As the U.S. Army faces new and uncertain challenges across the globe, the need to create new capabilities in organizations, doctrine, and equipment is critical. As new threats in the sea, air, land and cyber domains appear, it is vital for the Army to produce capable and well-equipped formations that are prepared to adapt and meet any challenges. This thesis examines the relationship between how peace-time innovation influences combat adaptation. It uses the history of the 10th Mountain Division as a historical example of how the Army faced threats in multiple areas of the world. In response, it innovated to create a new capability to fight in the mountains. Using new techniques, it recruited highly experienced volunteers, developed new training and equipment to build a new capability for the U.S. Army. As a result of this innovation, the 10th Mountain exemplified a highly adaptive and successful formation in combat. The War Department's ability to leverage innovation to create an adaptive organization is relevant to the contemporary Army and how it looks at the challenges of multi-domain battle and the Army War Fighting Challenges.The challenges of mountain warfare span the chapters of military history. Mountainous terrain coupled with dynamic weather challenges any military's ability to move, maneuver, employ direct and indirect fires, conduct logistical operations and conduct medical evacuation. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations during World War II was no exception. The ability to dislodge and defeat German defensive positions that dominated the high ground in northern Italy presented unique problems for the commanders of the Fifth and Eighth Armies in mid-1944. The United States Army and the War Department addressed this challenge by employing the capabilities of the 10th Mountain Division.The formation of the 10th Mountain Division was almost a four-year process. Starting as early as 1940, the foundations for training, equipping and recruit mountain soldiers was evident. The Division was eventually activated and trained for combat at Camp Hale, Colorado. From its initial formation until its eventual deployment to Italy in 1944, the Army used a unique process to address the challenges of creating a new capability. It leveraged America's civilian alpine expertise alongside Army leaders to train, man, and equip the division. This concept was an innovative process that was used to build a new capability for the Army. This new capability gave the Army an advantage in the mountains of northern Italy in late 1944 and early 1945. The division's initial missions were the trigger for the Allied spring offensive in 1945. It continued to lead 5th Army north through Italy until the war's end. Throughout this time, the division employed new techniques, developed during their training at Camp Hale, to enable them to adapt quickly to their wartime situations and successfully conduct their operations in northern Italy.Chapter 1 * Introduction * Research Methodology * National Sentiment and Training for War * DOTMLPF Framework * Innovation and Adaptation * Conclusion * Chapter 2 * The National Ski Patrol * The Catalyst for Change * Recruiting * Equipment and Doctrine * Conclusion * Chapter 3 * The Training Problem * Early Divisional Winter Training * Construction of Camp Hale * The Mountain Training Center and the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment * Mountain Winter Warfare Board * Conclusion * Chapter 4 * The 10th Mountain Division * Training the Division for War * Arrival in Italy * Riva Ridge and Mount Belvedere * Conclusion * Chapter 5 * Conclusions and Recommendations * Recommendations * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment