In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has presented the Judgment as a mediating faculty between Understanding and Reason. The understanding, (together with Sensibility), provides objects, whereas the reason provides "Ideas" or principles. It is the task of the Judgment to make the application of the principles to objects possible. But, the theoretical function of judgment is 'determinant', i.e. the subsumption of the particular under the universal is dependent upon the laws of formal logic, and hence, is analytic. What Kant calls the 'reflective' judgment, however, is one which relies upon the presupposition of a certain end. It is, thus, the "reflective judgement" which is in need of a "Critique". That is to say, the Critique of Judgement seeks to solve the problem of determining whether and how it is possible a priori to judge Nature as being adapted to an end. Moreover, since, such a question is neither one of knowledge nor one of will, it is neither theoretical nor practical. The object of Kant's concern, therefore, is the reflection or the contemplation of Nature through the presupposition of its purposiveness or finality. Here, we are given two ways to proceed: 1) aesthetically, by regarding nature as adapting to the reflecting subject as such, and 2) teleologically, by viewing Nature as having her own finality. Accordingly, Kant divides his attention to each of these kinds of judgments in the two parts of the Critique of Judgement. What I shall concentrate my attention, however, is only to the philosophical significance of Kant's conception of the "aesthetic judgement". And, through the course of this thesis, I shall argue for the consistency and the intelligibility of Kant's theory of taste which, I believe, sheds much light upon the confused parameters of contemporary aesthetics. Also, this thesis is a defense of Kant's theory against Hume's empirical approach. The judgment of the beautiful is not to be confused with that of the agreeable nor the good, since the beautiful lacks any empirical reality as it consists in a delight felt by the agent as he re fleets upon the representation of an object. Thus, a taste judgment is concerned only with the "form" of the object presented in the mind. And, it is in this that the clue to the intelligibility of the purposiveness of aesthetic objects is to be discovered. The purposiveness of the beautiful is a result of its adaptation to the principles which enable its representation. The understanding, whose function is to present objects, are both requisites for the formulation of a taste judgment. As such, both the imagination and the understanding must co-operate with one another in 'harmony' so as to pro duce the feeling--state of pleasure in the beautiful. Furthermore, since the relation to the principles of objective ideation obtains, the ground of "pure" aesthetic judgment points to the "supersensible substrate of humanity" which is the ground of cognition in general. The purposiveness of the aesthetic object is universally communicable, even though any proof by means of concepts is precluded from a claim of taste. And the approach toward the supersensible sub-strate is also what allows a philosopher to be freed from the mere pheno menality of cognition so that he may grasp a more comprehensive view of the whole of human experience. But what would result from such a 'trans cendence' is a subject for future studies.