Costs And Incentive Effects Of Stock Option Repricing
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| Author | : Ulrike Neubauer |
| Publisher | : Peter Lang Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 244 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
Does repricing of executive stock options, i.e. the practice of lowering the exercise price when options are out-of-the-money unfairly reward managers for poor performance and thereby undermine incentives set by the compensation contract? In a study that compares the pay package containing repriced option with an otherwise adjusted package it is shown that repricing is not more expensive to shareholders than otherwise adjusting non-option compensation components. However, the package containing repriced options provides significantly stronger incentives. Furthermore, a policy that constrains the board of directors from repricing does not have significant effects on shareholders' returns."
| Author | : Liu Zheng |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 128 |
| Release | : 2003 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Jeffrey L. Coles |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 47 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We provide evidence that firms reprice out-of-the-money executive stock options in order to realign managerial incentives. A sharp decline in stock price, by reducing the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance (delta) and, in many cases, increasing sensitivity of executive pay to stock-return volatility (vega), can cause managerial incentives to depart from optimal or target levels. Our results suggest that increasing delta does not appear to be a strong motivation for repricing. Rather, we find strong evidence that firms reprice executive options to reduce risk-taking incentives (vega) toward the target level.
| Author | : Mary Ellen Carter |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2001 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We examine stock option repricing activity that coincided with the December 4, 1998 FASB announcement regarding accounting for repriced employee stock options. The accounting treatment requires recognition of compensation expense in future periods if there is an increase in stock price after repricing. We find that repricing firms experience significant negative cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the December 4, 1998 FASB announcement date. We document a significant increase in repricing activity in the 12-day window between the announcement date and the proposed effective date, during which firms could reprice without taking a charge to earnings, and a significant decrease in repricing activity after the proposed effective date. This evidence suggests that the FASB announcement of the new accounting altered firms' economic decisions. In examining firms' decisions to reprice in the 12-day window to avoid the accounting charge, we find that positive earnings firms, growth firms, firms experiencing increasing earnings patterns, and firms with the greater potential effect on earnings are more likely than other firms to reprice in this window. In addition, we find that firms' prior repricing behavior affects their decision to reprice in this window, suggesting that there are implicit costs associated with repricing. The evidence is consistent with firms' trading off valuation implications of repricing to avoid an earnings charge against these implicit costs associated with repricing in the window.
| Author | : Brian J. Hall |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 60 |
| Release | : 1998 |
| Genre | : Chief executive officers |
| ISBN | : |
Detailed data about stock option contracts are used to measure and analyze the pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Two main issues are addressed. The first is the pay to performance incentives created by the revaluation of stock option holdings. The findings suggest that if CEO stock holdings were replaced by the same ex ante value of stock options, the pay to performance sensitivity of the median CEO would approximately double. Relative to granting at the money options, a value neutral policy of regularly granting options out of the money (Pe=1.5P) would increase pay to performance sensitivity by approximately 27 percent. The second issue is the pay to performance created by yearly stock option grants. Because most stock option plans are multi year plans, it is shown that different option granting plans have significantly different pay to performance incentives since changes in current stock prices affect the value of future option grants in different ways. Four option granting policies are compared and contrasted. Ranked from highest powered to lowest powered, these policies are: 1) LBO-style up-front options, 2) fixed number policies, 3) fixed value policies and 4) an (unofficial) policy of "back-door repricing." Empirical evidence suggests that (even ignoring the revaluation of past option grants) the pay to performance relationship in practice is stronger for 1) stock option grants relative to salary and bonus, and 2) fixed number plans relative to non-fixed number plans.
| Author | : Swaminathan L. Kalpathy |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 46 |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Studies on determinants of stock option repricing contrast repricers with firms that do not conduct repricings. In practice, firms resort to other alternatives to retain managers and to restore incentives. We examine a broad array of alternatives that includes repricings, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, and the neutral alternative of doing nothing. Multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice CEO stock options in response to economic factors. We address the debate on whether agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are severe in repricing firms, and do not find evidence that repricers are characterized by weak boards or entrenched managers.
| Author | : Mary Ellen Carter |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2001 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In this study, we examine factors that explain firms' decisions to reprice stock options. Comparing a sample of firms that reprice executive stock options in 1998 to a control sample of firms with out-of-the-money options in 1998 that choose not to reprice, we find that young, high technology firms are more likely to reprice than other firms. In addition, we find that the likelihood of repricing increases as options become more out-of-the-money, and that firms reprice in response to poor firm-specific performance, not poor industry performance. These results are not consistent with claims that firms reprice to insulate management from uncontrollable industry effects. However, we find no relation between the likelihood of repricing and conflicts of interest between executives and shareholders, suggesting that repricing is not related to agency problems. The results are consistent with the often stated motivation that firms must reprice out-of-the-money options to restore the incentive effects of those options and to prevent management in competitive labor markets from going to work for other firms.
| Author | : Daniel A. Rogers |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2009 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the U.S. gaming industry and find that risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.
| Author | : Nengjiu Ju |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 35 |
| Release | : 2003 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
While stock options are commonly used in managerial compensation to provide desirable incentives, their adverse effects have notbeen widely appreciated. We show that a call-type contractcreates incentives to distort the choice of investment risk.Relative to the risk level that maximizes firm value, a calloption contract can induce too much or too little corporaterisk-taking, depending on managerial risk aversion and theunderlying investment technology. We show that including additional compensation features of option repricing and/or severance packages has desirable countervailing effects on managerial choice of corporate risk policies. We argue that lookback call options are analogous to the observed practice of option repricing, and put options are analogous to severance packages. Such complex option-like features in managerial contracts can induce risk policies that increase shareholder wealth.
| Author | : Daniel A. Rogers |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 46 |
| Release | : 2005 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In this study, I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Specifically, given that options provide both incentives to increase risk as well as stock price, firms must be cognizant that executives may increasingly face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects, as options go underwater. Repricing may serve as a mechanism to alleviate such incentives. The study examines repricing activity by firms in the U.S. gaming industry during 1993-1998. I find that, in both firm-level and executive-level analyses, risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results are supportive of the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.
