The vast literature on economic sanctions is dominated by studies that cast a shadow of doubt on their effectiveness to achieve foreign policy goals. Despite numerous studies on economic sanction effectiveness, little has been accomplished in building theoretical understanding as to why actors initiate and execute economic coercion. This thesis examines the use of economic sanctions by countries that are considered within the international community as middle powers . Ultimately, I test the theory of the middlepowerhood on countries that deployed sanctions from 1954-2000. Statistical results of a rare events logit support the conclusion that middle powers have distinctive characteristics for utilizing economic coercion. Also, by looking at the case study of Canada, I test Drezner's game theoretical model of conflict expectations. The results of a rare events logit model confirm the conflict expectations model, as the probability of sanction use is greater when escalation and magnitude of tensions increase. Finally, I build a model of sanction tactics that incorporates stages of deployment.