Justification As Ignorance
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| Author | : Sven Rosenkranz |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 301 |
| Release | : 2021-03 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0198865635 |
Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states.
| Author | : G. S. Pappas |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 246 |
| Release | : 1979-10-31 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 9789027710246 |
With one exception, all of the papers in this volume were originally presented at a conference held in April, 1978, at The Ohio State University. The excep tion is the paper by Wilfrid Sellars, which is a revised version of a paper he originally published in the Journal of Philosophy, 1973. However, the present version of Sellars' paper is so thoroughly changed from its original, that it is now virtually a new paper. None of the other nine papers has been published previously. The bibliography, prepared by Nancy Kelsik, is very extensive and it is tempting to think that it is complete. But I believe that virtual com pleteness is more likely to prove correct. The conference was made possible by grants from the College of Human ities and the Graduate School, Ohio State University, as well as by a grant from the Philosophy Department. On behalf of the contributors, I want to thank these institutions for their support. I also want to thank Marshall Swain and Robert Turnbu~l for early help and encouragement; Bette Hellinger for assistance in setting up the confer ence; and Mary Raines and Virginia Foster for considerable aid in the pre paration of papers and many other conference matters. The friendly advice of the late James Cornman was also importantly helpful. April,1979 GEORGE S. PAPPAS ix INTRODUCTION The papers in this volume deal in different ways with the related issues of epistemic justification or warrant, and the analysis of factual knowledge.
| Author | : Rik Peels |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 282 |
| Release | : 2016-06-23 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1317369548 |
This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions of ignorance—an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy. Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse; some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.
| Author | : John L. Pollock |
| Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
| Total Pages | : 362 |
| Release | : 2015-03-08 |
| Genre | : Psychology |
| ISBN | : 1400870739 |
One of the most firmly entrenched beliefs of contemporary philosophy is that the only way to analyze a concept is to state its truth conditions. In epistemology this has led to the search for reductive analyses, to phenomenalism, behaviorism, and their analogues in other areas of knowledge. Arguing that these attempts at reductive analysis have invariably failed, John L. Pollock defends an alternative theory of conceptual analysis in this book. The author suggests that concepts should be analyzed in terms of their justification conditions rather than their truth conditions. After laying a theoretical foundation for this alternative scheme of analysis, Professor Pollock applies his theory in proposing solutions to a number of traditional epistemological problems. Among the areas of knowledge discussed are perception, knowledge of the past, induction, knowledge of other minds, and a priori knowledge. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
| Author | : Rik Peels |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 227 |
| Release | : 2016-12-22 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1107175607 |
The book provides a thorough exploration of the epistemic dimensions of ignorance: what is ignorance and what are its varieties?
| Author | : John M. Doris |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 367 |
| Release | : 2015-03-19 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191047325 |
John M. Doris presents a new account of agency and responsibility, which reconciles our understanding of ourselves as moral agents with psychological research on the unconscious mind. Much philosophical theorizing maintains that the exercise of morally responsible agency consists in judgment and behavior ordered by accurate reflection. On such theories, when human beings are able to direct their lives in the manner philosophers have dignified with the honorific 'agency', it's because they know what they're doing, and why they're doing it. This understanding is compromised by quantities of psychological research on unconscious processing, which suggests that accurate reflection is distressingly uncommon; very often behavior is ordered by surprisingly inaccurate self-awareness. Thus, if agency requires accurate reflection, people seldom exercise agency, and skepticism about agency threatens. To counter the skeptical threat, John M. Doris proposes an alternative theory that requires neither reflection nor accurate self-awareness: he identifies a dialogic form of agency where self-direction is facilitated by exchange of the rationalizations with which people explain and justify themselves to one another. The result is a stoutly interdisciplinary theory sensitive to both what human beings are like—creatures with opaque and unruly psychologies-and what they need: an account of agency sufficient to support a practice of moral responsibility.
| Author | : Cynthia Townley |
| Publisher | : Lexington Books |
| Total Pages | : 150 |
| Release | : 2011 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0739151053 |
This book develops new ideas in feminist epistemology by exploring diverse and sometimes positive roles for ignorance. The author argues that epistemic values cannot simply be reduced to the value of increasing knowledge and that ignorance is not merely inescapable for epistemic agents, but, rather, is valuable. She shows that ignorance-friendly epistemology offers a better descriptive and normative account of human epistemic practices. --publisher.
| Author | : Herbert I. Weisberg |
| Publisher | : John Wiley & Sons |
| Total Pages | : 469 |
| Release | : 2014-08-04 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 0470890444 |
An original account of willful ignorance and how this principle relates to modern probability and statistical methods Through a series of colorful stories about great thinkers and the problems they chose to solve, the author traces the historical evolution of probability and explains how statistical methods have helped to propel scientific research. However, the past success of statistics has depended on vast, deliberate simplifications amounting to willful ignorance, and this very success now threatens future advances in medicine, the social sciences, and other fields. Limitations of existing methods result in frequent reversals of scientific findings and recommendations, to the consternation of both scientists and the lay public. Willful Ignorance: The Mismeasure of Uncertainty exposes the fallacy of regarding probability as the full measure of our uncertainty. The book explains how statistical methodology, though enormously productive and influential over the past century, is approaching a crisis. The deep and troubling divide between qualitative and quantitative modes of research, and between research and practice, are reflections of this underlying problem. The author outlines a path toward the re-engineering of data analysis to help close these gaps and accelerate scientific discovery. Willful Ignorance: The Mismeasure of Uncertainty presents essential information and novel ideas that should be of interest to anyone concerned about the future of scientific research. The book is especially pertinent for professionals in statistics and related fields, including practicing and research clinicians, biomedical and social science researchers, business leaders, and policy-makers.
| Author | : Sanford C. Goldberg |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2010-09-09 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 9780521169240 |
Sanford Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part 1 he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part 2 he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics of communication-based beliefs depend on features of the cognitive and linguistic acts of the subject's social peers. In acknowledging an ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, his book develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism is epistemology, on the other.
| Author | : Jan Willem Wieland |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 312 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0198779666 |
Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
