Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility

Optimal Monetary Policy, Commitment, and Imperfect Credibility
Author: Hakan Kara
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2003
Genre:
ISBN:

In the conventional optimal monetary policy framework, two key assumptions underline the full commitment solution: Monetary authority is perfectly credible, and can commit for an infinite number of periods. Using a baseline forward looking model, this study explores the implications of relaxing these assumptions in turn. First, finite lasting commitments are introduced using a stochastic exogenous process that generates policy reoptimizations. As a consequence, monetary policy is characterized with a continuum from pure discretion to full commitment. Second, we solve the optimal and robust targeting rules when the central bank confronts imperfect and/or uncertain credibility. Imperfect credibility is defined as a situation in which the private sector expects the commitment regime to end sooner than that is intended by the policy maker. The results indicate that, under imperfect credibility, optimal policy becomes observationally closer to the discretionary solution, the more being so as the degree of uncertainty rises. These findings may be insightful for explaining the observed near-discretionary behavior of the central banks, which indeed operate under imperfect credibility.

A Note on Imperfect Credibility

A Note on Imperfect Credibility
Author: Ippei Fujiwara
Publisher:
Total Pages: 16
Release: 2016
Genre:
ISBN:

We explore how outcomes of optimal monetary policy with loose commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) can be observationally equivalent, or interpretable as outcomes of deeper optimal policy under sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990). Both interpretations of “imperfect credibility” in optimal monetary policy design are attempts to rationalize outcomes that lie in between the conventional extremes of optimal policy under commitment and under discretion. In a standard monetary-policy framework, when we match impulse responses of inflation and the output gap to large enough markup shocks, we find that a small probability (1 - a = 0.05) of replanning in the quasi/loose commitment world corresponds to N = 18 in the N-period punishment optimal sustainable monetary policy, in terms of observable outcomes. For plausible cases of loose-commitment model economies (with a between 0.77 and 1) we can find an observationally equivalent sustainable-plan economy indexed by some N.

Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers

Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
Author: Allan Drazen
Publisher:
Total Pages: 44
Release: 1993
Genre: Devaluation of currency
ISBN:

Standard models of policy credibility. defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out. emphasize the preferences of the policymaker (his "type") and the role of policies in signaling type. Whether a policy is carried out. however. should also reflect the state of the economy. so that even a "tough" policymaker may renege on an announced policy in adverse circumstances. We investigate this alternative notion of credibility, using an "escape clause" model of devaluation. in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in the process driving unemployment, following a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. in contrast to the results in the earlier literature. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis

Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks

Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks
Author: Davide Debortoli
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 56
Release: 2017-07-21
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1484311752

Yes, it makes a lot of sense. This paper studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilizing economic activity also stabilizes other welfare relevant variables. Second, the estimated model features mitigated inflation distortions due to a low elasticity of substitution between monopolistic goods and a low interest rate sensitivity of demand. The result holds up in the presence of measurement errors, with large shocks that generate a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and resource utilization, and also when ensuring a low probability of hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates.

The Inflation-Targeting Debate

The Inflation-Targeting Debate
Author: Ben S. Bernanke
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Total Pages: 469
Release: 2007-11-01
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0226044734

Over the past fifteen years, a significant number of industrialized and middle-income countries have adopted inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policymaking. As the name suggests, in such inflation-targeting regimes, the central bank is responsible for achieving a publicly announced target for the inflation rate. While the objective of controlling inflation enjoys wide support among both academic experts and policymakers, and while the countries that have followed this model have generally experienced good macroeconomic outcomes, many important questions about inflation targeting remain. In Inflation Targeting, a distinguished group of contributors explores the many underexamined dimensions of inflation targeting—its potential, its successes, and its limitations—from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint, and for both developed and emerging economies. The volume opens with a discussion of the optimal formulation of inflation-targeting policy and continues with a debate about the desirability of such a model for the United States. The concluding chapters discuss the special problems of inflation targeting in emerging markets, including the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.

Central Banks at a Crossroads

Central Banks at a Crossroads
Author: Michael D. Bordo
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 719
Release: 2016-06-09
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1107149665

This book discusses the role of central banks and draws lessons from examining their evolution over the past two centuries.

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality

Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality
Author: Jonathan Benchimol
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 52
Release: 2019-08-02
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1498324584

The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.