Intentionality
Download Intentionality full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Intentionality ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author | : John R. Searle |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 294 |
Release | : 1983-05-31 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9780521273022 |
Intentionality provides the philosophical foundations for Searle's earlier works, Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning.
Author | : Bertram F. Malle |
Publisher | : MIT Press |
Total Pages | : 444 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Psychology |
ISBN | : 9780262632676 |
Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.
Author | : Angela A. Mendelovici |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 297 |
Release | : 2018 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0190863803 |
Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states.
Author | : Gábor Forrai |
Publisher | : Rodopi |
Total Pages | : 207 |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9042018178 |
This book contains eleven original papers about intentionality. Some explore current problems such as the status of intentional content, the intentionality of perception and emotion, the connections between intentionality and normativity, the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, the characteristics of the intentional idiom. Others discuss the work of historical figures like Locke, Brentano, Husserl and Frege.
Author | : Grant R. Gillett |
Publisher | : John Benjamins Publishing |
Total Pages | : 275 |
Release | : 2001-02-13 |
Genre | : Psychology |
ISBN | : 9027299870 |
Is there an internal relationship between consciousness and intentionality? Can mental content be described in such a way so as to avoid dualism? What is the influence of social context upon consciousness, conceptions of self and mental content? This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major tenets. Focusing upon the rule governed nature of concepts and the grounding of the rules for concept use in the practical world, intentional consciousness emerges as a phenomena that depends upon social context. Given that dependence, the authors consider and set aside attempts to reduce human consciousness and intentionality to phenomena explicable at biological or neuroscientific levels. (Series A)
Author | : Uriah Kriegel |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 271 |
Release | : 2013-01-09 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 0199720525 |
Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - - the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program. With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program.
Author | : D.W Smith |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 444 |
Release | : 2012-12-06 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9401093830 |
This book has roots in our respective doctoral dissertations, both completed in 1970 at Stanford under the tutelage of Professors Dagfmn F øllesdal, John D. Goheen, and Jaakko Hintikka. In the fall of 1970 we wrote a joint article that proved to be a prolegomenon to the present work, our 'Intentionality via Intensions', The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971). Professor Hintikka then suggested we write a joint book, and in the spring of 1971 we began writing the present work. The project was to last ten years as our conception of the project continued to grow at each stage. Our iritellectual debts follow the history of our project. During our dis sertation days at Stanford, we joined with fellow doctoral candidates John Lad and Michael Sukale and Professors Føllesdal, Goheen, and Hintikka in an informal seminar on phenomenology that met weekly from June of 1969 through March of 1970. During the summers of 1973 and 1974 we regrouped in another informal seminar on phenomenology, meeting weekly at Stanford and sometimes Berkeley, the regular participants being ourselves, Hubert Dreyfus, Dagfmn Føllesdal, Jane Lipsky McIntyre, Izchak Miller, and, in 1974, John Haugeland.
Author | : Robert Sokolowski |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 252 |
Release | : 2000 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 9780521667920 |
Introductory volume, presenting the major philosophical doctrines of phenomenology.
Author | : Graham Priest |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 207 |
Release | : 2005-05-19 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : 0199262543 |
Towards Non-Being presents an account of the semantics of intentional language - verbs such as 'believes', 'fears', 'seeks', 'imagines'. Graham Priest's account tackles problems concerning intentional states which are often brushed under the carpet in discussions of intentionality, such as their failure to be closed under deducibility. Drawing on the work of the late Richard Routley (Sylvan), it proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, atworlds that may be either possible or impossible. Since Russell, non-existent objects have had a bad press in Western philosophy; Priest mounts a full-scale defence. In the process, he offers an account of both fictional and mathematical objects as non-existent.The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy or fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or cognitive representation in AI.
Author | : Luz Christopher Seiberth |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 244 |
Release | : 2021-12-15 |
Genre | : Philosophy |
ISBN | : 1000511057 |
This book argues that Sellars’ theory of intentionality can be understood as an advancement of a transcendental philosophical approach. It shows how Sellars develops his theory of intentionality through his engagement with the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The book delivers a provocative reinterpretation of one of the most problematic and controversial concepts of Sellars' philosophy: the picturing-relation. Sellars' theory of intentionality addresses the question of how to reconcile two aspects that seem opposed: the non-relational theory of intellectual and linguistic content and a causal-transcendental theory of representation inspired by the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. The author explains how both parts cohere in a transcendental account of finite knowledge. He claims that this can only be achieved by reading Sellars as committed to a transcendental methodology inspired by Kant. In a final step, he brings his interpretation to bear on the contemporary metaphilosophical debate on pragmatism and expressivism. Intentionality in Sellars will be of interest to scholars of Sellars and Kant, as well as researchers working in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy.