Team Incentive Contracts With Interim Private Information

Team Incentive Contracts With Interim Private Information
Author: Priyodorshi Banerjee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 35
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

We study contracting in a principal multi-agent moral hazard problem where agents receive private information on the realisation of a common productivity shock after contracts are signed, but before actions are taken. Joint performance evaluation schemes can be optimal when private information is of sufficiently high quality, while relative performance evaluation schemes are optimal with poor quality private signals. Interdependent incentive schemes create an endogenous externality between agents, the nature of which depends on the structure of the evaluation scheme. Joint performance evaluation schemes generate endogenous complementarities in the presence of correlated private information, and so may be optimal.

Use of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracting

Use of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracting
Author: Gregory Sanders
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Total Pages: 74
Release: 2018-04-19
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 1442280662

Traditional contracting is primarily transactional, rewarding contractors when deliveries are made or certain process milestones are met. Performance-Based Logistic (PBL) contracting seeks to base contractor incentives on ongoing performance measures to achieve reliability and cost savings. Key to the success of these arrangements are the incentives that align the interests of the customer and the vendor. This report describes the incentives used in PBL contracts, identifies best practices, and provides recommendations for effective incentives going forward. The study team interviewed PBL practitioners including defense-unique contractors, defense-commercial contractors, and experts who are knowledgeable in the government perspective in the United States and abroad. The team supplemented these interviews by analyzing a PBL dataset of U.S. Department of Defense contracts. Of the four identified categories of incentives—time-based, financial, scope, and other—interviews found that time-based incentives stood out for their reliable appeal and relative underuse in the United States.

Teams in Relational Contracts

Teams in Relational Contracts
Author: Ola Kvaloy
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2016
Genre:
ISBN:

We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under different set of assumptions, and show that the principal can use team size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the agents' incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. We also show that more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's effort incentives, in particular if outputs are negatively correlated.

Project Characteristics, Incentives and Team Production

Project Characteristics, Incentives and Team Production
Author: Richard Fu
Publisher:
Total Pages: 34
Release: 2015
Genre:
ISBN:

We develop a model to show how agency conflicts, free rider effects and monitoring costs interact to affect optimal team size and workers' incentive contracts. Team size increases with project risk, decreases with profitability, and decreases with monitoring costs as a proportion of output. Our predictions are consistent with empirical evidence that firm-specific risk has increased over time and average corporate earnings have declined, while firms' organizational structures have also flattened. The predicted effects of monitoring costs on team size are supported by evidence that improvements in information technology that are likely to lower monitoring costs lead to larger teams. Further, firms with relatively more intangible assets, where monitoring costs are likely to be higher, are smaller. Optimal incentive intensities decrease with risk and increase with profitability. The endogenous determination of team size accentuates the positive effects of a decline in risk and an increase in profitability on incentives.