My dissertation explores the leading role of ownership structures in corporate governance for publicly traded firms in emerging markets. I analyze the relationships between ownership structures, corporate governance mechanisms, firm value and market liquidity for a sample of Latin American firms. The predominant highly concentrated ownership within a context of weak shareholder protection provides a rich environment to explore corporate governance practices in a regional setting. The period of analysis, 2000-2006, is characterized by economic growth sustained by the expansion of foreign direct investment in a post-privatization era. The region as a whole, rather than just individual markets, became an attractive investment destination. In addition the development of a private pension system initiated in Chile and subsequently expanded to more than 25 countries (the AFP system) reinvigorated the capital markets which have become more attractive as a means of diversification for global portfolios. Moreover, understanding the implications of concentrated ownership structures is fundamental for participants in a yet incipient mergers and acquisitions market. My dissertation consists of three related essays which collectively cohere to represent my research approach and understanding of the topic and they all benefit from the exploitation of a unique ownership database. This work serves to advance the finance literature in several dimensions: a) the manuscript examines at markets which have hitherto been ignored or at best simply characterized as having very weak governance structures; b) it addresses endogeneity problems from the initial design of this research project through the data collection process; c) furthermore, I extend the literature on the interactions between governance mechanisms and firm value; and d) it develops new corporate governance measures, including novel "effective" firm ownership variables for these markets. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Specifically, I examine performance effects that may be attributable to discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights. I examine the extent to which dominant shareholders can divert resources for their own consumption, in turn reducing overall shareholder value. Given the large potential for private consumption, by the dominant shareholders, I also explore the motivations for outside investors to participate in the financing of the firms' activities.