Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks
Author | : Eric Emch |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 48 |
Release | : 2006 |
Genre | : Affinity credit cards |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Eric Emch |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 48 |
Release | : 2006 |
Genre | : Affinity credit cards |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Jens-Uwe Franck |
Publisher | : Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE) |
Total Pages | : 96 |
Release | : 2019-05-08 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
Author | : Bin Grace Li |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 48 |
Release | : 2019-03-18 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1484399625 |
It takes many years for more efficient electronic payments to be widely used, and the fees that merchants (consumers) pay for using those services are increasing (decreasing) over time. We address these puzzles by studying payments system evolution with a dynamic model in a twosided market setting. We calibrate the model to the U.S. payment card data, and conduct welfare and policy analysis. Our analysis shows that the market power of electronic payment networks plays important roles in explaining the slow adoption and asymmetric price changes, and the welfare impact of regulations may vary significantly through the endogenous R&D channel.
Author | : David S. Evans |
Publisher | : Harvard Business Review Press |
Total Pages | : 271 |
Release | : 2016-05-03 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 163369173X |
A different kind of matchmaker. Many of the most dynamic public companies, from Alibaba to Facebook to Visa, and the most valuable start-ups, such as Airbnb and Uber, are matchmakers that connect one group of customers with another group of customers. Economists call matchmakers multisided platforms because they provide physical or virtual platforms for multiple groups to get together. Dating sites connect people with potential matches, for example, and ride-sharing apps do the same for drivers and riders. Although matchmakers have been around for millennia, they’re becoming more and more popular—and profitable—due to dramatic advances in technology, and a lot of companies that have managed to crack the code of this business model have become today’s power brokers. Don’t let the flashy successes fool you, though. Starting a matchmaker is one of the toughest business challenges, and almost everyone who tries to build one, fails. In Matchmakers, David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, two economists who were among the first to analyze multisided platforms and discover their principles, and who’ve consulted for some of the most successful platform businesses in the world, explain how matchmakers work best in practice, why they do what they do, and how entrepreneurs can improve their chances for success. Whether you’re an entrepreneur, an investor, a consumer, or an executive, your future will involve more and more multisided platforms, and Matchmakers—rich with stories from platform winners and losers—is the one book you’ll need in order to navigate this appealing but confusing world.
Author | : Richard Schmalensee |
Publisher | : North Holland |
Total Pages | : 1002 |
Release | : 1989-09-11 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.
Author | : Xavier Vives |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 344 |
Release | : 2020-11-03 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0691210039 |
A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies. Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies. Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.
Author | : Heiko Richter |
Publisher | : Springer Nature |
Total Pages | : 607 |
Release | : 2023-01-22 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 3662661012 |
This volume provides the most comprehensive contemporary academic writing on Ukrainian competition and intellectual property law in English. Especially over the last few years, these areas have been in considerable flux, a main driver being the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement. The chapters cover a broad range of different topics and share a forward-looking perspective. They also outline the basic background that is necessary to understand the context of the issue discussed, especially with regards to the legal system of Ukraine. The publication is the result of a two-year project, and it is addressed to a wide range of international scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. It aims to make the state-of-the-art in Ukrainian legal scholarship visible and accessible to the international research community and to stimulate global debates in academia and politics. Therefore, it may be of interest and use to anyone who is interested in competition and intellectual property law, and/or in Ukraine.
Author | : David Gabel |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 246 |
Release | : 2012-12-06 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1461554837 |
David Gabel and David F. Weiman The chapters in this volwne address the related problems of regulating and pricing access in network industries. Interconnection between network suppliers raises the important policy questions of how to sustain competition and realize economic efficiency. To foster rivalry in any industry, suppliers must have access to customers. But unlike in other sectors, the very organization of network industries creates major impediments to potential entrants trying to carve out a niche in the market. In traditional sectors such as gas, electric, rail, and telephone services, these barriers take the form of the large private and social costs necessary to duplicate the physical infrastructure of pipelines, wires, or tracks. Few firms can afford to finance such an undertaking, because the level of sunk costs and the very large scale economies make it extremely risky. In other newer sectors, entrants face less tangible but no less pressing constraints. In the microcomputer industry, for example, high switching costs can prevent users from experimenting with alternative, but perhaps more efficient hardware platforms or operating systems. Although gateway technologies can reduce these barriers, the installed base of an incumbent can create powerful bandwagon effects that reinforce its advantage (such as the greater availability of compatible peripherals and software applications). In the era of electronic banking, entrants into the automated teller machine· (A TM) and credit card markets face a similar problem of establishing a ubiquitous presence.