Criticality Assessment of the Defense Waste Processing Facility

Criticality Assessment of the Defense Waste Processing Facility
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Total Pages: 13
Release: 1996
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Assessment of nuclear criticality potential of the S-Area Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is required to ensure the safe processing of radioactive waste for final disposal. At the Savannah River Site (SRS), high-level radioactive wastes are stored as caustic slurries. During storage, the wastes separate into a supernate layer and a sludge layer. The radionuclides from the sludge and supernate will be immobilized into borosilicate glass for storage and eventual disposal. The DWPF will initially immobilize sludge only, with simulated non-radioactive Precipitate Hydrolysis Aqueous (PHA) product. This paper demonstrates that criticality poses only a negligible risk in the DWPF process because of the characteristics of the waste and the DWPF process. The waste contains low concentration of fissile material and many elements which act as neutron poisons. Also, the DWPF process chemistry does not affect separation and accumulation of fissile materials. Experiments showed that DWPF can process all the high-level radioactive wastes currently stored at SRS with negligible criticality risk under normal and abnormal/process upset operation.

Assessment of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Criticality Potential in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Revision 1

Assessment of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Criticality Potential in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Revision 1
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 19
Release: 1993
Genre:
ISBN:

The S-Area Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) will initially process Batch 1 sludge in the sludge-only processing mode, with simulated non-radioactive Precipitate Hydrolysis, Aqueous (PHA) product, without the risk of nuclear criticality. The dilute concentration of fissile material in the sludge combined with excess of neutron absorbers during normal operations make criticality throughout the whole process incredible. Subsequent batches of the DWPF involving radioactive precipitate slurry and PHA will require additional analysis. Any abnormal or upset process operations, which are not considered in this report and could potentially separate fissile material, must be individually evaluated. Scheduled maintenance operation procedures are not considered to be abnormal.