Major Jeff Tennyson, a reservist with the 98th Division (Institutional Training), served as an advisor to the New Iraqi Army in 2004-2005. Tennyson's unit, an engineer company, was already mobilized at Fort Leonard Wood when he found out they would be deploying. He went through predeployment training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, describing it as "slow and frustrating. There was a lot of training we could have done on our own, and a lot of that training we do all the time since we're a drill sergeant unit," Tennyson said. "Another problem with the training was that we didn't really know what we were getting into. We didn't have contact with the advisor support teams (ASTs) that were there already." Following Camp Atterbury, Tennyson remained together with his AST, noting, "We were lucky. I know it didn't happen that way for everybody. There was a lot of jostling around of the rosters." He also said that the training received in Kuwait was much better: "Once we got into Kuwait, the training was great. The contractors from Military Professional Resources Inc. did a lot of the close quarters and AK47 training. We did live fire convoy training and it was excellent. It would have been great to have spent a little more time in Kuwait and less time at Camp Atterbury," he added. Tennyson also describes many of the challenges faced in advising their assigned Iraqi battalion in Al Kisik - initially the 12th Battalion, 3rd Iraqi Army Division, which was midway renamed the 3rd Battalion - including minimal prior training, poor muzzle control, lack of security procedures and heavy personnel turnover. Tennyson states, "Essentially we had to do basic training with them continuously." He also says that, fortunately, the battalion leadership was stable, but describes their quality as "everything from total slugs to good soldiers with combat experience." After his Iraqi battalion moved to Tall Afar, they started conducting real missions, including convoys, presence patrols and cordon and searches. But a problem occurred when the partnered unit from the 25th Infantry Division was replaced by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. At this point, the Iraqis' operations were severely curtailed and the unit's proficiency suffered for it. Tennyson says that by the time his team left, the Iraqis "still had a long way to go but they were starting to get it." He closes the interview by stating that it is critical for an AST to know early in the deployment process which unit's area of operations they will function in so that command visibility can be established, logistical contacts can be made, and training operations can be planned and coordinated early and easily.