This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1893 edition. Excerpt: ...duties consisted in soliciting passenger trafiic in that city and county-over the road he represented. He did not sell tickets for his company; neither did he receive nor pay out money on ac count of it. His sole offence consisted in soliciting passengers to go over his company's road, without having paid the licensetax imposed upon him by said order as a condition precedent to his right to act as such agent in said county. The court held that the license-fee as to such agency was a tax upon interstate commerce, and in that respect was unconstitutional. The court, speaking of the agency and tax, said: "The object and effect of his soliciting agency were to swell the volume of the business of the road. It was one of the means by which the company sought to increase, and doubtless did increase, its interstate passenger traffic. It was not incidentally or remotely connected with the business of the road, but was a direct method of increasing that business. The tax upon it, therefore, was, according to the principles established by the decisions of this court, a tax upon a means or an occupation of-carrying on interstate commerce, pure and simple." In this case the contract between the corporation and _Iulian, and the bond sued on, were executed in this state, and were business transacted in Arkansas. But no sales or indebtedness were created by them. The contract was only an agreement to sell, and the bond was a condition upon which the corporation agreed to sell, and a means adopted to secure the indebtedness to be contracted by sales, and both constituted a contract. They were imade a foundation of a future trade between a corporation of one state and a citizen of another, and were a direct method devised to increase the...