance of circular causation and extended computational activity. In Being There, Andy Clark weaves these several threads into a pleasing whole and goes on to address foundational questions concerning the new tools and techniques needed to make sense of the emerging sciences of the embodied mind. Clark brings together ideas and techniques from robotics, neuroscience, infant psychology, and artificial intelligence. He addresses a broad range of adaptive behaviors, from cockroach locomotion to the role of linguistic artifacts in higher-level thought.
| Author | : Joulia Smortchkova |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 256 |
| Release | : 2020-09-28 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0190686685 |
The topic of this book is mental representation, a theoretical concept that lies at the core of cognitive science. Together with the idea that thinking is analogous to computational processing, this concept is responsible for the "cognitive turn" in the sciences of the mind and brain since the 1950s. Conceiving of cognitive processes (such as perception, reasoning, and motor control) as consisting of the manipulation of contentful vehicles that represent the world has led to tremendous empirical advancements in our explanations of behaviour. Perhaps the most famous discovery that explains behavior by appealing to the notion of mental representations was the discovery of 'place' cells that underlie spatial navigation and positioning, which earned researchers John O'Keefe, May-Britt Moser, and Edvard I. Moser a joint Nobel Prize in 2014. And yet, despite the empirical importance of the concept, there is no agreed definition or theoretical understanding of mental representation. This book constitutes a state-of-the-art overview on the topic of mental representation, assembling some of the leading experts in the field and allowing them to engage in meaningful exchanges over some of the most contentious questions. The collection gathers both proponents and critics of the notion, making room for debates dealing with the theoretical and ontological status of representations, the possibility of formulating a general account of mental representation which would fit our best explanatory practices, and the possibility of delivering such an account in fully naturalistic terms. Some contributors explore the relation between mutually incompatible notions of mental representation, stemming from the different disciplines composing the cognitive sciences (such as neuroscience, psychology, and computer science). Others question the ontological status and explanatory usefulness of the notion. And finally, some try to sketch a general theory of mental representations that could face the challenges outlined in the more critical chapters of the volume.
| Author | : Robert W. Clowes |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 327 |
| Release | : 2021-09-28 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 3030726444 |
This edited book deepens the engagement between 21st century philosophy of mind and the emerging technologies which are transforming our environment. Many new technologies appear to have important implications for the human mind, the nature of our cognition, our sense of identity and even perhaps what we think human beings are. They prompt questions such as: Would an uploaded mind be 'me'? Does our reliance on smart phones, or wearable gadgets enhance or diminish the human mind? and: How does our deep reliance upon ambient artificial intelligence change the shape of the human mind? Readers will discover the best philosophical analysis of what current and near future 21st technology means for the metaphysics of mind. Important questions are addressed on matters relating to the extended mind and the distributed self. Expert authors explore the role that the ubiquitous smart phone might have in creating new forms of self-knowledge. They consider machine consciousness, brain enhancement and smart ambient technology, and what they can tell us about phenomenal consciousness. While ideas of artificial general intelligence, cognitive enhancements and the smart environment are widely commented on, serious analysis of their philosophical implications is only getting started. These contributions from top scholars are therefore very timely, and are of particular relevance to students and scholars of the philosophy of mind, philosophy of technology, computer science and psychology.
| Author | : Mark H. Bickhard |
| Publisher | : Elsevier |
| Total Pages | : 397 |
| Release | : 1995-03-07 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 0080867634 |
The book focuses on a conceptual flaw in contemporary artificial intelligence and cognitive science. Many people have discovered diverse manifestations and facets of this flaw, but the central conceptual impasse is at best only partially perceived. Its consequences, nevertheless, visit themselves asdistortions and failures of multiple research projects - and make impossible the ultimate aspirations of the fields. The impasse concerns a presupposition concerning the nature of representation - that all representation has the nature of encodings: encodingism. Encodings certainly exist, butencodingism is at root logically incoherent; any programmatic research predicted on it is doomed too distortion and ultimate failure. The impasse and its consequences - and steps away from that impasse - are explored in a large number of projects and approaches. These include SOAR, CYC, PDP, situated cognition, subsumption architecture robotics, and the frame problems - a general survey of the current research in AI and Cognitive Science emerges. Interactivism, an alternative model of representation, is proposed and examined.
| Author | : Fabrizio Calzavarini |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 498 |
| Release | : 2020-12-02 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 3030540928 |
This volume brings together new papers advancing contemporary debates in foundational, conceptual, and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience. The different perspectives presented in each chapter have previously been discussed between the authors, as the volume builds on the experience of Neural Mechanisms (NM) Online – webinar series on the philosophy of neuroscience organized by the editors of this volume. The contributed chapters pertain to five core areas in current philosophy of neuroscience. It surveys the novel forms of explanation (and prediction) developed in cognitive neuroscience, and looks at new concepts, methods and techniques used in the field. The book also highlights the metaphysical challenges raised by recent neuroscience and demonstrates the relation between neuroscience and mechanistic philosophy. Finally, the book dives into the issue of neural computations and representations. Assembling contributions from leading philosophers of neuroscience, this work draws upon the expertise of both established scholars and promising early career researchers.
| Author | : Evan Thompson |
| Publisher | : Harvard University Press |
| Total Pages | : 561 |
| Release | : 2010-09-30 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0674736885 |
How is life related to the mind? The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan Thompson explores in Mind in Life. Thompson draws upon sources as diverse as molecular biology, evolutionary theory, artificial life, complex systems theory, neuroscience, psychology, Continental Phenomenology, and analytic philosophy to argue that mind and life are more continuous than has previously been accepted, and that current explanations do not adequately address the myriad facets of the biology and phenomenology of mind. Where there is life, Thompson argues, there is mind: life and mind share common principles of self-organization, and the self-organizing features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. Rather than trying to close the explanatory gap, Thompson marshals philosophical and scientific analyses to bring unprecedented insight to the nature of life and consciousness. This synthesis of phenomenology and biology helps make Mind in Life a vital and long-awaited addition to his landmark volume The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (coauthored with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela). Endlessly interesting and accessible, Mind in Life is a groundbreaking addition to the fields of the theory of the mind, life science, and phenomenology.
