Performance and Behavior of Family Firms

Performance and Behavior of Family Firms
Author: Esra Memili
Publisher: MDPI
Total Pages: 174
Release: 2018-03-23
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3038427810

This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms" that was published in IJFS

Three Essays on Corporate Governance of Family Firms

Three Essays on Corporate Governance of Family Firms
Author: Tarek El Masri
Publisher:
Total Pages: 171
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

This dissertation is comprised of three essays on issues related to the corporate governance of family firms. The first essay explores how owners-managers of family firms conceptualize and define their firms. Understanding the essence of a family firm helps us better understand their governance and behaviour. This essay contributes to the family business literature by presenting the seven most important criteria in identifying a family business (Handler 1989; Shanker & Astrachan 1996), namely: family ownership, control, involvement, succession, long-term vision, founders' legacy, and extended family of employees. The essay also contributes a familiness measurement tool that can be used in future research aiming at better understanding the family firm. The second essay investigates how management control technologies are calibrated in accordance with the sometimes conflicting economic and noneconomic goals resulting from the dual identities of family firms. The results show that family firms calibrate pervasive management control technologies, such as calculative, family-centric or procedural controls to strengthen the business identity and reduce the family identity of their family business. In comparison, the minimal use, or perceived absence, of management control technologies suggest that it accentuates and fosters family identity. Hence, reverting to management control technologies becomes related in a unilateral way to the business identity of the firm, despite the dual control ambition of family firms. The third essay analyzes CEO and TMT compensation practices to identify patterns that can explain the gap between family firms and the pool of external highly qualified executives. The data analysis highlights a connection between the degree of family ownership, the composition of the BOD, and the identity of the CEO. The results also show that family firms rely more heavily on cash-based awards than on equity-based awards as a form of CEO and TMT compensation. Family firms are reluctant to use option-based rewards and the use of share-based awards is also kept at a minimum. Other evidence point towards a role that institutional ownership plays in restructuring the compensation packages of the TMTs at family firms. Keywords: Family Firms, Definition of Family Firms, Family Firm Identity, Management Control Technologies, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation.

Two Essays in Corporate Finance

Two Essays in Corporate Finance
Author: An Chee Low
Publisher:
Total Pages: 160
Release: 2007
Genre: Compensation management
ISBN:

Abstract: Problems of endogeneity often cloud interpretation in corporate governance research. In this dissertation, I make use of changes in takeover laws as exogenous shocks to examine how managers react to a weakening of the corporate governance structure. In the first essay, I examine how the increased protection from hostile takeovers affects managerial incentives to change firm risk, while in the second essay I examine how firm size and firm investment behavior changes in response to the exogenous shocks. In both cases, I find that managers take actions that are beneficial to themselves but are detrimental to shareholders. Empirical evidence in the first essay show that risk-averse managers decrease firm risk in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s. I also find that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives. Further, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking. Overall, the evidence supports the hypothesis that equity-based compensation can be used to align managerial interests with that of shareholders. In the second essay, I find that managers increase their firm size in response to the increased protection from hostile takeovers. The increase is predominantly among firms with low growth and high cash holdings which are exactly the firms where the agency costs of free cash flow are most costly to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). I also predict important differences in managerial empire-building through internal investments versus external acquisitions in the 1980s and 1990s based on changes in stocks and options-based incentives. Consistent with my predictions, managers prefer to empire-build through internal investments during the 1980s, while in 1990s they choose to grow more through external acquisitions.

Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance

Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance
Author: David De Angelis
Publisher:
Total Pages: 192
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.

ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE

ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE
Author: Serkan Akguc
Publisher:
Total Pages: 218
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

The analysis of key corporate decisions is mostly restricted to publicly listed firms even though privately held firms constitute a substantial part of any economy. In this dissertation, my goal is to enhance our understanding of some of the important decisions of private firms, namely: cash holdings, investment and performance using unique and large cross-country samples. In the first chapter, I examine cash holdings of private, unlisted firms versus publicly traded firms in 33 European countries during 2002-2011. I find that the average cash-to-assets ratios are lower in the Eurozone than in non-Eurozone countries by 5.4% due to lower transaction demand under a single currency regime. Public firms have higher cash ratios than private firms. However, the difference in cash ratios between public and private firms is higher in the Eurozone than in non-Eurozone countries, reflecting that: (a) precautionary demand is higher in the Eurozone due to risks and pitfalls of policy coordination, and (b) economic adjustments and transfers in the Eurozone more directly affect publicly traded firms than private ones. Moreover, I show that, during the financial crisis, corporate cash ratios increased in the Eurozone, indicating that the increase in precautionary cash demand was greater than a decrease in transaction demand due to the adoption of the Euro. In the second chapter, I compare the operating performance and efficiency of publicly and privately held firms in the UK over the period 2003-2012. I find that privately held firms typically perform better than publicly traded firms. This finding is robust in various model settings, using industry and size as well as propensity scored matched samples, considering alternative definitions of operating performance, ownership structure and taking into account the endogeneity of firm's exchange listing choice. I also show that average operating profitability of public firms is even lower than that of private firms when both types of firms are financially constrained. Finally, I show that informational value of R&D is higher for private firms than it is for public firms. In the third chapter, I examine the relationship between time horizons and corporate investment, both on the firm and country levels, for private, unlisted firms and publicly traded firms using a unique dataset from 73 countries around the world during the time period of 2003-2012. I show that a longer time horizon (i.e. higher propensity to save and invest) on a cultural and country level also manifests itself as higher investment at the firm level. This is robust to using alternative proxies for the country-level time horizon. Investment behavior of private firms, not public firms, follows a country-level horizon pattern, which is reflective of close monitoring by fewer owners and the absence of stock market pressures in making investment decisions. When I consider time-horizon at the firm-level, we find that firms with a longer time horizon invest more, and this effect is more pronounced for public firms than for private firms, given the former's greater, easier, and cheaper access to capital in the public capital market. I also show that public firms invest more and are more responsive to investment opportunities than private firms.

How Family Firms Differ

How Family Firms Differ
Author: S. Bhaumik
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 150
Release: 2014-11-25
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1137473584

Family firms account for a large proportion of firms in most countries. In industrialised countries of North America and Western Europe, they generally account for a large share of small and medium sized enterprises. In emerging market economies such as India, they also account for the majority of the large firms. Their importance for factors such as employment creation notwithstanding, relative to the widely held Anglo-Saxon firms, which are ubiquitous in the economics, finance and management literatures, family firms have historically received much less attention from scholars of these disciplines. However, in part owing to increased focus on emerging markets, there is a growing literature on family firms. In How Family Firms Differ, the authors explore important aspects of family firms, drawing on the existing literature and their own research on these firms.

Corporate Finance and Governance in Stakeholder Society

Corporate Finance and Governance in Stakeholder Society
Author: Shinichi Hirota
Publisher: Routledge
Total Pages: 318
Release: 2015-02-11
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1317558464

This book develops a new framework - the stakeholder model - that helps to understand corporate finance and governance in modern society, where the sources of people’s happiness have shifted from monetary to non-monetary factors. The book takes a more comprehensive approach than is typically found in the standard economics and finance literature, by explicitly incorporating both the monetary and non-monetary interests of stakeholders and by examining the value creation of corporations from a much broader perspective. Specifically, the book addresses contemporary issues concerning corporate finance and governance worldwide, including: How should we define corporate value in stakeholder society? What is the role of modern corporations? What are the principles underlying corporate financing decisions? To what extent should shareholder rights be enhanced? What determines the effectiveness of a company’s board of directors? What missions do firms set out and what is the role of mission statements? How can we understand the diversity of financial and governance systems among different countries? What legal and institutional reforms enhance or diminish corporate value in stakeholder society? The book will answer these questions theoretically and empirically.