Vietnam Studies - Command and Control 1950-1969 [Illustrated Edition]

Vietnam Studies - Command and Control 1950-1969 [Illustrated Edition]
Author: Major General George S. Eckhardt
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Total Pages: 137
Release: 2014-08-15
Genre: History
ISBN: 1782893679

[Includes 11 charts, 1 map, and 20 illustrations] “In combat situations prior to Vietnam, U.S. military forces had an existing command and control structure which could be tailored to accomplish the task at hand. In Europe during World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower modified the command structures developed for the North African and Mediterranean operations to form Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). After his departure from Bataan in 1942, General Douglas MacArthur had several months in which to design the command structure that ultimately contributed to the defeat of the Japanese...There, the command and control arrangements, which ultimately directed a U.S. Military force of over 500,000 men, evolved from a small military assistance mission established in 1950. The Military Assistance Advisory Group’s philosophy of assistance rather than command significantly influenced the development of the organization. “This monograph describes the development of the U. S. military command and control structure in Vietnam. The focus of the study is primarily on the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and the U.S. Army in Vietnam (USARV). The relationships with the joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), and other outside agencies are discussed only as their decisions, policies, and directives affected MACV and operations within South Vietnam. The air war against North Vietnam and naval operations of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were CINCPAC’s responsibilities and are only mentioned in regard to their impact on MACV and the forces under MACV. “This study is not a conventional military or diplomatic history of the war in Vietnam. Rather, it is an analytical appraisal of the command and control structure.”

Command and Control 1950-1969 (Vietnam Studies)

Command and Control 1950-1969 (Vietnam Studies)
Author: George S. Eckhardt
Publisher:
Total Pages: 103
Release: 1974
Genre:
ISBN:

Beskriver udviklingen af USA's militære kommando og kontrolfunktioner i Vietnam. Fokus er primært sat på "The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam" (MARCV) og "U.S. Army in Vietnam" (USARV). Herudover redegøres for relationerne mellem "Joint Chiefs of Staff" (JCS), "Commander in Chief, Pacific" (CINCPAC), "U.S. Army, Pacific" (USARPAC).

Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam

Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam
Author: Donald J. Mrozek
Publisher: The Minerva Group, Inc.
Total Pages: 220
Release: 2002
Genre: History
ISBN: 9780898759815

Dr. Donald J. Mrozeks research sheds considerable light on how the use of air power evolved in the Vietnam War. Much more than simply retelling events, Mrozek analyzes how history, politics, technology, and the complexity of the war drove the application of air power in a long and divisive struggle. Mrozek delves into a wealth of original documentation, and his scholarship is impeccable. His analysis is thorough and balanced. His conclusions are well reasoned but will trouble those who have never seriously considered how the application of air power is influenced by factors far beyond the battlefield. Wether or not the reader agrees with Mrozek, the quality of his research and analysis makes his conclusions impossible to ignore. John C. Fryer, Jr. Brigadier General, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76

The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76
Author: Robert A. Doughty
Publisher:
Total Pages: 68
Release: 1979
Genre: Military art and science
ISBN:

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.