Game Theoretical Models for Disarmament
Author | : Wilfried Engelmann |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 55 |
Release | : 1993 |
Genre | : Disarmament |
ISBN | : 9783861114086 |
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Author | : Wilfried Engelmann |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 55 |
Release | : 1993 |
Genre | : Disarmament |
ISBN | : 9783861114086 |
Author | : David A. Burke |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 116 |
Release | : 1999-11-01 |
Genre | : Information warfare |
ISBN | : 9781423540212 |
The repeated game of incomplete information model, a subclass of game theory models, was modified to include aspects of information warfare. The repeated game of incomplete information model was first developed to analyze nuclear weapons disarmament negotiations. The central role of information in this model suggested its applicability to IW, which focuses on the defense and acquisition of information. A randomized experimental design was utilized to determine how people behave in a laboratory IW setting and to test the IW game model's basic predictions. The impact of experience and learning on IW performance was also assessed during the experiment. IW experience and devices that support learning during an IW engagement improved performance in some situations. The IW game theory model was shown to have some predictive capability and, with further development, could support further IW analysis and simulation.
Author | : John P Mayberry |
Publisher | : Westview Press |
Total Pages | : 234 |
Release | : 1992-10-19 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
Commissioned for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the late 1960s, these papers, all by game theorists, marked great advances in bargaining theory, repeated games with incomplete information and proliferation models with special applications to arms control.
Author | : Morton D. Davis |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 23 |
Release | : 1962 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
The problem is to determine the proper behavior of two parties to a disarmament agreemenc: one, the inspector attempting to either inhibit evasion or to maximize the probability of detecting any evasion should it occur, the other, an evader or possible evader, attempting to evaluation the possible gains from evasion, the possible losses in being caught evading, and thus deciding whether to evade or not, and if deciding to evade how to do so with the least chance of being caught. The model is a simplification of reality with an assumption that the evader has decided to evade and has but to choose the ''proper'' manner. As an input to such decisions, it isimportant to know the consequences of evading, so that the problems considered, logically precede the ones ignored. The model has an inspector and evader with diammetrically opposed interests, trying to raise and lower, the probability of detecting evasions, respectively. In the terminology of Game Theory, this is a zero-sum game. (Author).
Author | : Robert J. Aumann |
Publisher | : MIT Press |
Total Pages | : 372 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9780262011471 |
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author | : Irmgard Niemeyer |
Publisher | : Springer Nature |
Total Pages | : 449 |
Release | : 2020-03-12 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 3030295370 |
This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.
Author | : Thomas L. Saaty |
Publisher | : John Wiley & Sons |
Total Pages | : 216 |
Release | : 1968 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Nicolai N. Vorob'ev |
Publisher | : Birkhäuser |
Total Pages | : 501 |
Release | : 2012-12-06 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : 3034885148 |
The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and § 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and § 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Kalkofen (on equilibrium selection). When the Russian edition was being written, these direc tions in game theory had not yet attained their final form, which appeared only in quite recent monographs; the present author has had to resist the temptation of attempting to produce an elementary exposition of the new theories for the English edition; readers of this edition will find only brief mention of the new material.