Discussion Of Accounting Discretion Corporate Governance And Firm Performance
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Author | : Stewart Jones |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 559 |
Release | : 2015-05-22 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1135107262 |
Financial accounting theory has numerous practical applications and policy implications, for instance, international accounting standard setters are increasingly relying on theoretical accounting concepts in the creation of new standards; and corporate regulators are increasingly turning to various conceptual frameworks of accounting to guide regulation and the interpretation of accounting practices. The global financial crisis has also led to a new found appreciation of the social, economic and political importance of accounting concepts generally and corporate financial reporting in particular. For instance, the fundamentals of capital market theory (i.e. market efficiency) and measurement theory (i.e. fair value) have received widespread public and regulatory attention. This comprehensive, authoritative volume provides a prestige reference work which offers students, academics, regulators and practitioners a valuable resource containing the current scholarship and practice in the established field of financial accounting theory.
Author | : Jennifer Francis |
Publisher | : Now Publishers Inc |
Total Pages | : 97 |
Release | : 2008 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1601981147 |
This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.
Author | : |
Publisher | : Spokesman Books |
Total Pages | : 38 |
Release | : 2003 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Mr.Luc Laeven |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 43 |
Release | : 2009-09-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1451873549 |
This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.
Author | : Rakesh Khurana |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 318 |
Release | : 2011-09-19 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1400841097 |
Corporate CEOs are headline news. Stock prices rise and fall at word of their hiring and firing. Business media debate their merits and defects as if individual leaders determined the health of the economy. Yet we know surprisingly little about how CEOs are selected and dismissed or about their true power. This is the first book to take us into the often secretive world of the CEO selection process. Rakesh Khurana's findings are surprising and disturbing. In recent years, he shows, corporations have increasingly sought CEOs who are above all else charismatic, whose fame and force of personality impress analysts and the business media, but whose experience and abilities are not necessarily right for companies' specific needs. The labor market for CEOs, Khurana concludes, is far less rational than we might think. Khurana's findings are based on a study of the hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies and on extensive interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms. Written with exceptional clarity and verve, the book explains the basic mechanics of the selection process and how hiring priorities have changed with the rise of shareholder activism. Khurana argues that the market for CEOs, which we often assume runs on cool calculation and the impersonal forces of supply and demand, is culturally determined and too frequently inefficient. Its emphasis on charisma artificially limits the number of candidates considered, giving them extraordinary leverage to demand high salaries and power. It also raises expectations and increases the chance that a CEO will be fired for failing to meet shareholders' hopes. The result is corporate instability and too little attention to long-term strategy. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of corporate culture and the nature of markets and leadership in general.
Author | : Oliver Marnet |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 318 |
Release | : 2008-03-10 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1134073682 |
Corporate scandals due to bad accounting happen too frequently for a system of corporate governance to be deemed effective. Exploring the reasons behind corporate misbehaviour, this book also answers the question of whether recent reforms are sufficient to prevent further scandals from occurring in the future.
Author | : Eero Kasanen |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 38 |
Release | : 1992 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9789517020633 |
Author | : |
Publisher | : ScholarlyEditions |
Total Pages | : 317 |
Release | : 2012-01-09 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1464966974 |
Issues in Accounting, Administration, and Corporate Governance: 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Accounting, Administration, and Corporate Governance. The editors have built Issues in Accounting, Administration, and Corporate Governance: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Accounting, Administration, and Corporate Governance in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Accounting, Administration, and Corporate Governance: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.
Author | : Simeon Djankov |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 56 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Barriers to entry (Industrial organization) |
ISBN | : |
New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureacrats.
Author | : Lucian A. Bebchuk |
Publisher | : Harvard University Press |
Total Pages | : 308 |
Release | : 2004 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9780674020634 |
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.