Eliminating Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs

Eliminating Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs
Author: Daniel Buchholz
Publisher:
Total Pages: 22
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

Do parties to an alternate business entity are provided sufficient judicial protection during the formation of an operating agreement? On the one hand, the core policy of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (“DLLCA”) is “to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.” Thus, parties can provide themselves with adequate protection through the negotiation of the operating agreement. On the other hand, however, parties may not be in a position to negotiate during the drafting of the operating agreement and become unable to back out of the deal. Because the operating agreement does not need to be filed when the LLC is formed, parties may become too invested in the company by the time the operating agreement is drafted, preventing them from finding another business partner and, thereby, removing their bargaining power. Moreover, while the policy of the DLLCA may be to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract, there is evidence that operating agreements are not highly negotiated and may even be based on form agreements.

On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties

On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties
Author: Andrew S. Gold
Publisher:
Total Pages: 65
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

Delaware recently amended its statutes to permit limited liability companies (quot;LLCsquot;) and limited partnerships to eliminate fiduciary duties. At the same time, Delaware law makes clear that the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated for these business entities. In this context at least, fiduciary duties become contractual defaults. Accordingly, significant issues are raised as to when fiduciary duties have been successfully removed, and how broad any residual duty of good faith should be. Based on existing Delaware law, this is a problem of contract interpretation: courts must resolve the status of intra-firm duties in light of the firm's governing agreement. For a range of reasons, including statutory policy, avoidance of judicial error, and autonomy concerns, this article will suggest that a textualist mode of interpretation is appropriate when courts enforce LLC or limited partnership agreements which have eliminated fiduciary duties.

Symonds & O'Toole on Delaware Limited Liability Companies

Symonds & O'Toole on Delaware Limited Liability Companies
Author: Robert L. Symonds
Publisher: Wolters Kluwer
Total Pages: 1664
Release: 2006-10-17
Genre: Law
ISBN: 0735555982

Symonds & O'Toole on Delaware Limited Liability Companies byrenowned experts Robert L Symonds, Jr. and Matthew J. O'Toole combinespractice-based Delaware LLC insights, completely current coverage, andup-to-date forms presented in logical order, allowing you to confidentlyrepresent your clients from start to finish. Everything you need to know aboutDelaware Limited Liability Companies is included in this one easy-to-usereference, complete with Bonus Delaware LLC Forms CD-ROM.Since the 1988 IRS ruling permitting the advantages of pass-through taxreporting, the number of Delaware Limited Liability Companies formedannually has increased at an explosive rate. Symonds & O'Toole onDelaware Limited Liability Companies provides practical evaluation ofthe Delaware Limited Liability Company, expertly analyzing the mostcurrent Delaware LLC law, as well as the underlying principles andreasoning, allowing you to master the specific issues facing Delaware LLCpractitioners today, and to find workable approaches to potentiallyproblematic Delaware LLC situations.Symonds & O'Toole on Delaware Limited Liability Companies isthe first resource to include complete coverage of all 2006 statutory changesregarding:Filings of Delaware LLC Documents with the Secretary of StateDelaware Limited Liability Company managementFundamental Transactions, including Delaware LLC mergers, conversionand consolidation of other entities into the Delaware LLC (andDelaware LLC into other entities)Everything you need to know about a Delaware Limited Liability Company isfound in this one easy-to-use reference:Expert "how to" guidance on drafting Delaware Limited LiabilityCompany agreementsExtensive Tables covering changes to the Delaware limited Liability CompanyAct and Delaware LLC case lawDelaware LLC Forms for practitioners drafted by experiencedpractitionersReliable In-Depth, Expert Coverage of all 2006 Delaware LLC statutoryamendmentsAbout Authors Robert L. Symonds Jr. and Matthew J. O'Toole:Robert L. Symonds Jr. and Matthew J. O'Toole are shareholders and directors inthe Delaware office of Stevens & LeeP.C. Both have broad experience with the structuring and use ofDelaware business entities. Mr. Symonds is one of the original drafters of theDelaware Limited Liability Company Act, and is a member of the Delaware StateBar Association's committee charged with reviewing and proposing amendments tothe Delaware Statutory Trust Act. Mr. O'Toole is a member of the Council ofthe Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association. Mr. Symondsand Mr. O'Toole both serve on the Delaware State Bar Association's committeethat reviews and proposes amendments to Delaware's Limited Liability Companyand Partnership Statutes, and Mr. Symonds is immediate past Chair of thatcommittee.

Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs

Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs
Author: H. Justin Pace
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2016
Genre:
ISBN:

LLCs statutes ostensibly offer businesspersons far greater ability to contract out of fiduciary duties than the partnership statutes that once would have covered similar businesses. Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies identifies five approaches to contracting out of fiduciary duties. Of these, the approach taken in the Delaware statute is by far the most popular, rivaled only by the approach of the ULLCA. Sixteen other states have adopted the Delaware approach. These include both major LLC states such as Nevada and Delaware and major commercial states such as California and Texas. The Delaware approach allows for complete freedom of contract in contracting out of fiduciary duties (outside of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all contracts). While it is unsurprising that many states would look to Delaware for business association law given the leading role it has traditionally played, it is surprising that they would adopt such a permissive approach to this issue. This paper shows that several courts outside of Delaware have been hostile to waivers of fiduciary duties in LLC operating agreements, permissive LLC statutes notwithstanding. This paper also shows, perhaps more problematically, that courts in only some of the states that follow Delaware's approach have addressed the issue. This paper addresses arguments against enforcing waivers, including arguments rooted in cognitive limitations, and identifies statutory, not common, law as the better path to providing for waiver.

