Contests With Endogenously Valued Prizes
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Endogenous Public Policy and Contests
Author | : Gil S. Epstein |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 223 |
Release | : 2007-09-05 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 3540748180 |
This book focuses on the role of interest groups and their lobbying efforts in public policy. It applies strategic contest theory as the basic methodology and clarifies the fundamental parameters that determine the behavior of the government and the interest groups. It illustrates the proposed approach in five specific cases: determination of monopoly price, privatization policy, migration quotas, minimum wage and promotion in tournaments.
Rent-seeking Contest when the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts
Author | : Tai-Yeong Chung |
Publisher | : London, Ont. : Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario |
Total Pages | : 30 |
Release | : 1994 |
Genre | : Contests |
ISBN | : |
Contest Theory
Author | : Milan Vojnović |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 737 |
Release | : 2016-02-04 |
Genre | : Computers |
ISBN | : 1316472906 |
Contests are prevalent in many areas, including sports, rent seeking, patent races, innovation inducement, labor markets, scientific projects, crowdsourcing and other online services, and allocation of computer system resources. This book provides unified, comprehensive coverage of contest theory as developed in economics, computer science, and statistics, with a focus on online services applications, allowing professionals, researchers and students to learn about the underlying theoretical principles and to test them in practice. The book sets contest design in a game-theoretic framework that can be used to model a wide-range of problems and efficiency measures such as total and individual output and social welfare, and offers insight into how the structure of prizes relates to desired contest design objectives. Methods for rating the skills and ranking of players are presented, as are proportional allocation and similar allocation mechanisms, simultaneous contests, sharing utility of productive activities, sequential contests, and tournaments.
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II
Author | : Luis C. Corchón |
Publisher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
Total Pages | : 547 |
Release | : 2018-02-23 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1788112784 |
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
Author | : R. D. Congleton |
Publisher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
Total Pages | : 553 |
Release | : 2015-02-27 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1782544941 |
The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political econo
40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1
Author | : Roger D. Congleton |
Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 720 |
Release | : 2008-08-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9783540791812 |
The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.
Annual Report
Author | : Iowa State University. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 52 |
Release | : 1992 |
Genre | : Agriculture |
ISBN | : |
Competition with Identity Driven Entry
Author | : Sebastian Burchhardt |
Publisher | : Springer |
Total Pages | : 161 |
Release | : 2015-05-28 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 3658101466 |
Sebastian Burchhardt develops a game theory model that analyzes the possible behavioral patterns of employees during M&A processes and the impact of such patterns on the success of the transaction itself. The result is the development of a principal-multi-agent model that allows for endogenous contest entry driven by identity. In addition, the model proposes guidance for practical M&A management.