Accounting Conservatism And Board Monitoring
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| Author | : Yanmin Gao |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 47 |
| Release | : 2016 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper provides a theoretical foundation for findings in empirical studies that document a positive association between conservatism and strong corporate governance through the board's monitoring efficiency. We construct a model with a board that decides whether to replace the incumbent manager based on accounting information and the outcome of its monitoring strategy, which also depends on the accounting information. If accounting is used only for the replacement decision, conservatism is harmful. However, conservatism is beneficial if accounting is relevant to the monitoring decision because it enhances the net benefit of monitoring. The net benefit of conservatism increases if the board becomes more efficient in monitoring. We also discuss earnings management and specific empirical implications.
| Author | : Feng Chen |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 63 |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
While prior research holds the consensus that accounting conservatism can serve as an effective monitoring device, it is not clear whether shareholders can successfully enforce managers' adherence to accounting conservatism when directors fail to fulfill their fiduciary duties. We attempt to answer the question by exploiting staggered enactments of the universal demand (UD) laws in 23 U.S. states. UD laws raise procedural hurdles for shareholders to file derivative lawsuits against managers and directors who allegedly breach their fiduciary duties. For firms incorporated in states that adopt UD laws, restrictions on shareholder litigation rights shift power to managers, thereby weakening directors' incentives to monitor managers. We predict and find a decrease in conditional conservatism following the enactment of UD laws. The main result is attributable to both the direct channel (through restriction of shareholder litigation rights) and the indirect channel (through the deployment of management-friendly governance provisions). The decline in conditional conservatism exists only for firms with low institutional ownership, low external equity dependence, or high ex-ante derivative lawsuit risk. Our findings suggest that shareholders cannot successfully demand accounting conservatism when managers possess extensive power and directors lack the incentives to monitor managers.
| Author | : Vieira, Elisabete S. |
| Publisher | : IGI Global |
| Total Pages | : 433 |
| Release | : 2021-02-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1799875989 |
New trends are emerging regarding earnings management and corporate governance showing similarities and striking differences in the practices of different countries and economies. These new trends currently shape the field of modern corporate governance with crucial issues being looked at in governance law and practices, accounting systems, earnings quality and management, stakeholder involvement, and more. In order to advance these new avenues in corporate governance, research looks at accounting policies firms use in different opportunistic circumstances in order to manage earnings, the corporate governance practices in different countries, firm performance, and other dimensions of companies. The understanding of these topics is beneficial in understanding the current state of different types of firms and their practices in modern times. Comparative Research on Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, and Economic Value is focused on the investigation of key challenges and perspectives of corporate governance and earnings management and outlines possible scenarios of its development. The chapters explore this new avenue of research and cover theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies related to different themes in the global context of earnings management and corporate governance. This book is ideal for economists, businesses, managers, accountants, practitioners, stakeholders, researchers, academicians, and students who are interested in the current issues and advancements in corporate governance and earnings management.
| Author | : Salami Suleiman |
| Publisher | : LAP Lambert Academic Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 136 |
| Release | : 2015-07-27 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9783659759857 |
Controversy persists on the role of accounting conservatism in financial reporting. The separation of ownership from management and the presence of creditors result in information asymmetry among stakeholders to a firm which conservative reporting. This has been a tool for disciplining governance in corporate entities. Accounting Conservatism therefore puts an end to Collapse of Multinational Firms through sound corporate governance.
| Author | : Juan M. García Lara |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 40 |
| Release | : 2007 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Using a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997-2002 we find that firms where the CEO has low influence over the functioning of the board of directors show a greater degree of accounting conservatism. We measure the influence of the CEO over the board of directors using two aggregate indexes combining 6 (8) characteristics of the functioning of the board of directors and its monitoring committees: board size, proportion of non-executive directors, proportion of independent directors, whether the chairman of the board is an executive director, the number of board meetings, and the existence of an audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee and an executive committee. We define conservatism as the asymmetric recognition speed of good and bad news in earnings, and we measure it following Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Our results are robust to alternative specifications and specific controls for investment opportunities and for the endogenous nature of corporate governance and earnings quality. Overall, our evidence shows that firms with strong boards use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool, even in an institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain.
| Author | : Judson Caskey |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We develop a model to analyze how board governance affects firms' financial reporting choices, and managers' incentives to manipulate accounting reports. In our setting, ceteris paribus, conservative accounting is desirable because it allows the board of directors to better oversee the firm's investment decisions. This feature of conservatism, however, causes the manager to manipulate the accounting system to mislead the board and distort its decisions. Effective reporting oversight curtails managers' ability to manipulate, which increases the benefits of conservative accounting and simultaneously reduces its costs. Our model predicts that stronger reporting oversight leads to greater accounting conservatism, manipulation, and investment efficiency.
| Author | : Ross L. Watts |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 388 |
| Release | : 2004 |
| Genre | : Accounting |
| ISBN | : 9789867491138 |
| Author | : Farzaneh Nassir Zadeh |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2022 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Purpose -- The study on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality is not new. However, the results are inconsistent and mixed, and to some degree, even contradictory, which represents a gap in the literature. The purpose of this study is to provide some explanations for these mixed results in the literature by investigating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, as a moderator variable (which has not been considered in the literature before), on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality based on the Dechow and Dichev model and the modified Jones model. Design/methodology/approach --The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; furthermore, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses is panel data. Findings --The findings reveal that the adopted models Dechow and Dichev) and the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence, large shareholders, and institutional ownership) can have a moderating effect on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality. These findings are exciting, contribute to the current literature, and explain some of the reasons for mixed results. Practical implications -- The findings of the current study provide an important guideline for firms to consider the impact of adopted models (Dechow and Dichev), as well as the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence, large shareholders, and institutional ownership) on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality. Originality/value -- Examining the impact of Dechow and Dichev models as well as the corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality is new in this paper. It can explain part of the reasons for the mixed and inconsistent results in the literature.
| Author | : Carlo D’Augusta |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 89 |
| Release | : |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 3031671457 |
| Author | : James Harris Bliss |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 880 |
| Release | : 1924 |
| Genre | : Accounting |
| ISBN | : |
