Monotone Games

Monotone Games
Author: Tarun Sabarwal
Publisher: Springer Nature
Total Pages: 176
Release: 2020-10-26
Genre: Mathematics
ISBN: 3030455130
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This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.

Positional Games

Positional Games
Author: Dan Hefetz
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 154
Release: 2014-06-13
Genre: Mathematics
ISBN: 3034808259
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This text is based on a lecture course given by the authors in the framework of Oberwolfach Seminars at the Mathematisches Forschungsinstitut Oberwolfach in May, 2013. It is intended to serve as a thorough introduction to the rapidly developing field of positional games. This area constitutes an important branch of combinatorics, whose aim it is to systematically develop an extensive mathematical basis for a variety of two player perfect information games. These ranges from such popular games as Tic-Tac-Toe and Hex to purely abstract games played on graphs and hypergraphs. The subject of positional games is strongly related to several other branches of combinatorics such as Ramsey theory, extremal graph and set theory, and the probabilistic method. These notes cover a variety of topics in positional games, including both classical results and recent important developments. They are presented in an accessible way and are accompanied by exercises of varying difficulty, helping the reader to better understand the theory. The text will benefit both researchers and graduate students in combinatorics and adjacent fields.

Simple Games

Simple Games
Author: Alan D. Taylor
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Total Pages: 266
Release: 2021-01-12
Genre: Mathematics
ISBN: 0691223890
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Simple games are mathematical structures inspired by voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill, is pitted against the status quo. The first in-depth mathematical study of the subject as a coherent subfield of finite combinatorics--one with its own organized body of techniques and results--this book blends new theorems with some of the striking results from threshold logic, making all of it accessible to game theorists. Introductory material receives a fresh treatment, with an emphasis on Boolean subgames and the Rudin-Keisler order as unifying concepts. Advanced material focuses on the surprisingly wide variety of properties related to the weightedness of a game. A desirability relation orders the individuals or coalitions of a game according to their influence in the corresponding voting system. As Taylor and Zwicker show, acyclicity of such a relation approximates weightedness--the more sensitive the relation, the closer the approximation. A trade is an exchange of players among coalitions, and robustness under such trades is equivalent to weightedness of the game. Robustness under trades that fit some restrictive exchange pattern typically characterizes a wider class of simple games--for example, games for which some particular desirability order is acyclic. Finally, one can often describe these wider classes of simple games by weakening the total additivity of a weighting to obtain what is called a pseudoweighting. In providing such uniform explanations for many of the structural properties of simple games, this book showcases numerous new techniques and results.

Internet and Network Economics

Internet and Network Economics
Author: Ning Chen
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 430
Release: 2012-02-02
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 3642255108
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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2011, held in Singapore, in December 2011. The 31 revised full papers and 5 revised short papers presented together with the abstracts of 3 papers about work in progress were carefully reviewed and selected from 100 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on algorithmic game theory, algorithmic mechanism design, computational advertising, computational social choice, convergence and learning in games, economics aspects of security and privacy, information and attention economics, network games and social networks.

Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory

Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
Total Pages: 306
Release: 1999
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780821805251
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Since the publication of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games" and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice. The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.

Handbook of the Shapley Value

Handbook of the Shapley Value
Author: Encarnación Algaba
Publisher: CRC Press
Total Pages: 607
Release: 2019-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1351241400
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Handbook of the Shapley Value contains 24 chapters and a foreword written by Alvin E. Roth, who was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley in 2012. The purpose of the book is to highlight a range of relevant insights into the Shapley value. Every chapter has been written to honor Lloyd Shapley, who introduced this fascinating value in 1953. The first chapter, by William Thomson, places the Shapley value in the broader context of the theory of cooperative games, and briefly introduces each of the individual contributions to the volume. This is followed by a further contribution from the editors of the volume, which serves to introduce the more significant features of the Shapley value. The rest of the chapters in the book deal with different theoretical or applied aspects inspired by this interesting value and have been contributed specifically for this volume by leading experts in the area of Game Theory. Chapters 3 through to 10 are more focused on theoretical aspects of the Shapley value, Chapters 11 to 15 are related to both theoretical and applied areas. Finally, from Chapter 16 to Chapter 24, more attention is paid to applications of the Shapley value to different problems encountered across a diverse range of fields. As expressed by William Thomson in the Introduction to the book, "The chapters contribute to the subject in several dimensions: Mathematical foundations; axiomatic foundations; computations; applications to special classes of games; power indices; applications to enriched classes of games; applications to concretely specified allocation problems: an ever-widening range, mapping allocation problems into games or implementation." Nowadays, the Shapley value continues to be as appealing as when it was first introduced in 1953, or perhaps even more so now that its potential is supported by the quantity and quality of the available results. This volume collects a large amount of work that definitively demonstrates that the Shapley value provides answers and solutions to a wide variety of problems.

