Aristotle On Perceiving Objects
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| Author | : Anna Marmodoro |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 305 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0199326002 |
"Marmodoro's monograph engages with Aristotle's views on a philosophically challenging question regarding perception, which has been central in the history of philosophy and is very much the focus of current debates in a number of philosophical and psychological disciplines: How do we become perceptually aware of objects in the world? Despite the significance of the question, the ways in which ancient philosophers have addressed it have only just begun to be be explored. There is a great wealth of insight on this question to be found in Aristotle, regarding our ability to perceive items in our environment, which he develops through his very demanding metaphysics, and Marmodo explores these insights in depth here. Aristotle's attempts at accounting for our awareness of complex perceptual content were highly original, drawing on and building on the metaphysics he has developed elsewhere in his works, but have not been adequately explored to date"--
| Author | : Mark Eli Kalderon |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 233 |
| Release | : 2015-01-29 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191027731 |
Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study in the philosophy of perception written in the medium of historiography. He considers the phenomenology and metaphysics of sensory presentation through the examination of an ancient aporia. Specifically, he argues that a puzzle about perception at a distance is behind Empedocles' theory of vision. Empedocles conceives of perception as a mode of material assimilation, but this raises a puzzle about color vision, since color vision seems to present colors that inhere in distant objects. But if the colors inhere in distant objects how can they be taken in by the organ of sight and so be palpable to sense? Aristotle purports to resolve this puzzle in his definition of perception as the assimilation of sensible form without the matter of the perceived particular. Aristotle explicitly criticizes Empedocles, though he is keen to retain the idea that perception is a mode of assimilation, if not a material mode. Aristotle's notorious definition has long puzzled commentators. Kalderon shows how, read in light of Empedoclean puzzlement about the sensory presentation of remote objects, Aristotle's definition of perception can be better understood. Moreover, when so read, the resulting conception of perception is both attractive and defensible.
| Author | : Anna Marmodoro |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 305 |
| Release | : 2014-07-02 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0199326010 |
How can we explain the structure of perceptual experience? What is it that we perceive? How is it that we perceive objects and not disjoint arrays of properties? By which sense or senses do we perceive objects? Are our five senses sufficient for the perception of objects? Aristotle investigated these questions by means of the metaphysical modeling of the unity of the perceptual faculty and the unity of experiential content. His account remains fruitful-but also challenging-even for contemporary philosophy. This book offers a reconstruction of the six metaphysical models Aristotle offered to address these and related questions, focusing on their metaphysical underpinning in his theory of causal powers. By doing so, the book brings out what is especially valuable and even surprising about the topic: the core principles of Aristotle's metaphysics of perception are fundamentally different from those of his metaphysics of substance. Yet, for precisely this reason, his models of perceptual content are unexplored territory. This book breaks new ground in offering an understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics of the content of perceptual experience and of the composition of the perceptual faculty.
| Author | : Stephen Everson |
| Publisher | : Clarendon Press |
| Total Pages | : 320 |
| Release | : 1997-02-13 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191519057 |
Stephen Everson presents a comprehensive new study of Aristotle's account of perception and related mental capacities. Recent debate about Aristotle's theory of mind has focused on this account, which is Aristotle's most sustained and detailed attempt to describe and explain the behaviour of living things. Everson places it in the context of Aristotle's natural science as a whole, showing how he applies the explanatory tools developed in other works to the study of perceptual cognition. Everson demonstrates that, contrary to the claims of many recent scholars, Aristotle is indeed concerned to explain perceptual activity as the activity of a living body, in terms of material changes in the organs which possess the various perceptual capacities. By emphasizing the unified nature of the perceptual system, Everson is able to explain how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive not only such things as colours and sounds but material objects in our environment. This rich and broad-ranging book will be essential reading not only for students of Aristotle's theory of mind but for all those concerned to understand the explanatory principles of his natural science. 'No part of Aristotle's psychological theory has been of greater interest to scholars over the past few years than his account of perception. . . . this excellent book . . . will appeal to Aristotelian scholars and philosophers of mind alike . . . Everson manifests a thorough understanding of much of the literature on Aristotle's psychological theory and displays a talent for offering sophisticated arguments that are informed by the conceptual possibilities demarcated in both ancient and modern philosophy . . . Everson has presented a rich and insightful critique of a thesis which has had significant impact upon contemporary discussions of Aristotle's psychological theory. Further, in offering ths critique, he has avoided many of the snares and entanglements to which others have fallen prey.' John E. Sisko, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
| Author | : Pavel Gregoric |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 267 |
| Release | : 2007-06-14 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0199277370 |
Gregoric investigates the Aristolian concept of the common sense, which was introduced to explain complex perceptual operations that can't be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, or knowing that one's senses are inactive.
