Optimization, Dynamics, and Economic Analysis

Optimization, Dynamics, and Economic Analysis
Author: Engelbert J. Dockner
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 434
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3642576842

This book includes a collection of articles that present recent developments in the fields of optimization and dynamic game theory, economic dynamics, dynamic theory of the firm, and population dynamics and non standard applications of optimal control theory. The authors of the articles are well respected authorities in their fields and are known for their high quality research in the fields of optimization and economic dynamics.

Bayesian Implementation

Bayesian Implementation
Author: Thomas R. Palfrey
Publisher: CRC Press
Total Pages: 126
Release: 2020-08-26
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1000154645

The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.

Contract Theory

Contract Theory
Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 746
Release: 2004-12-10
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262025768

A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

Optimal Enterprise

Optimal Enterprise
Author: Mikhail V. Belov
Publisher: CRC Press
Total Pages: 277
Release: 2021-07-28
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 1000344223

In the modern world, most gross product is created within Enterprise firms, project programs, state agencies, transnational corporations and their divisions, as well as various associations and compositions of the above entities. Enterprises, being, on the one hand, complex, and, on the other hand, widespread systems, are the subject matter of cybernetics, system theory, operations research, management sciences and many other fields of knowledge. However, the complexity of the system obstructs the development of mathematically rigorous foundations for Enterprise control. Moreover, methods of operations research and related sciences, which are widely used in practice, provide optimization of the constituents of an Enterprise, without modeling it as a whole system. But the optimization of parts does not lead to the optimality of the whole, and, also, the absence of top-down and holistic mathematical models of Enterprise contradicts the principle of holism and the system approach. The approach in this book looks first at Enterprise Systems and their essential aspects as complex sociotechnical systems composed of integrated sets of structural and process models (Chapters 1 and 2). A uniform description of all the heterogeneous fields of the modern Enterprise (marketing, sales, manufacturing, HR, finance, etc.) is then made, and the Enterprise Control Problem is posed as a top-down and holistic mathematical optimization problem (Chapter 3). Original models and methods of contract theory (Chapter 4), technology management (Chapter 5), human behavior and human capital (Chapter 6) and complex activity and resource planning (Chapter 7) are developed to solve the problem. Structural processes and mathematical models constitute an Optimal Enterprise Control Framework (Chapter 8) that provides a practical solution to the Enterprise Control Problem. This book is a resource for postgraduate and doctoral students, postdoctoral researchers and professors with research interests in the following fields of science: Fundamental Complex Systems study, Complex Systems Engineering, Enterprise Systems Engineering Applications of Operations Research, Optimization, Probability and Stochastic processes to Management Science, Economics and Business Theory of the Firm Business and Management – general, strategy/leadership, organization management, operations management and management information systems Theory of Business Processes, Business Processes Improvement and Reengineering

Contributions to Insurance Economics

Contributions to Insurance Economics
Author: Georges Dionne
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 536
Release: 2013-04-17
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9401711682

For a number of years, I have been teaching and doing research in the economics of uncertainty, information, and insurance. Although it is now possible to find textbooks and books of essays on uncertainty and in formation in economics and finance for graduate students and researchers, there is no equivalent material that covers advanced research in insurance. The purpose of this book is to fill this gap in literature. It provides original surveys and essays in the field of insurance economics. The contributions offer basic reference, new material, and teaching supple ments to graduate students and researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. It represents a complement to the book of readings entitled Foundations of Insurance Economics - Readings in Economics and Finance, recently published by the S.S. Huebner Foundation of Insurance Education. In that book, the editors (G. Dionne and S. Harrington) disseminate key papers in the literature and publish an original survey of major contributions in the field.

Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns

Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns
Author: Robert Gibbons
Publisher:
Total Pages: 70
Release: 1991
Genre: Compensation management
ISBN:

This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a worker's current output to update its belief about the worker's ability and competition then forces future wages (or wage contracts) to reflect these updated beliefs. Career concerns are stronger when a worker is further from retirement, because a longer prospective career increases the return to changing the market's belief. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.