An Endogenous Theory Of Property Rights
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Author | : Peter Ho |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 324 |
Release | : 2018-10-15 |
Genre | : Social Science |
ISBN | : 1351623486 |
From a neo-liberal, neo-classical paradigm, secure, formal and private property rights are crucial to fostering sustained development. Institutions that fail to respond to shifting socio-economic opportunities are thus forced to make new arrangements. The enigma is posed by developments on the ground. Why would the removal of authoritarian institutions during the Arab Spring or Iraq War not increase market efficiency but rather cause the reverse, while China and India, despite persisting insecure, informal and common institutions, featured sustained growth? This collection posits that understanding these paradoxes requires a refocusing from form to function, detached from normative assumptions about institutional appearance. In so doing, three things are accomplished. First, starting from case studies on land, it is ascertained that the argument can be meaningfully extended to labour, capital and beyond. Second, the argument validates the ‘Credibility Thesis’ – that is, once institutions persist, they fulfil a function. Third, the collection studies ‘development, broadly construed’, by including the modes of production and beyond, the rural and urban, the developed and developing. This is why it reviews property rights from China and India, to Turkey, Mexico and Malaysia, covering issues such as customary rights and privatization, mining and pastoralism, dam-building and irrigation, but also state-owned banks, trade unions and notaries. This book was originally published as a special issue of The Journal of Peasant Studies.
Author | : Aaron Tornell |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 45 |
Release | : 2002 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
This paper introduces endogenous property rights into a neoclassical growth model. 1t identifies a mechanism that generates growth rates which are increasing at low levels of capital. and decreasing at high levels of capital. The driving force behind changes in property rights is the attempt of each rent-seeking group to secure exclusive access to a greater share of capital by excluding others. We characterize an equilibrium in which there is a shift from common to private property, followed by a switch back to common property.
Author | : Daniel Diermeier |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : Economics |
ISBN | : |
It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One are formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution which is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where agents without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal blocking power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. Yet, such incentives can be undermined by adding formal constraints. The flip-side of this effect is that individual investment efforts might require coordination. The model also predicts that the distribution of wealth in societies with weaker formal institutions (smaller supermajority requirements) among players without veto power will tend to be more homogenous.
Author | : David De Meza |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 31 |
Release | : 1998 |
Genre | : Business enterprises |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Eirik Grundtvig Furubotn |
Publisher | : Cambridge, Mass. : Ballinger Publishing Company |
Total Pages | : 408 |
Release | : 1974 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Daniel Leonard |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2012 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
The purpose of this article is to present a model of the endogenous evolution of a society's property rights regime. We use an overlapping-generations framework in which capital accumulation takes place. Property rights enforcement is costly. Individuals decide collectively in each period the appropriate level of enforcement and pay taxes to finance it. Poor households have less interest in the enforcement of property rights than rich households. We also consider heterogenous households with different tastes. They differ on their choice of law enforcement. As their wealth and numbers evolve, political power may change sides, hence the property rights regime also evolves.
Author | : Bernhard Heitger |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 2003 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Mathias Erlei |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2014 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
In a hold-up experiment designed to test theoretical predictions following from Hart and deMeza and Lockwood regarding investment behavior, Sonnemans, Oosterbeek and Sloof (SOS) find only a partial confirmation of theory. According to SOS these deviations from standard theory can be explained by positive reciprocal behavior. In this paper, we replicate the experiment by SOS and add another group of treatments in which asset ownership is endogenized by auctioning off the assets. Our experiment shows that the results by SOS crucially depend on the ownership structure being exogenously assigned by the experimenter. We present experimental evidence that, by and large, corroborates the theoretical predictions made by Hart.
Author | : David De Meza |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 35 |
Release | : 1998 |
Genre | : Business enterprises |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Terry L. Anderson |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 412 |
Release | : 2003 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 9780691099989 |
In the end, the book provides a fresh, comprehensive overview of an intriguing subject, accessible to anyone with a minimal background in economics. (An introductory chapter introduces the handful of assumptions embedded in the text's economics and law).