Dismantling North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programs

Dismantling North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programs
Author: David J. Bishop
Publisher:
Total Pages: 24
Release: 2005-04-29
Genre:
ISBN: 9781463582937
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This paper examines the choices available to the United States for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The options range from doing nothing to executing policies of engagement, containment, or preemption. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and there are numerous factors influencing the problem. The major factors include U.S. national interests, the role of China, the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance, the difficult nature of North Korea, and the U.S. war on terror. Engagement is less risky in the short term because it reduces the risks of miscalculation and escalation by preventing the conditions which support North Korea seeing war as a rational act. However, it is risky in the long term because it allows North Korean nuclear weapons development to proceed unchecked. This could lead to proliferation to terrorists and rogue states. Containment's main advantage is that it takes a direct path to solving the problem. Its major disadvantage is that it could cause North Korea, a failing state, to view war as a rational act. Containment is also not supported by friends and allies in the region. Preemption is the most direct method to ensure elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons. However, the risks associated with this option could lead to catastrophic loss of life and devastation and ultimately to loss of U.S. influence in the region. The optimal course of action is not one policy in particular, but a combination of engagement and containment. Furthermore, preemptive action will invite foreign policy disaster for the United States and should only be used as a last resort. Specific policy recommendations to improve implementation of a hybrid policy of engagement and containment include strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, supplementing multilateral talks with bilateral talks, offering a formal security guarantee to North Korea, broadening the Proliferation Security Initiative to include China, and improving national intelligence capabilities. If preemption must be used, national leaders must know what conditions would trigger that decision, and they must prepare in advance the necessary protocol for warning and informing friends, allies, and other concerned parties.

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Towards North Korea: Nuclear Program, Dprk Belligerent Acts and American Responses, Potential for Military Action, New Ty

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Towards North Korea: Nuclear Program, Dprk Belligerent Acts and American Responses, Potential for Military Action, New Ty
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher: Independently Published
Total Pages: 64
Release: 2017-03-30
Genre: History
ISBN: 9781520959481
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The United States policy for dealing with a nuclear North Korea has been a combination of containment, deterrence, and limited engagement since 1994. While this policy has prevented war on the Korean peninsula, it has not prevented North Korea from developing a nuclear program and proliferating this technology, as well as missile technology, to numerous countries not friendly to the United States. In order to stop North Korea from transferring weapons technology, the United States needs a new strategic concept. This paper will examine four options that may be used to support the element of the U.S. National Security Strategy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.The United States policy for dealing with a nuclear North Korea has been a combination of containment, deterrence, and limited engagement since the enactment of the 1994 Agreed Framework. While this and earlier policies have prevented war on the Korean peninsula, such approaches have not prevented North Korea from developing a nuclear program and proliferating this technology, as well as missile technology, to numerous countries not friendly to the United States. In order to stop North Korea from transferring weapons technology, the United States needs a new strategic concept. This paper will examine four options that may be used to support the element of the U.S. National Security Strategy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.The question is if current U.S. policy has prevented North Korea from developing a nuclear program and exporting its technology to other countries. The answer is no. Even though one of North Korea's demands is to be removed from the list of state sponsored of terrorism, the North has not complied by following policies that would lead to that removal. Gregory J. Moore states that "the United States did not prevent North Korea from acquiring and testing nuclear weapons, despite its deterrent strategies, its diplomatic efforts, its ultimatums, and U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolutions against it." There are signs that the North should comply with the non-proliferation treaty. Gregory L. Schulte writes that, "Since the first atomic bomb was assembled, 18 countries have chosen to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs. Countries such as Argentina, Libya, South Africa, and Switzerland made this decision for a variety reasons, but foremost among them was the desire to improve their international standing. Another important factor was foreign pressure, especially from the United States." However, since the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea has not complied with any agreements they have made. Hence, the six-party talks are an example of failed American diplomacy.

