This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1855 edition. Excerpt: ... taken the 28th, as it actually was, it was not possible to march the 13 miles from Wischau to Austerlitz the 29th, instead of devoting that day to a little march of 7 miles, and attack on the 30th, with 70,000 men about in line, whereas Napoleon had not more than 45,000 till the morning of Dec. 1st. Or if Wischau had been taken the 27th instead of the 28th, and the 28th had been devoted to marching the 13 miles between Wischau and Austerlitz, might not a good application of Principle 3, which is also a principle of Strategy, have been made by attacking with 70,000 men in line the 45,000 men Napoleon had, for until the morning of the 1 st he had not more than 45,000? It may be replied that Napoleon, availing himself of the possession of the fortress of Brunn, would have taken up the strong position there was around it, and there awaited the arrival of Bernadotte, Davoust, and Mortier. Had he done so, the Kusso-Austrian chiefs would have had no one but themselves and their generous magnanimity to have thanked for it, as there was no tangible reason why Brunn should have been abandoned to him. Whether it would have taken up a strong position around Brunn can not be known; but, at all events, it is not often that anything is lost in war by using the utmost rapidity, gaining time, and being in readiness at the earliest moment, in accordance with Principle 51, and if they had failed in applying the Principle 3, they would certainly have applied the Principle 51. In war all that can be done, is, under the circumstances which present, to make the best application of the recognised principles of the art, which are the collated results of experience, and this having been done, the rest must be left to Fortune, with a manly and unyielding heart....