This paper attempts to review literature on corporate governance on the ownership structure from a firm performance perspective. The dominant paradigm of corporate governance is based on the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that separation of ownership and control affects the reported level of income of firms, either positively or negatively. Subsequent studies have taken off from this concept of separation of ownership and control or in what is otherwise more famously known as 'conflict of interests' theory. Seven major arguments that have emerged within the context of 'conflict of interests' theory are explained in this paper. These arguments are basically considered to have emerged as an explanation to discuss the motivations that govern the managers and owners running the corporations. The uniqueness of the paper is in the way the literature is organized. As alluded earlier, corporate governance within the conflict of interests framework is subject to behavioral motivations of those who run the corporations. The profoundness of conflict of interests lies in where the locus of control is - with the managers, the owners, the institutional investors or with the markets. Hence, the literature has been classified under a few major headings to explain the importance of 'locus of control' and its impacts on firm's performance. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in the summary.