| Author | : Anthony J. Lisska |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 372 |
| Release | : 2016-06-03 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191083666 |
Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy of mind, with special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. Dorothea Frede suggests that this faculty is an 'embarrassment' for Aquinas; to the contrary, the analysis offered in this book argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas's philosophy of mind would be an embarrassment. By means of this faculty of inner sense, Aquinas offers an account of a direct awareness of individuals of natural kinds—referred to by Aquinas as incidental objects of sense—which comprise the principal ontological categories in Aquinas's metaphysics. By using this awareness of individuals of a natural kind, Aquinas can make better sense out of the process of abstraction using the active intellect (intellectus agens). Were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics.
| Author | : Erick Raphael Jiménez |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 275 |
| Release | : 2017-07-06 |
| Genre | : Body, Mind & Spirit |
| ISBN | : 1107194180 |
A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible.
| Author | : Pavel Gregoric |
| Publisher | : Clarendon Press |
| Total Pages | : 268 |
| Release | : 2007-06-14 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191608491 |
Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's senses are active. Observing that lower animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the 'common sense' or sensus communis. Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. Pavel Gregoric offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. Aristotle on the Common Sense begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, Gregoric provides a detailed examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.
| Author | : Thomas Kjeller Johansen |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 313 |
| Release | : 2012-10-18 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191633011 |
Aristotle is considered by many to be the founder of 'faculty psychology'—the attempt to explain a variety of psychological phenomena by reference to a few inborn capacities. In The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, Thomas Kjeller Johansen investigates his main work on psychology, the De Anima, from this perspective. He shows how Aristotle conceives of the soul's capacities and how he uses them to account for the souls of living beings. Johansen offers an original account of how Aristotle defines the capacities in relation to their activities and proper objects, and considers the relationship of the body to the definition of the soul's capacities. Against the background of Aristotle's theory of science, Johansen argues that the capacities of the soul serve as causal principles in the explanation of the various life forms. He develops detailed readings of Aristotle's treatment of nutrition, perception, and intellect, which show the soul's various roles as formal, final and efficient causes, and argues that the so-called 'agent' intellect falls outside the scope of Aristotle's natural scientific approach to the soul. Other psychological activities, various kinds of perception (including 'perceiving that we perceive'), memory, imagination, are accounted for in their explanatory dependency on the basic capacities. The ability to move spatially is similarly explained as derivative from the perceptual or intellectual capacities. Johansen claims that these capacities together with the nutritive may be understood as 'parts' of the soul, as they are basic to the definition and explanation of the various kinds of soul. Finally, he considers how the account of the capacities in the De Anima is adopted and adapted in Aristotle's biological and minor psychological works.
| Author | : Christopher P. Long |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 293 |
| Release | : 2010-11-22 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1139492098 |
This book reconsiders the traditional correspondence theory of truth, which takes truth to be a matter of correctly representing objects. Drawing Heideggerian phenomenology into dialogue with American pragmatic naturalism, Christopher P. Long undertakes a rigorous reading of Aristotle that articulates the meaning of truth as a co-operative activity between human beings and the natural world that is rooted in our endeavours to do justice to the nature of things. By following a path of Aristotle's thinking that leads from our rudimentary encounters with things in perceiving through human communication to thinking, this book traces an itinerary that uncovers the nature of truth as ecological justice, and it finds the nature of justice in our attempts to articulate the truth of things.
