Culture, Agency Costs, and Governance

Culture, Agency Costs, and Governance
Author: Michael McDonald
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2017
Genre:
ISBN:

We examine the impact of two defining social characteristics (individualism and risk aversion) and their interaction with governance and firm agency problems on capital structure in the G20 countries. With a sample of roughly 13,000 firms from 1995 to 2009, we show that higher levels of individualism are associated with increased firm use of debt and lower cost of capital, whereas higher risk aversion has the opposite effects. All else equal, better firm-level governance substantially reduces these cultural effects, as does larger firm size, and less research-intensity at the firm. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a propensity score matching procedure and show that our results continue to hold. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of culture, firm-level governance and agency costs, debt cost of capital, bankruptcy risk, identification concerns, and other country level effects.

Managerial Discretion, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure

Managerial Discretion, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure
Author: Paul D. Childs
Publisher:
Total Pages: 52
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

In a dynamic continuous-time model, we examine the impact of a manager-shareholder conflict over the choice of investment risk on firm value and optimal capital structure. The manager's optimal investment risk policy is substantially different from the policy that maximizes equity or total firm value. The resulting agency costs of equity are many times larger than the agency costs of debt. Among a number of important implications, we find that managerial risk-aversion decreases the agency costs of equity. We also find that when equityholders have control rights over financing decisions, optimal leverage may increase relative to optimal leverage when investment risk is chosen to maximize total firm value. Additionally, greater managerial equity compensation may exacerbate the manager-stockholder conflict over investment policy, and in spite of higher agency costs of equity, may increase optimal leverage. Finally, we find that an increase in risk encourages the manager to pursue a more conservative investment strategy, which increases the agency costs of equity. Managerial risk-aversion, however, acts to mitigate this effect of risk on the agency costs of equity.

Agency Costs, Asset Specificity, and the Capital Structure of the Firm

Agency Costs, Asset Specificity, and the Capital Structure of the Firm
Author: Jon Vilasuso
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2001
Genre:
ISBN:

We develop a dynamic model that incorporates the insights of both the agency cost and asset specificity literature aboutcorporate finance. In general, we find that neither can be ignored, and that the optimal capital structure minimizes agency cost and asset specificity considerations. A key finding is that the conditions most favorable for reducing transaction costs due to asset specificity are the same as those for reducing the agency costs of debt. Empirically, we find that agency costs and asset specificity are significant determinants of a firm's capital structure in the transportation equipment and the printing and publishing industries.

A Stakeholder Rationale for Risk Management

A Stakeholder Rationale for Risk Management
Author: Gregor Gossy
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 219
Release: 2008-09-08
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3834997587

Gregor Gossy develops a stakeholder rationale for risk management arguing that firms which are more dependent on implicit claims from their non-financial stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, and employees, prefer conservative financial policies.

Do Agency Costs Matter for Optimal Capital Structure?

Do Agency Costs Matter for Optimal Capital Structure?
Author: Anjan V. Thakor
Publisher:
Total Pages: 46
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

I show that agency costs are irrelevant in determining optimal capital structure, in the sense that variations in capital structure induced by agency costs have no impact on firm value, if all agents have common and rational prior beliefs about future states of the world, project-choice control can be costlessly allocated to any party in each state, and there are no taxes. This conclusion is robust to assuming that only the manager can have project-choice control or that the only outsiders with project-choice control are the bondholders or that states are unobservable to any party that does not have project choice control. However, when the common-prior-beliefs assumption is dropped and the model is extended to allow equally-informed agents to disagree over firm value, a link emerges between capital structure and firm value even if allocating state-contingent project-choice control to any party is costless.

Agency Costs of Corporate Risk Management

Agency Costs of Corporate Risk Management
Author: Peter Tufano
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 1998
Genre:
ISBN:

This paper discusses a potential cost to corporate risk management strategies that are based on cash-flow hedging. Cash-flow hedging strategies allow firms to avoid the deadweight costs of external financing by setting their internal cash flows equal their investment needs. In the presence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, these hedging strategies can be used to reduce shareholder wealth, insofar as they remove the valuable discipline that obtaining new external financing imposes on managers.

The Agency Cost of Alternative Debt Instruments (Classic Reprint)

The Agency Cost of Alternative Debt Instruments (Classic Reprint)
Author: Antonio Mello
Publisher: Forgotten Books
Total Pages: 40
Release: 2018-02-25
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780666358035

Excerpt from The Agency Cost of Alternative Debt Instruments It is now commonly recognized that a firm's capital structure can affect its value through the incentives that are created for the equity holders in favor of one or another investment and operating policy. A place has therefore been created for a positive theory of capital structure. Missing, however, from the literature on agency costs in finance have been models that enable us to measure the effects of capital structure on the value of the firm's assets. In this paper we show how contingent claims models can be used to measure and compare the agency costs of different forms of debt-fixed rate and indexed. The model can be used to determine the optimal indexing structure and the optimal parameters of the debt contract. The case of index linked debt that we study in this paper is a commodity bond. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

The Control of Corporate Europe

The Control of Corporate Europe
Author: Fabrizio Barca
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Total Pages: 354
Release: 2001-11-15
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0191530050

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.