An Analysis of the Effect of the U. S. Marine Corps' Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions

An Analysis of the Effect of the U. S. Marine Corps' Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions
Author: Robert W. Barry, Jr.
Publisher:
Total Pages: 126
Release: 2001-12-01
Genre:
ISBN: 9781423523772

This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment
Author: Beth J. Asch
Publisher: RAND Corporation
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2010
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780833049667

"This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.

An Analysis of the Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U. S. Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program

An Analysis of the Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U. S. Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program
Author: David L. Ross
Publisher:
Total Pages: 93
Release: 2000-03-01
Genre:
ISBN: 9781423538820

This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.

An Analysis of the Retention Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U.S. Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program

An Analysis of the Retention Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U.S. Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program
Author: David L. Ross
Publisher:
Total Pages: 82
Release: 2000
Genre:
ISBN:

This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.