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| Author | : Tim Roughgarden |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 705 |
| Release | : 2021-01-14 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 1108494315 |
Introduces exciting new methods for assessing algorithms for problems ranging from clustering to linear programming to neural networks.
| Author | : Dirk Bergemann |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 471 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9814374598 |
Robust Mechanism Design: the Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs.
| Author | : Dirk Bergemann |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 471 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 981437458X |
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
| Author | : Martin Bichler |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 298 |
| Release | : 2017-12-21 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 1316805352 |
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
| Author | : Tilman Borgers |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 263 |
| Release | : 2015-05-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0190244682 |
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
| Author | : Zongwei Luo |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 320 |
| Release | : 2013-03-12 |
| Genre | : Science |
| ISBN | : 9400759959 |
This book provides advanced analytics and decision management techniques and tools for developing sustainable competitive advantages in the studied target context. In order to achieve sustainable economy, “the capacity to endure,” it is essential to understand and study the mechanisms for interactions and impact from and among these perspectives.
| Author | : Y Narahari |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 533 |
| Release | : 2014-03-13 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 9814525065 |
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
| Author | : Tim Roughgarden |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 356 |
| Release | : 2016-08-30 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 1316781178 |
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