Thinking the Other Unthinkable: Disarmament in North Korea and Beyond

Thinking the Other Unthinkable: Disarmament in North Korea and Beyond
Author: Toby Dalton
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2020-07
Genre:
ISBN: 9781952565038
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Neither the governments attempting to negotiate with North Korea, nor the drafters of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, define what verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure would entail, whether in one country or in all.What model for nuclear disarmament might a nuclear-armed state demand of its adversaries and accept for itself? If states were to commit to dismantle their nuclear arsenals, what would be the key benchmarks for assessing the progressive implementation of such a commitment? Designing sustainable, effective nuclear disarmament-of North Korea or any other nuclear-armed state-requires much more than dismantling warheads and controlling fissile material stocks. Disarming states would need to collectively agree what types and numbers of delivery systems (especially missiles) would be permissible. Both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-weapon states would need to determine what peaceful nuclear and space activities may remain during and after nuclear disarmament, and under what reassurance/monitoring conditions. At least some states would press for monitored limits on research and development activities vital to building or reconstituting nuclear arsenals. The paper starts from a logic that could inform a denuclearization agreement with North Korea and how to manage its retention of nuclear weapons-related capabilities, including nuclear energy production, conventionally armed ballistic missiles, and a space launch program, among others. The paper then explores comparable political and technical choices that would need to be made in the disarmament of other nuclear-armed states, focusing on six challenges that will shape negotiations on dual-use capabilities and activities that would remain during and after disarmament. Finally, the paper examines challenges in verifying compliance and surveys the often-avoided problem of enforcing disarmament agreements.The authors do not pretend that a particular disarmament roadmap could be charted today; rather they suggest how progress toward disarmament could be defined and assessed in light of challenges that are likely to exist. Thinking through and debating what would be involved in nuclear disarmament-and how it could be done in ways that would not make major warfare between states more likely-can constructively inform policy decisions that states are making now.

Understanding and Managing North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

Understanding and Managing North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
Total Pages: 63
Release: 2017-03-29
Genre:
ISBN: 9781520958408
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The February 2007 agreement reached with North Korea to shut down its nuclear reactor and give up its nuclear weapons program was heralded by many as a significant breakthrough following the shock of North Korea's nuclear weapons test in October of the previous year. This optimistic assessment, however, fails to consider the significant hurdles that will confront negotiators as they attempt to fulfill the promise of the February accord. The North Korean regime's 'hierarchy of nuclear motivations' including its perception of the security, leverage and prestige offered by the possession of nuclear weapons as well as the significant time and energies it has invested in developing a nuclear device, make an actual verifiable dismantling of this program unlikely. Further, the historical tendency for negotiations with North Korea to produce few positive results bodes ill for future success. Extant hurdles are further compounded by a U.S. negotiation position that heightens North Korea's security concerns, leaves little room for compromise, and has, unwittingly, encouraged North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. Without some unforeseen and dramatic change in position by either side, the ongoing negotiations regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program are unlikely to succeed in the near term. The best hope lies in gaining a complete understanding the North Korean position and developing a flexible strategy of engagement and containment. Such a strategy could address the security concerns of the Kim regime while limiting North Korea's ability to proliferate nuclear technology and providing security for the U.S. and its allies. Such an approach, however, would likely require the U.S. to set aside, at least temporarily the potentially costly and unrealistic goal of North Korean denuclearization. Without some unforeseen and dramatic change in the position on either side, the ongoing negotiations regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program are unlikely to succeed in the near term. The best hope for the United States lies in developing a thorough understanding the North Korea's rationale for developing nuclear weapons and developing a flexible strategy of engagement and containment that addresses the DPRK's concerns while continuing to provide security for the U.S. and its allies and limiting North Korea's ability to proliferate nuclear technology. Such a strategy may require that the U.S., for the moment, set aside the potentially costly and unrealistic goal of North Korean denuclearization until such a time as more favorable environment presents itself.

Going Critical

Going Critical
Author: Joel S. Wit
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Total Pages: 495
Release: 2004-04-19
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 0815796412
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A decade before being proclaimed part of the "axis of evil," North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze—and pledge ultimately to dismantle—its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again—that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy of Conditional Engagement

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy of Conditional Engagement
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 12
Release: 2004
Genre:
ISBN:
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The North Korean nuclear weapons program is a significant strategic threat to the United States and East Asia. The US Government should adopt a strategy of conditional engagement with Pyongyang in order to prevail upon North Korea (DPRK) to curtail and ultimately abandon its nuclear weapons program. North Korea's nuclear weapons program. North Korea has long been suspected of having a nuclear weapons program, despite being a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On 21 October 1994, Pyongyang entered into an "Agreed Framework" with the United States, in which it agreed to "freeze" its nuclear program and allow international inspections in return for fuel oil and "proliferation-resistant" nuclear reactors. As of September 2003, however, North Korea had abrogated the 1994 Agreed Framework, withdrawn from the NPT, and forced international inspectors to leave the country. 2 The CIA, in a report submitted to Congress on 19 November 2002, asserted that North Korea had one or possibly two weapons using plutonium it produced prior to 1992" and had "continued its nuclear weapons program." In April 2003, North Korea publicly admitted to having "a nuclear weapons capability" but proposed to "dismantle its nuclear facilities, allow inspections, and curb ballistic missile exports in return for a U.S. non-aggression pledge, establishment of diplomatic relations, and a commitment not to obstruct North Korean economic relations." On 2 October 2003, North Korea announced it had finished reprocessing spent fuel rods into plutonium and thereby had "nuclear deterrence." North Korea's justification for its nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang Radio (KCNA) on 12 May 2003 blamed the United States for forcing North Korea to develop nuclear weapons.