Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain
Author: Andreas Lange
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2010
Genre: Auctions
ISBN:

Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet, whether, and to what extent, the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with theory. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. Beyond testing theory, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Auctions with Resale Opportunities

Auctions with Resale Opportunities
Author: Chintamani Jog
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue-efficiency trade-off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer-advantaged resale case.

Auctions with Resale when Private Values are Uncertain

Auctions with Resale when Private Values are Uncertain
Author: Andreas Lange
Publisher:
Total Pages: 59
Release: 2004
Genre: Auctions
ISBN:

Auction theory is one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by developing theory to explore auctions with resale when private values are uncertain. We put our theory to the test by examining both field data and experimental data from the lab. Our field data are from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. More generally, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data.

Auctions With Resale Markets

Auctions With Resale Markets
Author: Sushil Bikhchandani
Publisher: Forgotten Books
Total Pages: 46
Release: 2018-03-23
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780365459170

Excerpt from Auctions With Resale Markets: A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions The Treasury bills are then delivered to the winning bidders and can be resold at an active secondary market. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.