Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions

Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions
Author: Ji Yong Lee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2020
Genre:
ISBN:

This paper examines what connection, if any, there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions. Despite truthful revelations being a weakly dominant strategy, previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding, which makes the use of such auctions for inferring homegrown values problematic. Examining the effect of cognitive ability is important, as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from observed bids. The results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory, and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. Our results suggest that considering subjects' cognitive ability in homegrown valuation studies can help identify the true underlying demand conditions.

Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions

Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions
Author: John A. List
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2020
Genre:
ISBN:

Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.

Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse

Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Author: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Total Pages: 419
Release: 2021-04-13
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0691218951

An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.

Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions

Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions
Author: David J. Cooper
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

This paper presents results from a series of second price private value auction (SPA) experiments in which bidders are either given for free, or are allowed to purchase, noisy signals about their opponents' value. Even though theoretically such information about opponents' value has no strategic use in the SPA, it provides us with a convenient instrument to change bidders' perception about the "strength" (i.e., the value) of their opponent. We argue that the empirical relationship between the incidence and magnitude of overbidding and bidders' perception of the strength of their opponent provides the key to understand whether overbidding in second price auctions are driven by "spite" motives or by the "joy of winning." The experimental data show that bidders are much more likely to overbid, though less likely to submit large overbid, when they perceive their rivals to have similar values as their own. We argue that this empirical relationship is more consistent with a modified "joy of winning" hypothesis than with the "spite" hypothesis. However, neither of the non-standard preference explanations are able to fully explain all aspects of the experimental data, and we argue for the important role of bounded rationality. We also find that bidder heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining their bidding behavior.

Bidding Behaviour in Second-Price and Random Nth-Price Auctions with Interval Private Values

Bidding Behaviour in Second-Price and Random Nth-Price Auctions with Interval Private Values
Author: Prasenjit Banerjee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2023
Genre:
ISBN:

When valuing market and non-market goods, using point estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) may generate biased results because people are often observed to have a range of acceptable values in mind. We investigate how individuals express their bids or WTP given uniform and skewed intervals of private values in the lab with two demand-revealing auction mechanisms -- a second-price auction and a random nth-price auction. The participants are allowed to bid in intervals. Since our participants face the risks of losing the auction and/or money due to uncertainties over private values and market price, we explore the effect of risk preferences on bidding behaviour. We find that (i) participants mostly bid in intervals; (ii) risk-averse participants prefer to bid in point estimates across the auction types; (iii) participants bid truthfully in the second-price auction given skewed interval values; (iv) the random nth-price auction, however, performs better than the second-price auction in extracting the true values given uniform interval values and left-skewed interval values, when we divide the skewed intervals into left- and right-skewed intervals; and (v) the mean of interval bids can be used to derive the demand for true WTP for a good with value uncertainty. We also find that risk-loving individuals overbid significantly, but risk preferences do not affect overall bidding behaviour.

Emotion Regulation and Bidding in Auctions

Emotion Regulation and Bidding in Auctions
Author: Gerlinde Utsch
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Total Pages: 73
Release: 2015-06-09
Genre: Technology & Engineering
ISBN: 3656974772

Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Engineering - Industrial Engineering and Management, grade: 1,0, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) (Institute of Information Systems and Management (IISM)), language: English, abstract: “Emotion has taken the center stage in decision theory, and with it emotion regulation promises to play an increasingly prominent role in psychology, economics and cognitive neuroscience”. This quotation from Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea and Miu (2010) alludes to the rising interest in the investigation of emotional processing in economics in the last few years and to the recognition of the importance of the connection between emotions, physiology and behavior in economic decision-making. But what is the relation of emotions to economics? Gross and Thompson (2006) state that “emotions arise when an individual attends to a situation and sees it as relevant to his or her goals”. Beside this definition of emotion there exist many other definitions, for example that “emotions reflect the status of one’s ongoing adjustment to constantly changing environmental demands” (Thayer & Lane, 2009) which is relevant in economics. Emotions can impair decision-making and can lead to irrational decisions which are not regarded in common prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Emotions are regulated by humans in different ways. Two main emotion regulation strategies are pointed out by Gross and John (2003): cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression which intervene in the emotion generative process at different points of time. The emotion regulation depends on an individual’s ability to adjust physiological arousal on a momentary basis (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). This is reflected by the resting heart rate variability (HRV) as an objective measure for individual differences in regulated emotional responding. HRV is considered a measure of heart-brain interactions and the flexible dynamic regulation of the autonomic nervous system (McCraty & Childre, 2010) as well as a sensitive indicator of inhibitory control mechanisms relevant for decision-making (Sütterlin, Herbert, Schmitt, Kübler & Vögele, 2011a). Because of their influence in economics it is important to better understand cognitive processes and that can be achieved by physiological measurements of HRV which give an objective insight in the emotional processing of individuals. Physiological parameters like skin conductance and heart rate are related to economic decision-making. Studies have already shown that physiological arousal can be a predictor for decision-making behavior (Adam, Gamer, Hey, Ketter & Weinhardt, 2009). [...]

Experimental Auctions

Experimental Auctions
Author: Jayson L. Lusk
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 316
Release: 2007-11-08
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780521671248

Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.