Author's abstract: The purpose of this work is to recommend the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. It is written for the micro-level reader (the young pilot, tank operator, etc.), the macro-level reader (US government staffers and above in the State and Defense Departments), and senior government officials (Generals, Congressmen, and Senators) to inform and enhance their ability to understand the DTIB and how arms transfers can help in its preservation. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, this paper recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. With the end of the Cold War and the continuing drawdown of US military forces and equipment, the DTIB is deteriorating. In this authors view, this decline can only be arrested with the help of the US government. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. The history of arms transfers is broken down into four periods, between 1945 and the present, to demonstrate this assertion. It predicts arms transfers will continue to be an instrument of foreign policy and can be used to enhance our DTIB. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decisionmaking process and represents it as a "Labyrinth of Control." This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations. A common, but misguided, view is that the US is selling its technological superiority through arms sales. In reality, the US can sell a technological product while maintaining control of related technological processes. Arms transfers can enhance supporting technologies by preserving the DTIB through ongoing and continuous production. It suggests the US government, especially the Department of State and Department of Defense, review, streamline and liberalize arms transfer procedures. In conclusion, this paper recommends the US government support industry by becoming actively involved in the arms transfer process. Offsets and coproduction agreements must be understood by US officials in negotiations with foreign nations. By allowing the transfer of US military weapon systems in their export version, the DTIB can be maintained without any loss in technological superiority. This study shows the US government can maintain the DTIB by actively and aggressively supporting industry in the arms transfer process.