Seven Points to Explain Why the Law Ought Not Allow the Elimination of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses - Cardozo is Dead

Seven Points to Explain Why the Law Ought Not Allow the Elimination of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses - Cardozo is Dead
Author: Daniel S. Kleinberger
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

Prepared as part of the author's work as co-reporter for the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, this essay argues against legislation that empowers private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty within a business organization. The essay considers: (i) the venerable role of fiduciary duty within business organizations and the limited predictive powers of those urging radical reform; (ii) the absence of prescience in contract drafters; (iii) the strict construction function of fiduciary law; (iv) the inevitable and inappropriate pressure that elimination would put on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing; (v) the differences in remedy available for fiduciary claims as distinguished from contract claims; (vi) the difference between drafting law for Delaware and drafting a uniform act; and (vii) reasons that public corporation law is different from LLC law and why Delaware law should not dominate the latter context.

The Rise of the Uncorporation

The Rise of the Uncorporation
Author: Larry E. Ribstein
Publisher:
Total Pages: 294
Release: 2010
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0195377095

The Rise of the Uncorporation covers the history, law, and finance of unincorporated firms. These "uncorporations" including general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies, are now the dominant business form of non-publicly-traded firms. Through private equity and publicly traded partnerships, uncorporations have emerged as a significant force in the governance of a wide range of the biggest firms. This is the first general theoretical and practical overview of alternatives to incorporation, including ancillary concepts connected with the evolution of these firms, and analysis of likely future trends in business organization. The Rise of the Uncorporation provides a clear and easily understandable theoretical and practical background to this important subject.

Lubaroff and Altman on Delaware Limited Partnerships, 2nd Edition

Lubaroff and Altman on Delaware Limited Partnerships, 2nd Edition
Author: Lubaroff, Altman, Novak, Raju
Publisher: Wolters Kluwer
Total Pages: 1242
Release: 2019-12-17
Genre: Law
ISBN: 154381736X

Lubaroff and Altman on Delaware Limited Partnerships is the first complete guide containing everything needed to form, operate and dissolve a Delaware limited partnership. Includes forms prepared by the authors, explanations of every statutory section, and analysis of fiduciary duties, protections, reorganization, foreign limited partnerships, derivative actions, and indemnification rights. By Martin I. Lubaroff and Paul M. Altman. The text of every section of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as revised from 1983 through 2011, is set out in full, showing additions and deletions in each version of the act. The explanations of every statutory section cover all practical aspects of forming, operating, and dissolving a limited partnership. Thorough explanations of statutory provisions are integrated with detailed analysis of case law from Delaware. Plus, timely coverage is given to critical legal issues: Fiduciary duties of the partners Protections related to the liability of limited partners Defining the financial aspects of the limited partnership General and limited partners Reorganization of a limited partnership with or into other types of business entities Foreign limited partnerships Derivative actions Indemnification rights that can be granted to partners under a partnership agreement Delaware limited liability companies Previous Edition: Lubaroff and Altman on Delaware Limited Partnerships, ISBN 9781567062885

Triple Error

Triple Error
Author: Allan Vestal
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

In a recent law review article Delaware Chief Justice Myron Steele argues that Delaware courts should interpret Delaware's limited liability company (“LLC”) and limited partnership (“LP”) statutes as not including any default fiduciary duties. Therefore, he argues that the only fiduciary duties in Delaware LLCs and LPs arise from the parties' express contract. Although such thought-piece musings from most state court jurists would not be particularly significant, the fact that Chief Justice Steele writes from a significant business law state means that attention is given to what he says. We argue that Chief Justice Steele is in error in three identifiable ways, which we elaborate in the remainder of this essay.

The Going-Private Freeze-Out

The Going-Private Freeze-Out
Author: Brent J. Horton
Publisher:
Total Pages: 50
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

This Article is the first to empirically examine provisions that limit or eliminate the fiduciary duties of managers (in the case of LLCs) and general partners (in the case of LPs) in the operating agreements of publicly traded non-corporate business associations, and link those findings to a problem faced by investors in such entities, the going-private freeze-out. In a going-private freeze-out, public stockownership is eliminated and the company becomes closely held. This Article is especially timely given the exponential growth of LPs and LLCs over the past fifteen years. In 2011, in Delaware, the state of formation for most publicly traded companies, seventy-five percent of newly formed companies were either LPs or LLCs (up from twenty percent in 1997). This Article begins with an explanation of corporate going-private freeze-outs, and the dissatisfaction that may arise among cashed-out shareholders seeking a fair price. In the corporate context such shareholders are protected by the fiduciary doctrine of entire fairness. The cashed-out shareholders can bring a lawsuit to force a fair price.In contrast, for non-corporate entities, the protection of entire fairness may fail. In Delaware, LPs and LLCs can draft provisions in their operating agreements that eliminate fiduciary duties, including the applicability of entire fairness to going-private freeze-outs. The Author discusses cases where challenges to going-private freeze-outs based on entire fairness were foreclosed by provisions in the applicable operating agreement. Most prominent among these cases are In re Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, and Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC.This Article, The Going-Private Freeze-Out, culminates with an empirical analysis, that is to say, a count of how many publicly traded non-corporate business associations contain provisions like those in Atlas Energy and Lonergan-specifically special approval provisions and fiduciary elimination provisions. The Author concludes that almost ninety percent of publicly traded non-corporate business associations subject their investors to a unique susceptibility (beyond that experienced by investors in publicly traded corporations) to going-private freeze-outs.