Alternative National Military Strategies For The United States
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Author | : Conrad C. Crane |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 32 |
Release | : 2000 |
Genre | : National security |
ISBN | : |
Summarizes presentations given at a conference convened by the U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies.
Author | : Antulio J. Echevarria II |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 68 |
Release | : 2016-04-04 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781693080074 |
So-called gray zone wars are not new, but they have highlighted shortcomings in the way the West thinks about war and strategy. This monograph proposes an alternative to the U.S. military's current campaign-planning framework, one oriented on achieving positional advantages over rival powers and built around the use of a coercion-deterrence dynamic germane to almost all wars as well as to conflicts short of war.
Author | : Barry R. Posen |
Publisher | : Cornell University Press |
Total Pages | : 190 |
Release | : 2014-06-03 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0801470862 |
The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America’s consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength. After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.
Author | : Dennis M. Drew |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2002-04 |
Genre | : National security |
ISBN | : 9780898758870 |
National secuirty strategy is a vast subject involving a daunting array of interrelated subelements woven in intricate, sometimes vague, and ever-changing patterns. Its processes are often irregular and confusing and are always based on difficult decisions laden with serious risks. In short, it is a subject understood by few and confusing to most. It is, at the same time, a subject of overwhelming importance to the fate of the United States and civilization itself. Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow have done a considerable service by drawing together many of the diverse threads of national security strategy into a coherent whole. They consider political and military strategy elements as part of a larger decisionmaking process influenced by economic, technological, cultural, and historical factors. I know of no other recent volume that addresses the entire national security milieu in such a logical manner and yet also manages to address current concerns so thoroughly. It is equally remarkable that they have addressed so many contentious problems in such an evenhanded manner. Although the title suggests that this is an introductory volume - and it is - I am convinced that experienced practitioners in the field of national security strategy would benefit greatly from a close examination of this excellent book. Sidney J. Wise Colonel, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education
Author | : Dr. Jeffrey Record |
Publisher | : Pickle Partners Publishing |
Total Pages | : 105 |
Release | : 2015-11-06 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1786252961 |
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Author | : Michael J. Mazarr |
Publisher | : Lulu.com |
Total Pages | : 154 |
Release | : 2015 |
Genre | : Reference |
ISBN | : 9781329784611 |
"Discussions of an emerging practice of 'gray zone' conflict have become increasingly common throughout the U.S. Army and the wider national security community, but the concept remains ill-defined and poorly understood. This monograph aims to contribute to the emerging dialogue about competition and rivalry in the gray zone by defining the term, comparing and contrasting it with related theories, and offering tentative hypotheses about this increasingly important form of state competition. The idea of operating gradually and somewhat covertly to remain below key thresholds of response is hardly new. Many approaches being used today -- such as support for proxy forces and insurgent militias -- have been employed for millennia. The monograph argues that the emergence of this more coherent and intentional form of gray zone conflict is best understood as the confluence of three factors. Understood in this context, gray zone strategies can be defined as a form of conflict that pursues political objectives through integrated campaigns; employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools; strives to remain under key escalatory or red line thresholds to avoid outright conventional conflict; and moves gradually toward its objectives rather than seeking conclusive results in a relatively limited period of time. Having examined the scope and character of gray zone conflict, the monograph offers seven hypotheses about this emerging form of rivalry. Finally, the monograph offers recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies to deal with this challenge"--Publisher's web site.
Author | : Steven Metz |
Publisher | : DIANE Publishing |
Total Pages | : 135 |
Release | : 2022 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 1428911588 |
Author | : Melanie W. Sisson |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 218 |
Release | : 2020-04-23 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1000056872 |
This book examines the use of military force as a coercive tool by the United States, using lessons drawn from the post-Cold War era (1991–2018). The volume reveals that despite its status as sole superpower during the post-Cold War period, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded. In the coming decades, the United States will face states that are more capable and creative, willing to challenge its interests and able to take advantage of missteps and vulnerabilities. By using lessons derived from in-depth case studies and statistical analysis of an original dataset of more than 100 coercive incidents in the post-Cold War era, this book generates insight into how the US military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the US armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of US power to create effective coercive strategies. This book will be of interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, strategic studies and International Relations in general.
Author | : Edward J. Drea |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 186 |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : Cold War |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Keith A. Dunn |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 360 |
Release | : 2019-03-04 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0429717784 |
In this volume, prominent civilian and military experts in defense, representing the maritime-continental coalition, military reform, and noninterventionist schools of thought, outline the changes in military strategy, policy, and force structure that they believe the United States must adopt if it is to cope successfully with threats to national security in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors analyze US interests and objectives, the changing strategic environment, and the major security threats facing the United States in the coming decades. They also discuss what they believe is the proper mix of political, economic, and military instruments for dealing with fixture threats. The alternative strategies they present are wide-ranging and comprehensive, running the gamut from a strategic withdrawal from global commitments to proposals for increasing US power projection and forcible entry capabilities in the Third World. In many ways the chapters are critical of current and past approaches to military strategy. The authors believe it is essential that strategists understand the existing critiques of current U.S. military strategy in order to make the correct policy decisions for the future.