This important NSA publication provides a historical guide to German clandestine activities in South America in World War II. It identifies and presents a thorough account of German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine work in South America, and a well-researched, detailed report of the U.S. response to the perceived threat. PART I * GERMAN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES * Table of Contents * Foreword * Chapter 1: The German Intelligence Services * Perspective * The Abwehr * The Reich Security Administration * Chapter 2: Axis Agent Operations in Latin America * SARGO * The Brazilian Nets * Regrouping * The Chilean Nets * Operation JOLLE * MERCATOR I and MERCATORII * The Planning for Operation JOLLE * The End of Operation JOLLE * The Benefits Derived * Chapter 3: Allied Organizations Concerned with the Intelligence Problem * U.S. Navy (1917-1941) * The U.S. Coast Guard (1931-1941) * The Federal Communications Commission (1911-1941) * The British Effort: GC&CS and the RSS (1919-1941) * The Reorganization of the U.S. SIGINT Effort (1939-1942) * Initial Operations * Security Problems * The FBI Connection * The Army Connection * The Radio Intelligence Center * Chapter 4: Counterclandestine DF Operations in Latin America * Introduction * The U.S. Navy in Colombia and Ecuador (1940-1941) * Other Latin American Nations before the War * Establishment of the AIS Clandestine Radio Locator Net * Creation of the Concept: December 1941-January 1943 * Implementation of the Concept * January 1943 to the War's End * Cuba - Graft and Corruption * Chile - Nazis and Mountains * Argentina - More Nazis * Ecuador - Manana Land * Colombia - Everything in Place * Brazil - Full Cooperation * The AIS Takes Over * Disposition of the AIS Net * Conclusion * Glossary It seems fairly clear from the evidence that the Germans never expected a great deal from their agents in South America or even in the United States in World War II. The lack of German espionage activity in these areas in WWII stands in stark contrast to the bombings and other activities which occurred during WWI. Perhaps these WWI experiences influenced U.S. policy makers to the extent that they overestimated the danger in WWII. In fact, it might be suggested that South America and the United States were not the major threats of German clandestine activity in WW II, but that Europe, England, North Africa, and the Middle East offered far more potential for beneficial results. An examination of clandestine activities in these areas might produce different conclusions. One might also comment on the extraordinary activity that took place between and among U.S. intelligence organizations in the face of so small and unsuccessful a German effort. In addition to concluding that it had little effect on the outcome of the war, one might also have noted the similarities characterizing the nature of the relationships. Specifically, this includes the relationships in the broader COMINT field during and after the war. The fall of the Batista government in Cuba in 1959 and the subsequent rise of Castro's Cuba as a Soviet ally in the Western Hemisphere marked the beginning of Russian success in obtaining a foothold in an area that had been the exclusive sphere of influence of the United States. The concept of carving out a piece of the Western Hemisphere did not originate with the Soviet Union. Since 1823, the year the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated, most of the major European powers tried at one time or another to subvert it. Germany tried twice. The first time, in 1917, Germany planned to attack the United States through Mexico. This plan was foiled by Britain when it provided the United States with a decrypted copy of the famous Zimmermann Telegram. Germany's second attempt was more complex, but in the end, just as unsuccessful.