This dissertation consists of three essays in applied financial economics. The unifying theme is the use of financial regulation as quasi-experiments to understand the interrelationship between derivatives and the underlying assets. The first two essays use different quasi-experimental econometric techniques to answer the same research question: how does option listing affect the return volatility of the underlying stock? This question is difficult to answer empirically because being listed on an options exchange is not random. Volatility is one of the dimensions along which the options exchanges make their listing decisions. This selection bias confounds any causal effect that option listing may have. What is more, the options exchanges may list along unobservable dimensions. Such omitted variable bias can also confound any causal effect of option listing. My first essay overcomes these two biases by exploiting the exogenous variation in option listing that is created by the SEC-imposed option listing standards. Specifically, the SEC mandates that a stock must meet certain criteria in the underlying market before it can trade on an options exchange. For example, a stock needs to trade a total of 2.4 million shares over the previous 12 months before it can be listed. Since 2.4 million is an arbitrary number, stocks that are "just above" the 2.4 million threshold will be identical to stocks that are "just below" it, the sole difference being their probability of option listing. Accordingly, I use the 2.4 million threshold as an instrument for option listing in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. I find that option listing causes a modest decrease in underlying volatility, a result that corroborates many previous empirical studies. My second essay attempts to estimate the effect of option listing for stocks that are "far away from" the 2.4 million threshold. I overcome the aforementioned omitted variable bias by fully exploiting the panel nature of the data. I control for the unobserved heterogeneity across stocks by implementing a two-way fixed effects model. Unlike most previous studies, I control for individual-level fixed effects at the firm level rather than at the industry level. My results show that option listing is associated with a decrease in volatility. Importantly, these results are only statistically significant in a model with firm-level fixed effects; they are insignificant with industry-level fixed effects. My third essay is a policy evaluation of the SEC's Penny Pilot Program, a mandated decrease of the option tick size for various equity options classes. Several financial professionals claimed that this decrease would drive institutional investors out of the exchange-traded options market, channeling them into the opaque, over-the-counter (OTC) options market. I empirically test an implication of this hypothesis: if institutional investors have fled the exchange-traded options market for the OTC market, then it may take longer for information to be impounded into a stock's price. Using the `price delay' measure of Hou and Moskowitz (2005), I test whether stocks become less price efficient as a result of being included in the Penny Pilot Program. I perform this test using firm-level fixed effects on all classes that were included in the program. I confirm these results with synthetic control experiments for the classes included in Phase I of the Penny Pilot Program. Generally, I find no change in price efficiency of the underlying stocks, which suggests that the decrease in option tick size did not materially erode the price discovery that takes place in the exchange-traded equity options market. I also find evidence that the decrease in option tick size caused an increase in short selling for the piloted stocks.