Hard Core Cartels Recent progress and challenges ahead

Hard Core Cartels Recent progress and challenges ahead
Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
Total Pages: 64
Release: 2003-05-27
Genre:
ISBN: 926410125X

This book reviews progress in the fight against hard core cartels. It quantifies the harm caused by cartels and identifies improved methods of investigation. It also examines progress in strengthening sanctions against businesses and individuals.

Fighting Hard-core Cartels Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes

Fighting Hard-core Cartels Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes
Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
Total Pages: 102
Release: 2002-05-29
Genre:
ISBN: 9264174990

This book contributes to the existing knowledge about the extent of cartels' overcharges and other harm to businesses and consumers worldwide, and sheds light on new and effective "leniency programmes", as well as on optimal sanctions in cartel cases.

Hard Core Cartels

Hard Core Cartels
Author: Organizacja Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju
Publisher:
Total Pages: 60
Release: 2000
Genre:
ISBN:

Do Discriminatory Leniency Policies Fight Hard-Core Cartels?

Do Discriminatory Leniency Policies Fight Hard-Core Cartels?
Author: Georg Clemens
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

This paper experimentally analyzes the effects of nondiscriminatory and discriminatory leniency policies on hard-core cartels. We design a mechanism to form a hard-core cartel, which allows that multiple ringleaders emerge. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of hard-core cartels. A leniency policy that grants amnesty to all “whistle-blowers” except for ringleaders may therefore reduce the incentive to become a ringleader and disrupt cartel formation. Yet, our experimental results show that whistle-blowing rarely occurs. Paradoxically, the discriminatory leniency policy induces firms to become ringleaders. We find that firms create trust among other firms when acting as ringleaders. This signaling effect ultimately facilitates coordination in the explicit cartel.

Defining and Regulating Hardcore Cartels in Hong Kong

Defining and Regulating Hardcore Cartels in Hong Kong
Author: Sinchit Lai
Publisher:
Total Pages: 60
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

In 2012, Hong Kong passed the Competition Ordinance, the region's first cross-sector competition law. In the statue, the government introduced a legal term called “Serious Anti-competitive Conduct” which includes four conducts, namely price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging. At a glance, this legal term is very similar to another term called “Hard Core Cartels” introduced by OECD in 1998. In fact, the two terms are different because “Hard Core Cartels” includes only the four conducts formed horizontally (e.g. between competitors) while “Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct” includes the four conducts formed both horizontally and vertically (e.g. between distributors and retailers). This created a divergence between international standard and Hong Kong legislators. Based on the definition of “Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct”, Hong Kong legislators formed a dual-track system by imposing differentiable statutory regulations to conducts that the legislators believed to be more and less serious. Thereafter, the local law enforcement agency created two more terms known as “Cartel Conduct” and “The Four Don't” off the statue. This is identified as an attempt of the agency to reconcile the divergence. After reviewing the legislation history, this Comment suggested that the divergence was formed by ignorance when the Hong Kong government proposed to the legislators to introduce the term “Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct” in the statue in response to the concern of SMEs. Furthermore, this Comment analyzed the divergence based on rule of evidence developed in the U.S. judicial experience and suggested that the divergence is unjustified. Also, this Comment pointed out the limitations of the agency's attempt to reconcile the divergence. This Comment concluded that the divergence and reconciliation all together unintendedly created more legal uncertainties and discouraged companies to form some agreements that may induce net pro-competitive effect. Thus, this Comment urged for amending the definition of “Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct” in Hong Kong's Competition Ordinance.

Regulating Cartels in Europe

Regulating Cartels in Europe
Author: Christopher Harding
Publisher:
Total Pages: 439
Release: 2010
Genre: Law
ISBN: 0199551480

One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of EU competition law and policy has been the regulation of those serious competition or antitrust violations now often referred to as 'hard core cartels'. Such cartel activity typically involves large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe and beyond, and comprise practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing, and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little disagreement now, in terms of competition theory and policy at both international and national levels, regarding the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been subject to increasing condemnation in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Regulating Cartels in Europe provides critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the activities of such anti-competitive business cartels. They trace the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the more pragmatic and empirical approached favored in Europe with the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels. In particular, the work considers critically the move towards the use of fully fledged criminal proceedings in this area of legal control, examining evolving aspects of enforcement policy such as the use of leniency programs and the deployment of a range of criminal law and other sanctions. This new edition of the work covers emerging themes and arguments in the discipline, including the judicial review of decisions against cartels, the criminological and legal basis of the criminalization of cartel conduct, and the range and effectiveness of sanctions used in response to cartel activity.

How Do Cartels Operate?

How Do Cartels Operate?
Author: Joseph Emmett Harrington
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 120
Release: 2006
Genre: Cartels
ISBN: 1933019409

This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel's organizational structure.