Multiagent Systems, second edition

Multiagent Systems, second edition
Author: Gerhard Weiss
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 917
Release: 2013-03-08
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 0262313561
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The new edition of an introduction to multiagent systems that captures the state of the art in both theory and practice, suitable as textbook or reference. Multiagent systems are made up of multiple interacting intelligent agents—computational entities to some degree autonomous and able to cooperate, compete, communicate, act flexibly, and exercise control over their behavior within the frame of their objectives. They are the enabling technology for a wide range of advanced applications relying on distributed and parallel processing of data, information, and knowledge relevant in domains ranging from industrial manufacturing to e-commerce to health care. This book offers a state-of-the-art introduction to multiagent systems, covering the field in both breadth and depth, and treating both theory and practice. It is suitable for classroom use or independent study. This second edition has been completely revised, capturing the tremendous developments in multiagent systems since the first edition appeared in 1999. Sixteen of the book's seventeen chapters were written for this edition; all chapters are by leaders in the field, with each author contributing to the broad base of knowledge and experience on which the book rests. The book covers basic concepts of computational agency from the perspective of both individual agents and agent organizations; communication among agents; coordination among agents; distributed cognition; development and engineering of multiagent systems; and background knowledge in logics and game theory. Each chapter includes references, many illustrations and examples, and exercises of varying degrees of difficulty. The chapters and the overall book are designed to be self-contained and understandable without additional material. Supplemental resources are available on the book's Web site. Contributors Rafael Bordini, Felix Brandt, Amit Chopra, Vincent Conitzer, Virginia Dignum, Jürgen Dix, Ed Durfee, Edith Elkind, Ulle Endriss, Alessandro Farinelli, Shaheen Fatima, Michael Fisher, Nicholas R. Jennings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Evangelos Markakis, Lin Padgham, Julian Padget, Iyad Rahwan, Talal Rahwan, Alex Rogers, Jordi Sabater-Mir, Yoav Shoham, Munindar P. Singh, Kagan Tumer, Karl Tuyls, Wiebe van der Hoek, Laurent Vercouter, Meritxell Vinyals, Michael Winikoff, Michael Wooldridge, Shlomo Zilberstein

Multiagent Systems

Multiagent Systems
Author: Gerhard Weiss
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 917
Release: 2013-03-08
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 0262018896
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This is the first comprehensive introduction to multiagent systems and contemporary distributed artificial intelligence that is suitable as a textbook.

Decision and Game Theory for Security

Decision and Game Theory for Security
Author: John S. Baras
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 268
Release: 2011-11-11
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 364225280X
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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2011, held in College Park, Maryland, USA, in November 2011. The 16 revised full papers and 2 plenary keynotes presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on attacks, adversaries, and game theory, wireless adhoc and sensor networks, network games, security insurance, security and trust in social networks and security investments.

Uncertainty in Economic Theory

Uncertainty in Economic Theory
Author: Itzhak Gilboa
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Total Pages: 577
Release: 2004-08-02
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1134344163
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This volume brings together important papers, coupled with new introductions, in the massively influential area of uncertainty in economic theory. Seminal papers are available together for the first time in book format, with new introductions and under the steely editorship of Itzhak Gilboa - this book is a useful reference tool for economists all over the globe.