Incentives For Unaware Agents
Download Incentives For Unaware Agents full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online free Incentives For Unaware Agents ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author | : Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2020 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into Principal-Agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space. Depending on the agent's default behavior, it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps the agent unaware) or a complete contract. The key tradeoff is that of enlarging the agent's choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints. If agents differ in their unawareness, optimal contracts show a self-reinforcing pattern: if there are few unaware agents in the economy optimal contracts promote awareness, if unawareness is wide-spread optimal contracts shroud the contracting environment, thus keeping the agent unaware.
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 421 |
Release | : 2002 |
Genre | : Economics |
ISBN | : 9787510050503 |
Author | : Ching-to Ma |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 40 |
Release | : 1987 |
Genre | : Commercial agents |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Sarah Auster |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 32 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : Contracts |
ISBN | : |
This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal-agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlarges the agent's awareness strategically when proposing the contract. He faces a trade off between participation and incentives. Leaving the agent unaware allows him to exploit the agent's incomplete understanding of the world. Making the agent aware enables the principal to use the revealed contingencies as signals about the agent's action choice. The optimal contract reveals contingencies that have low probability but are highly informative about the agent's effort.
Author | : Timothy Besley |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 41 |
Release | : 2004 |
Genre | : Agency (Law) |
ISBN | : |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2006 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Troy A. Kravitz |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 84 |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : Behaviorism (Political science) |
ISBN | : 9781303220661 |
Situations in which multiple parties with competing preferences interact are endemic throughout society. These essays consider the problem of a principal who seeks to induce self-interested agents to exert effort or promise contributions. The principal's task is to create an incentive structure that aligns the agents' preferences with his own. Chapter 1 considers a principal seeking to induce agents to exert costly, unobservable effort when the output they produce is unverifiable. The firm's solution is to hire multiple workers for some tasks and compare the output produced by the agents. The optimal mechanism bundles multiple tasks together to reduce the cost of monitoring and conditions wage payment for any task upon satisfactory completion of all tasks. The optimal mechanism is not efficient as the principal prefers greater duplication of tasks in exchange for reduced worker rents. Asymptotically, as jobs grow large, the firm approximates its first-best payoffs from the contractible effort benchmark. It is only in the limit that the optimal mechanism is also efficient. Chapter 2 studies the campaign finance landscape following recent changes to the law. A discriminatory all-pay contest model with a contribution cap is used to study legislative and lobbying behavior. The principal, a strategic lawmaker, is central to the analysis. The lawmaker both designs the prize the lobbyists are competing to obtain -- and, in doing so, determines their valuations for the prize -- and determines the terms of the prize's allocation. Contrary to existing work, expected contributions always increase as the contribution cap is relaxed. The effect on policy is more nuanced and depends on whether the cap is binding. The analysis highlights that a decrease in competitive forces, for example, from one lobbyist being richer or valuing the prize more, can be only partially offset by providing a discriminatory benefit to the other lobbyist. The strategic lawmaker endeavors to prevent such an imbalance from arising in the first place.
Author | : Fouad Sabry |
Publisher | : One Billion Knowledgeable |
Total Pages | : 340 |
Release | : 2024-01-05 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
What is Incentive In their broadest sense, incentives may be defined as anything that encourages a person to change their behavior in the direction that is intended. It is underlined that incentives are important by the fundamental law of economics and the rules of behavior, which suggest that bigger incentives equal to greater levels of effort and, as a result, higher levels of performance. This provides evidence that incentives are important. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Incentive Chapter 2: Motivation Chapter 3: Contract theory Chapter 4: Two-factor theory Chapter 5: Content theory Chapter 6: Personnel economics Chapter 7: Overjustification effect Chapter 8: Self-determination theory Chapter 9: Motivation crowding theory Chapter 10: Managerial psychology Chapter 11: Incentive program Chapter 12: Incentivisation Chapter 13: Cognitive evaluation theory Chapter 14: Warm-glow giving Chapter 15: Pay-for-Performance (Federal Government) Chapter 16: Work motivation Chapter 17: Employee motivation Chapter 18: Reward management Chapter 19: Uri Gneezy Chapter 20: Employee recognition Chapter 21: Motivation and employee engagement (II) Answering the public top questions about incentive. (III) Real world examples for the usage of incentive in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of incentive.
Author | : Jonathan C. Glover |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 73 |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has.
Author | : Ching-to Ma |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 40 |
Release | : 1987 |
Genre | : Incentives in industry |
ISBN | : |